











  JUSTICE, RIGHTS, AND JURAL RELATIONS 











  By 
 


















  Justice, Rights, and Jural Relations 
 
   PREFACE  
This book is a philosophical investigation into the background of Justice, the Law, and the 
ever increasing application of so called “rights”.  It is my contention that failure to understand 
the  underlying  philosophies  involved  has  led  to  confusion.    In  order  to  understand  and 
separate  the  blurred  lines  even  between  law  and  justice  we  have  to  appreciate  that  the 
philosophical inputs are quite different. The diagram Fig 1 in chapter 2 sets it out pictorially. 
Here the reader will see that the type of State we have, which creates our legal system, stems 
from the relevant political philosophy. However the system of Jurisprudence is governed by 
the relevant Philosophy of law.  Justice again  is quite different in that it is based on the 
Philosophy of Morals and Ethics. 
    In  order  properly  to  understand  the  concept  of  RIGHTS,  around  which 
modern Western civilization is beginning to revolve, it is necessary to understand fully the 
concepts both of JUSTICE (Morals & Ethics) and of JURAL RELATIONS (a relationship 
brought about by the activation of the law).  A right, or what most people conceive of as a 
right, is something which should be enforceable  against others or even against the whole of 
society.  It is its enforceability which makes it a right.  If we aren‟t entitled to try to enforce it 
by law, it isn‟t a right. 
    Moreover to be a fully blown right there has to be someone against whom it 
should be enforceable.  For example I have a right to the £100 which Jones owes me but 
regrettably I have no right to nice weather.  Now the relationship with the other party or body 
(for I can have rights against a company or the State) is the Jural Relationship.  And these, 
as we shall see, depend for their creation on the activation of a Law.  Rights have to a) have a 
philosophical justification and then b) be created in law in order to become enforceable. They 
do not just appear or hang about like the Cheshire cat in Alice in Wonderland irrespective of 
either their morality or enforceability.   
    But what then gives rise to the claim that something should be a right?  Some 
philosophers  have  tried  to  base  the  validity  of  claims  to  certain  rights  and  the  laws 
establishing them upon the idea that there is a body of „natural‟ law.  This has led to endless 
disputes with Legal Positivists who in effect maintain,  that the only Law is that created by 
the  relevant  law  making  authority.    These  problems  have  not  until  now  been  resolved.  
However  I  have  taken  an  entirely  different  approach  which  I  believe  can  lead  to  a 
rapprochement (see Chapter 5).   3 
 
    I maintain that the claim that something should be a right is in fact founded on 
a moral claim for Justice.  Thus until the triple relationship, (i.e. the connection between 
rights, justice, and jural relations)  is properly understood it is not possible to form really 
rational  judgements  concerning  the  subject.    Unfortunately  the  growth  of  the  „Rights 
Industry‟ has been swept along on a tide of emotionalism rather than logic.  Rights have been 
declared in esoteric generalizations such as a right to Freedom of Speech, a Right to Life, etc. 
and anyone who breaches these risks being branded as being in breach of Human Rights and 
possibly even an International Criminal.  
     In fact it is the generalization of these so called rights, which is extremely 
popular amongst libertarians, politicians and worst of all lawyers, who at least ought to know 
better, that leads to terrible confusions and inconsistencies, most of which result from a lack 
of understanding of the whole philosophical basis and logical arguments upon which claims 
may legitimately be founded.  At the moment the tide of emotionalism sweeps logic into the 
gutter.  What is forgotten is that every right involves a corresponding restraint.  Even the 
most basic right, my right to be sitting where I am, is only available by virtue of denying the 
same right not only to every other human being but to all other forms of life, both animate (I 
cannot share this space with a tiger) and inanimate (nor can I share it with a pile of bricks).  
Thus to the extent that I exercise any right of mine, so I affect others.  As to whether the 
effect is just or unjust is of correlative consequence.  
    The case against the over simplification of rights is that it results in confusion, 
over complication, and an exponential increase in litigation. For example, the most generally 
cited „Right‟ is of the simply stated „Right to Freedom of Speech‟.  Does this include the right 
to enter an overcrowded building and shout “Fire”?   If not, then we have to say  “Yes there is 
a right to freedom of speech but it doesn‟t include the right to shout „Fire‟....or to make public 
State secrets in wartime...or to give away your company‟s commercial secrets....or to give 
away secrets you have promised to keep etc., etc.”. - though the last case illustrates the legal 
maze one gets into when “Freedom of Speech” plus “The public‟s right to know” (another 
generalised right) are used to try to overrule a  clearly undertaken and ostensibly  binding 
contract.  In this way the rule of law can be, and is being, totally sabotaged leaving us in a 
morass of uncertainty and litigation.  Even the results of this litigation will only stand until 
the next so called right is brought in to undermine it.  
    It is absolutely vital, if one wants to talk about „rights‟ with any authority, to 
understand just what a “right” is.  Of course we say the French and the Germans are lucky, 
they have two words for „right‟.  What we should be saying is, how fortunate we are, for in 4 
 
fact in English there are six words covering the concept, but as usual we are too lazy to use 
them.  Now the six fold classification was actually first set out years ago by Professor Wesley 
Newcomb  Hohfeld,  a  Professor  of  both  Yale  and  Stanford  Universities  and  a  generally 
acknowledged genius.  Unfortunately, as is sometimes the case with geniuses, there was a 
drawback.  Besides being a genius he was reputed to have complete contempt for those who 
didn‟t immediately understand him, plus a short fuse, which no doubt made asking questions 
hazardous.  On top of that, he  had a penchant for  illustrating  his points  by reference to 
exceedingly complicated cases in the field of the law of Trusts (which field of itself along 
with Tax Law and Patent Law leaves even above average students reaching for a cold towel 
to wrap round their heads).  No wonder then that his work, published under the thrilling title 
of  “Fundamental  Legal  Conceptions  as  applied  in  Judicial  reasoning”  although 
deferentially treated, was not altogether avidly followed in the mass market.  Nevertheless, 
we must gird up our loins and take a fresh look at what he told us (albeit minus the trust 
cases) because what he had to say is of extreme importance to our understanding. 
    It is also essential that we understand where and how these rights originate.  
How do they arise?  And what are their effects?  Well in the first instance they do not arise 
from the Law - this is just the means of putting them into effect.  They arise from Society‟s 
idea of what is just or fair.  But this faces us with another problem.  That which is the law, is 
fixed until altered by Parliament, but that which we consider fair changes.  In the first place it 
can differ widely between different societies, and worse still if we look back we can see that 
it  changes  within  the  same  society  at  different  times.    For  example  in  some  States  it  is 
considered just that a man may have more than one wife, in our society it is deemed criminal.  
In Rome, and even  in England  at one time, slavery was considered quite  just, now  it  is 
definitely not.  It is at this stage that one begins to realize that these all important  rights are 
not quite as simple or necessarily as fundamental as the libertarians would have us believe. 
    To  enforce  a  right  we  have  to  have  a  law,  and  this  imposes  that  strange 
creature  the  „jural  relation‟  upon  us.    Again  the  whole  subject  of  Jural  Relations  was 
brilliantly analysed by another genius, Albert Kocourek.  Unfortunately in the case of this 
genius, while his logic was exemplary and he has no record of being difficult, he was an 
absolute  perfectionist.  He  analysed  every  conceivable  jural  relation  and  in  doing  so 
introduced about seventeen pages of new defining terms.  These include such delights as 
„Allophylaxis‟,  „Biactive  integral  conflict‟,  „Endophylactic  relations,  and  „Heteromeral 
relations‟ all of which no doubt severely restricted his reading public (if  indeed it didn‟t 
paralyse them).  Nevertheless to understand our subject we have, at least, to dip our toe into 5 
 
these waters, though we don‟t have to drown in them. 
    Once we understand the relationship between the law, justice, and rights it is 
possible to clarify our thinking.    
    A confusion stems from the fact that emotionally it has been sought generally 
to treat Freedoms as Rights.  The truth is, as a philosophical analysis shows, Freedom is a 
state.  As a state it does not, and cannot per se, involve a jural relationship, whereas a proper 
right does.  In practice this means that we are asking, both legally and philosophically, the 
wrong questions.  Instead of trying to determine whether such and such a freedom is a right, 
we should be saying  “This (action or state) restricts my freedom - Is such a restriction Just?”   
Then and only then can we get things in their proper perspective.  Moreover any proposed 
new „right‟ should be examined for its effect on other freedoms and the question answered as 
to whether any restrictions thereby caused are themselves just. 
    Unfortunately we cannot just take a light overview of the subject, pointing out 
inconsistencies and errors - the whole field of Rights, and of Justice is far too important for 
they are now coming to govern more and more of our lives.  They affect our laws and the 
input is not necessarily coming from our own courts, but often from politicians (which really 
ought  to  raise  alarm  bells).    It  is  imperative  therefore  that  we  should  have  a  thorough 
understanding of the basis on which they might be founded.  Moreover it is not sufficient for 
lawyers to study the subject.  It is vital that our law makers, and therefore thinking members 
of the public should understand the background to this new emphasis being placed on the 
rules governing the way we live. 
    This places a considerable burden on anyone tackling the subject because the 
concepts  of  Justice  and  of  rights  are  both  products  of  the  fields  of  ethics,  morality  and 
jurisprudence.  I decided therefore that I would take a philosophical approach to the basic 
concepts as this usually gives rise to the clearest understanding.   
    To start with I have recounted briefly some different ways that philosophers 
from Plato to Mill have looked at justice, and then, in chapter 2,  looked at how the concept 
of Justice applies to a modern civilized  society. Next, in  Chapter 3 we tackle the whole 
question as to what the word „Rights‟ means.  This means that we are going to have to realise 
that while we often refer to a thing as a “right”, what we may be talking about may in fact be 
a right or “claim-right” which is the most usual form, or, it may on looking more closely, 
refer to a “privilege”;  or to a “power” to do something;  or the “authority” to do it etc etc.  
Each of these variants in practice have different philosophical bases and legal ramifications. 
It is my hope that after tackling this chapter, the reader will never again just accept bland 6 
 
references to „rights‟ without questioning just what is being referred to.  Chapter 3, I readily 
admit, is not the easiest in the book, but this is simply because we have had to tackle some 
new and unfamiliar definitions.  There is no way round this but the answer I have always 
found is simple.  At first the unfamiliar always seems difficult, but once a thing becomes 
familiar the difficulties minimize.  Therefore I have suggested at the beginning of the chapter 
that one should only try to grasp the most important  concepts, such as the difference between 
a right and a privilege,  at first.  One can always come back to the less familiar ones later.  
After all Stephen Hawking never suggested that A Brief History of Time was going to be 
simple and this is a lot simpler than that. 
    In  chapter  4.  I  apply  our  new  thinking  to  such  contentious  and  difficult 
practical topics as Civil Disobedience; Objections to by-passes; Hunt saboteurs and Animal 
Rights; Conscientious Objection; and the question of a duty to obey the law, in order to show 
how our new understanding may help to resolve some of the issues. 
    In  chapter  5.  I  discuss  problems  which  have  arisen  within  the  law  in  the 
application of general principles, such as rights to freedom, and to particular laws which may 
conflict with these generalised rights.  Again we consider justice or equity as opposed to a 
strict interpretation of the law.  I have not adopted a lawyer‟s approach to the subject but 
again tackled it from a philosophical point of view.  This surprisingly gave rise to a solution 
to an age old problem which has bedevilled philosophy and jurisprudence for years, i.e. how 
to reconcile Legal Positivism* with  Natural Law*
1 theories.  For philosophers it will, I hope, 
prove to be most important.  At this point I try to show how the new theory relates to such 
questions as the treatment of animals. 
    Chapter  6  deals  particularly  with  „Intention‟.      The  reason  for  this  is  that 
intention whilst properly the subject of philosophy of Mind also forms a very important part 
of English  law which refers to it  frequently  and gives us  many  interesting examples.  It 
affects what a person may be guilty of, whether the courts should treat them in one way or 
another, it affects concepts such as recklessness etc., and it relates to justice, and thus affects 
our rights.  Although the chapter refers to a number of cases, is not a statement of what the 
law is.  I have deliberately tried to choose interesting or contentious cases and have set out 
the facts of each case before showing how the Judges tackled the problems (and, as you will 
see, there were some very difficult problems they had to deal with).  I have also tried to show 
that a philosophical approach to Intention is the best, giving us three types of intention, and 
                                                 
1 * These terms are explained more fully in the text 7 
 
that these are paramount and that the law merely provides certain rules as to their application 
in differing circumstances. 
    In chapters 7 & 8 I look at the vexed problem of Punishment, as again this 
relates to both justice and our rights, both as individuals and as members of the public, and 
finally, in chapter 9 I try to draw a few conclusions. 
    In following through the analysis of, and establishing the relationship between, 
Freedom, the State, Law, and Justice it soon became apparent that it was the blurring of the 
philosophical  difference  between  Law  and  Justice  that  has  given  rise  to  many  of  our 
difficulties.  Originally the courts of Justice were entirely separate from the courts of Law.  
Subsequently    the  two  were  merged,  and  justice  lost  its  priority.    Nowadays  it  is  not 
uncommon to hear a judge say  “This  is a Court of Law”.  Sadly this  is what they  have 
become.  Gone are the days when great judges founded principles of justice (which later 
became Rules of Law) such as those in  Riggs v Palmer (a murderer shall not inherit under 
the will of his victim); or Palsgraf v The Long Island Railroad Co.  (The case which first 
established the concept of not being responsible beyond the ambit of foreseeable risk); or the 
Rule in Rylands v Fletcher (Establishing liability for the escape of dangerous things), a rule 
which has stood for over one hundred years.  Perhaps our best chance for the future lies in re-
establishing a separate “Court of Justice”, but such arguments are not the purpose of this 
book. 
    In  the  course  of  my  research  and  in  trying  to  analyse  the  fundamental 
differences between Law and Justice several important by-products came to light.  The first 
of these, namely a possible means of reconciling the dispute which has raged between the 
concept  of  Legal  Positivism  and  Natural  Law  Theories  is  of  fundamental  philosophical 
importance and convinced me that I was pursuing the right line of approach.  Moreover the 
concept introduced there is basic to the question of rights because it provides a logical and 
consistent justification for their establishment as opposed to that of natural rights theorists.   
    Once  the  fundamental  importance  of  Justice  is  appreciated  and  given  its 
correct priority, its interaction with all other civilizing concepts can be analysed.  This is the 
second purpose of this book; to determine the relationship of Justice with concepts such as 
Rights,  Freedom,  Law,  Governance,  Punishment  and  the  State.    That  there  is  an 
interaction with each of these is not easily recognized because of the fact that the concepts of 
State, the Law and Justice are founded on different philosophical approaches. 
    Despite its fundamental importance an analysis of the principles of Justice, 
e.g. fairness, reveals that while those principles  can remain constant, the various  internal 8 
 
concepts, such as what is currently considered to be fair in a particular society at a particular 
time, are concepts that may themselves vary.  They are based on a moral viewpoint and these 
views will vary for different Societies at any one time, and for any one society at different 
times.  The changes are often gradual and in the past have been sufficiently gradual as to give 
the appearance of immutability.  This is a false concept - Justice insofar as that which may be 
considered just, is not an immutable constant.  Again I must emphasize that it is the reflection 
of the moral concept of a particular society at a particular time. 
    It is a further purpose to show that this very variable nature of the concept of 
what is „just‟ is not a weakness but a primary advantage.  It is the moral foundation of justice 
that enables us to tackle the fundamental conflict between Legal Positivism and the Natural 
Law theories.  This is a new approach to the problem and it introduces three new concepts: 
THE PRIME INHERENT LAW; The fact that POWER IS PRIOR TO RIGHTS; and the 
POWER - RESPONSIBILITY factor derivable from justice. 
    Armed  with  these  derived  theories  it  is  possible  to  jettison  the  basically 
detrimental approaches we have been forced to adopt.  The concept of a Rights based society 
goes, to be replaced by the realization that freedom is a non jural state and that the correct 
question to ask is not what RIGHTS to various freedoms do I have?  but rather the much 
more specifically applicable question - Is this restriction on my freedom Just?   Similarly the 
whole emotionally charged and philosophically unstable concept of Rights existing prior to 
Law may be jettisoned. 
    Finally I have shown that my theories apply equally to societies such as ours 
or those with a constitution such as the U.S.A., or those under the code Napoleon.  Moreover 
while at first it appears that there is a direct conflict with Professor Dworkin  (Taking Rights 
Seriously), this conflict can be eliminated and I show that my theory would provide a ground 
from which similar results might result. 
                     D.O.H-N.  
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CHAPTER 1. JUSTICE. - THE CONCEPT   
    Justice  is  a  neglected  and  underrated  concept.  It  is  more  often  than  not 
regarded  merely  as an  adjunct of the  law.  This  is,  it  is true, one of  its  most  important 
applications, but the concept is far broader and affects vital aspects of our lives without our 
realizing it.  This is because it appears in many guises, the principal one of which is fairness.  
On hearing the word fairness one does not nowadays automatically think of it in terms of 
„justness‟ but 2500 years ago that would have come to mind at once.  We have relegated 
justice to a secondary role, stripping it of its fundamental role which is that it is very simply 
the basis of any civilized society.  In fact it is inherent in civilization.  No society that is not 
just can call itself civilized.  Justice is the civilizing regulator of Government, of Freedom, of 
Law, and of Punishment. 
    The  consequences  of  having  ignored  the  fundamental  nature  of  justice  are 
enormous.  We concentrate on "democracy" or "rights" trying to form a democratic rights 
based society with only the  vaguest idea of what the word democracy really  means, and 
absolutely no idea of what we mean by "rights" or how to found them.  In any society the 
concept of rights is of great importance and its disentanglement will be dealt with later. 
    If we return the concept of justice to its true position we will find that the 
whole approach to our society is changed.  On the way we shall discard some hallowed myths 
which have grown into the dogma of today's troubled civilization.  To do so requires an 
effort.  One must stop looking at the trees - our right to this and our right to that, but rather 
we  must  look  at  the  forest,  the  pattern  of  which  is  dictated  by  justice,  a  justice  which 
determines the relative position of our rights within that forest. 
    Let us first look at the concept of Justice itself.  Justice is a word of many 
meanings.  Philosophers often start by taking it in one sense, that of Political Justice, and 
maintain  that  its  features  are  derived  from  that  -  Its  Impartiality,  its  Universality,  its 
stringency.  Then again they may look at Legal justice or Distributive justice.  Some involve 
it inextricably (and wrongly) with rights or equality.  These approaches are unfortunate, they 
give the impression that there are different types of justice from examples of which we may 
deduce the essence.  In truth they should merely be regarded as attempted applications of 
justice, in the fields of law, distribution, politics etc. 
    The most logical approach is to try to analyse the concept of justice per se and 
a good start is a Hohfeldian one, i.e to look first at it lexicographly and draw parallels of use 
of its variations. 
    Lexicographly,  and  most  generally,  it  is  associated  with  fairness,  even-12 
 
handedness (impartiality) and doing what is right in the circumstances.  Therefore the first 
thing to note is that it is not an absolute or invariable, it may vary with the circumstances.  
Basically it would appear to be a moral viewpoint and in each circumstance it is defined by 
that viewpoint.  Looked at in this light we can see that many of the alleged attributes of 
justice are false. 
    Firstly, its fundamental nature.  Justice is not a fixed concept, it is, like equity 
(its  legal counterpart or application), "as  long as the  Chancellor's  foot".  What  has  been 
deemed Just and proper by one society, for example slavery, may be condemned and deemed 
unjust and improper by a subsequent society.  For example in ancient Peru there was a certain 
game in which the killing of the losing side was viewed as natural and acceptable, or even 
just.  To us, today, it would be considered unacceptable, being wrong and unjust to the point 
of barbarism.  Therefore any claims we come upon as to the possible irrevocable tenets of 
justice (e.g. rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness (whatever that may mean) must 
be viewed with considerable scepticism. 
    Next we should look at the claims to Universality.  This concept is often cited 
as a feature of equality, but we know that justice, though impartial, treats only equals equally.  
This  is why an  imbecile who cannot appreciate the seriousness of a crime  is  not treated 
"equally" to one who knowingly commits the same crime. Moreover what causes people to 
be regarded within a category of "equals" may itself change with different societies (or at 
different  times  within  one  society)  so  that  we  have  to  be  doubly  careful.  Certainly  its 
„universality‟ is in grave doubt, at least insofar as to there being universal rules of Justice.  
There is not one to which exceptions past or present can not be found.  However, we shall 
find that such general rules of justice as we may later deduce, while not being necessarily 
immutable, may change at a very slow rate so that for many purposes of current application 
they may be regarded (at least superficially) as unchanging. 
    Even its Impartiality must be questioned - After all justice is a moral view, but 
where do we get our moral views?  They are usually passed down to us by the leaders of a 
society (Moral, Religious or Political, and today  more and  more  from our popular  icons 
created by the press and television).  Morals are not democratic, they are often thoroughly 
despotic.  However because we are now entered upon the age of rapid mass communication, 
a particular moral approach may gain swift acceptance giving it the appearance of being led 
from the people.  In practice it will almost invariably have been set by the few and accepted 
by the many. 
    In  short,  justice  amounts  to  a  moral  judgement  of  a  particular  time  in  a 13 
 
particular society, and relating to the particular situation e.g. law, distribution etc.  This is 
especially true when we talk of distributive justice.  In the first place there can be no single 
rule  because  the  rule  of  so  called  Distributive  Justice  that  may  work  in  a  situation  of 
abundance will not apply in cases of shortage.  Whatever results is merely a rule deemed 
appropriate (and thus just) for that society at that time and that situation.  To take an example 
of the sort of problem that can arise in the case of distribution:-  To whom is a very rare life 
saving drug to be given? - To the one who is in most distress and needs it most; To the fittest 
and therefore most likely to benefit; To the wealthiest whose money permitted the discovery 
of the drug; To the war leader needed to save the society which is currently under attack; To 
the undisputed genius who has done more to alleviate sickness, but who may by now be a bit 
past it; To the youngest who may prove to have no potential whatsoever; To the middle aged 
one thought to be on the verge of great discoveries; and so on ad infinitum.  One's answer to 
any of these insoluble problems will be swayed by one's moral outlook or prejudice.  And we 
must remember that one man's moral outlook can easily prove to be another man's prejudice. 
    So, having decided that some of the modern approaches to defining justice are 
flawed let us take -  
A look to the past. 
PLATO 
    When  considering  Plato's  treatment of  „Justice‟  in  The  Republic  we  must 
remember that the subtitle is „About Dikaoisune‟, which some argue has a far more moral 
connotation than „justice‟ i.e. it is closer to „doing right‟, and indeed this, I think, is a help 
when we examine the arguments. 
    In  answering  the  question  “Why  should  we  be  just  (do  what  is  right  /  be 
good)?”,  Socrates  has  to  face  three  challenges.    First  Thrasymachus  argues  that  human 
behaviour is governed by self interest and that this should be the guiding influence, and the 
interest of the stronger should prevail.  In response to this Socrates argues that the exercise of 
any skill is actually disinterested, including government (to which he keeps reverting because 
of course it is the object of The Republic to set out his ideal form of government).  Frankly 
these  arguments  are  difficult  and  not  very  satisfactory  in  resolving  the  nature  of  justice, 
except to stress the point that it is disinterested, i.e. impartial. 
    At this point Glaucon joins in the challenge.  His first point is that one who 
has caused injustice and suffered from it, realizes that it is better to make a compact not to do 
or suffer wrong.  This is the basic or individual contract theory, and from this Glaucon argues 
men began to make laws and covenants.  So he argues justice is a compromise but anyone 14 
 
who had the power and ability to do wrong and get away with it would be mad not to do so.  
In  support of  this  contention  he  cites  an  example  based  on  the  ring  of  Gyges
2  So, says 
Glaucon, imagine two such rings; one is given to a just man and the other to an unjust man.  
He then goes on to suggest that even the just man would succumb to the temptation to use it, 
or be thought an idiot if he did not.  Then he compares the two lives and points out that the 
unjust man has to be accomplished in his wickedness not to be found out, in f act he must 
seem to be good.  But the just man must not be seen to be good lest he be deemed to be 
merely seeking the acclaim of a good name.  In short, the unjust man has the better time and 
is the more popular. To put it another way, the rain rains alike on the just and the unjust but... 
  "More on the just than the unjust fella', 
          for the unjust fella' has the just's umbrella."
3 
    Adeimantus then weighs in, adding that people really only do what is right for 
what they can get out of it, either in this life or the next.
4  He then points out that what is 
needed is a demonstration that Justice is inherently superior to injustice. 
    The response by Socrates to Glaucon's challenge of the ring of Gyges and 
Adeimantus' point is to look to, and draw parallels with, the justice of the State.  However 
this approach has the drawback that it merely provides us with a view of a particular form of 
a state i.e. Plato's Republic, which he deems to be the most just.  However his point is that 
just as a „just‟ state is more desirable than an unjust one so it is necessary that men be just.  
    Socrates then proceeds with the idea that a man is just in the same way a state 
is just.  He argues that there is no gain in debasing the god-like part of ourselves to the beast 
part. Plato also provides us with a strong argument that, in the main, it is better for the 
individual to be just.  He illustrates this with the picture of a man who climbs to the top 
irrespective of the damage he does to others on the way, but his success, according to Plato, is 
bought at an awful price for he lives in terror of his enemies' retribution.  While this was 
certainly true of a dictator such as Stalin, one might be tempted to think that his argument is 
                                                 
2 This is the story of a shepherd who discovered a hoard of treasure, but took only a ring which had te 
power, when he twisted the bezel, of making him invisible. He was no slouch in making use of it, and he ended 
up by seducing the queen of Lydia, murdered the king with her help, and seized the throne. 
 
3        Not that, as a philosopher, one should put it quite that way. 
4        It is interesting to note that this argument applies particularly today to societies with a western 
theistic religion. In eastern philosophy which is not so concerned with the nature of the next life as the 
attainment of an end state (be it nirvana, somadhi, moksha, etc.), the question of acting morally is guided by the 
fact that acting immorally is likely to deflect you from your purpose. It is therefore quite a different approach to 
the western theistic stick and carrot approach. 15 
 
open to the suggestion that if one does not go to such extremes there may be a point where 
ruthlessness pays. 
    So Plato has given us some ideas but hardly a complete answer. 
ARISTOTLE. 
    It is Aristotle as usual who gives us a much better and more useful 
interpretation, as we see from both the Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics.  However we 
must note that he views justice as a Virtue, an essential virtue of both individuals and 
Societies.  He does not regard it as either a moral principle or as an agreement arrived at 
between individuals.  [He starts from the viewpoint that in ethics man knows what is to be 
known (N.E. Ross 1925 II ss i-ii 28-30) but he emphasises that good behaviour is in essence 
due to good training in morally upright habits.]  He does not try to show that Justice is better 
for us than Injustice.  He sets out what were considered to be the principle virtues of a good 
life.  These virtues are often a mean between extremes:  Courage is the mean between 
foolhardiness and cowardice; Justice he equates with taking and receiving neither too much 
nor too little.  Of course what is too much or too little depends upon the other merits of the 
person concerned.  It is not a mean of equality or equal division, it is neither more nor less 
than is one's due, and one's due depends on one's merits. 
    In Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle takes as a starting point the 
various meanings of an unjust man.  Both the lawless and the grasping and unfair are thought 
to be unjust, and the lawful and fair as just.  And so, he concludes that lawfulness and 
fairness form a virtue, a great one in relation to one's neighbours.  Justice alone of the virtues 
is thought to be another's good. He goes on however that there appears to be more than one 
kind of justice.  There appears to be the division of justice into two parts, the unlawful and 
the unfair.  The law tends to look at the virtue (justice) as the whole virtue i.e. responsibility 
to one's neighbour, but of particular justice there are again two types -  Justice of 
Distribution, and Justice of Rectification.  Now it is important to note that Aristotle refers 
here to the Justice of Rectification, not Retribution.  It is not just tit for tat.  Aristotle believes 
that the criminal should be punished in kind, but that there should be some addition to the 
punishment to „expunge‟ any gain from the crime.  This notion of wiping out the advantage 
gained by the criminal (the power he has exercised over the victim) is of great significance to 
Aristotle and it is something which today, rather foolishly, we tend to ignore.  This aspect of 
justice will be dealt with in greater detail later when we look at Punishment. 
    Also in the case of rectification there are two divisions i.e. with respect to 
transactions which are a) voluntary - such as agreements, sales, purchases etc., and b) 16 
 
involuntary - clandestine, theft, violent assault, imprisonment, abuse insult etc.
5 
    With regard to Distributive Justice Aristotle's concept is one of 
proportionate equality.  People ought to receive goods in accordance with their merits.  
“...The just, therefore involves at least four terms; for the persons for whom it is in fact just are two, 
and the things in which is manifested, the objects distributed, are two.  And the same equality will 
exist between the persons and between the things concerned; for as the latter - the things concerned - 
are related, so are the former; if they are not equal, they will not have what is equal, but this is the 
origin of quarrels and complaints - when either equals have and are awarded unequal shares, or 
unequals equal shares.  Further this is plain from the fact that awards should be „according to merit‟; 
for all men agree that what is just in distribution must be according to merit in some sense, though 
they do not all specify the same sort of merit, but democrats identify it with the status of a freeman, 
supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or noble birth), and supporters of aristocracy with excellence."
6 
    It is right that the best should do best and the lesser able less well
7.  However, 
it must at once be noted that this idea is quite different from our modern concept of a free 
market economy which is distorted by a lack of the individual's justice in dealing with each 
other, and additional factors such as advertising.  For a man who charges unfairly (as the 
successful free marketeer, in maximizing his profits may well do) obtains more than his due, 
and is thus actually inflicting an injustice on his customers.  Materialism in this regard is 
quite prepared to ignore justice in this sense.  This is born out by the fact that in our society 
the richest in the land have often made their money either directly or indirectly out of the 
marketing of food, and the profit ratio in the U.K. is acknowledged to be twice that on the 
continent.  However materialistic ends have reached the degree of acceptance that not only do 
these people profit vastly, but they are then given honours and titles - usually for having 
donated sums of the money unjustly (in the sense we are talking of it) made from the 
customers to a charity of their choice.  Lest the foregoing sound like some argument against 
free trade it must be emphasized that Aristotle would have been the first to agree that a trader 
should receive a fair reward (and profit) for his skills and expertise in bringing goods to the 
people.  Where the problem would have come is in relation to what is deemed a fair or just 
                                                 
5        It is interesting to note that Aristotle includes assassination in a, and murder in b. I do not wish to 
get into a discussion of his individual classifications, which is the province of the Aristotelian specialist and I 
confess to having been ever so slightly choosy in selecting my examples. Nevertheless this does not, I submit 
detract from the validity of the two categories, voluntary and involuntary. 
6        N.E. V.3. [1131a 17-28]. 
7         Although Aristotle does not actually take this approach, his concept is in fact wholly consistent 
with a „Natural‟ approach i.e. it is consistent with the need for the best to succeed for the survival of the species. 17 
 
return. 
    Despite this we still believe to some extent in „goodness‟ or merit. We 
consider that justice is done if the best runner wins the race even if it is due to a natural 
ability rather than training.  To apply the same principle to the "smartest" operator is a denial 
of Aristotelian justice, but it might be acceptable as a distortion of survival of the fittest.  
Cicero, as we shall see, has firmer views.  Even so it may be argued that we have suffered too 
much from Utilitarianism and Egalitarianism and Materialism.  Claims to equality were dealt 
with best in the play The Admirable Crighton by J.M.Barrie, and by Gilbert and Sullivan in 
The Gondoliers.  The distortion of Justice as a result of Utilitarianism will be discussed later. 
    Aristotle's approach was and still is right - consistency among equals is a 
necessary feature of Justice, but total uniformity does not provide justice.  
CICERO  (De Officiis) 
    Cicero rates the four cardinal virtues as Wisdom, Justice, Courage and 
Temperance.  He takes the attitude that there is no such thing as private ownership 
established by nature but that men are born not for themselves alone, so that we have 
therefore to provide mutual help.  The foundation of Justice therefore is good faith - Truth 
and fidelity to promises and agreements.  There are, according to him, two types of Injustice; 
1) Those who inflict wrong, and 2) Those who fail to protect others when they can, i.e. 
Active and Passive Injustice.  Sometimes fear causes us to do wrong but more often it is 
avarice.  Ambition which leads to unjust acquisition is to be avoided.  Also, in passing, it is 
interesting to note that Cicero was one of the first to distinguish between impulsive passion as 
being less culpable than wilful premeditated wrongdoing.  
    The motivations for passive injustice are fear, indifference, indolence, and 
incompetence.  All men should contribute their efforts and interest to the social life.  He 
maintains that the rules are that 
1) No harm be done to anyone and 
2) The common interest shall be conserved.  
Moreover there is a justification for changing one's views if for example what you have 
promised to do will cause harm.  So when keeping a promise will do more harm than good, it 
is proper to follow the greater good.  [NB. The greater good to the promisee, not the greater 
good to all and sundry - Cicero was not a Utilitarian!] 
    There is, he argues, a limit to retribution and punishment.  It is sufficient if the 
wrongdoer is brought to repent so he may not repeat the offence and also that others are 
deterred  [So it seems there must in practice be more than a true repentance on the road to 18 
 
Pentonville].  Cicero also takes the view that when discussion fails and we are forced to war 
we should fight to protect our freedom to live in peace and unharmed.  When victory is won 
we should spare those who have not been bloodthirsty and barbarous in their warfare.  [So 
apparently and correctly we should not spare terrorists.]  However he holds the view that 
morality promotes the good and that therefore it is necessary to try to restore the social 
relationship that has been violated.  Thus revenge for the sake of revenge is not right. 
    Again Cicero, when considering promises, makes it clear that we should have 
regard to the spirit and not just the words, and also that we should give justice to the humblest 
(the slaves) - they must be required to work but must be given their dues.  Finally he feels 
that of the two - injustice by force or fraud - the latter is the most contemptible.  Throughout 
we see how many of Aristotle's principles appear here, albeit in a slightly different guise. 
    It was not until later that the basic principles above gave way or were 
displaced by the horrors of such philosophies as utilitarianism. 
HUME. 
    Hume took the view that while the virtues of Humanity and Benevolence were 
intuitive, the social virtues of Justice and Fidelity were not.  He takes Justice and Fidelity to 
be necessary for the well-being of mankind but the benefit arises from the system concurred 
in by the whole or greater part of the society.  He points out that Justice and the rules of law 
are impersonal and will award riches to a selfish miser whilst taking them from a beneficent 
man without title.  
    While many of Hume's views can be linked with the Aristotelian concept of 
justice he started to veer us off course, in my submission, by linking justice with property.  
Hume took the view that Justice was part of the moral and political virtues in general.  He felt 
that moral judgements are logically distinctive i.e. that they express a certain kind of 
sentiment or feeling.  Importantly he felt that the same set of facts could arouse different 
sentiments (even though he felt it was unlikely).  I suspect that it is far more likely than 
Hume would credit, for he lived in a time of a more ordered society in which one could not 
have access, as we do today, to the disparity of viewpoints between nations, and indeed 
between the people of any one nation. 
    The importance is, however, that he realized that moral viewpoints could vary, 
and thus it must follow that views of what is just could vary.  However it is my view that 
justice has some very deep seated principles which means that such variations as do take 
place will do so slowly, so that a new viewpoint will usually evolve over time.  Examples that 
immediately spring to mind are that originally no doubt the dipping of witches was 19 
 
considered by most to be a fair means of determination, or that burning at the stake by the 
Inquisition for the sake of a person's soul was quite just.  Today both would be considered 
quite unjust and indeed they would have been considered unjust in Greek or Roman times 
before the evil in the practice of the Christian religion and fear overcame man's previous 
conception of Justice.  Thankfully once the all powerful grip of unsubstantiated dogma began 
to be destroyed by improved knowledge the natural tendency towards justice came to be 
realized again.  This would appear to favour the argument that a concept of Justice might be 
inherent though it can be displaced by fear and/or training.  However one must remember that 
Hume assumed that it was the virtues of Humanity and Benevolence which were intuitive.  
All in all, as I shall argue later, I agree with Hume that Justice is learnt, not intuitive. 
    After asserting that moral judgements are a certain kind of sentiment Hume 
went on to the effect that 
1. Reason is, and ought to be the slave of passion, and 
2. It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of 
my finger
8  
As action requires motive so we must want the state of affairs it produces.  Moral assessment 
considers the character displayed in action.  So we may find some actions agreeable others 
not.  But Justice is different, we may approve a hard but just judge but we may not like him.  
Thus it would seem justice is not merely a matter of the morality of the action but rather the 
ethics.   
    Hume linked Justice to property and this is, in my submission, wrong.  It came 
about because he thought that only when society became civilized did it need rules and these 
give rise to rights, all of which have a proprietorial element in them.  For example - even 
when I promise to take you out I make a promise of my time. I think it is not necessary and 
possibly even counter productive to take this approach.  Furthermore he subjected this 
concept to the Public Utility, so that Justice, in essence, was reduced to a matter of communal 
convenience. 
J. S. MILL. 
    Mill maintained that one of the strongest obstacles to the doctrine that 
„Happiness was the criterion of right and wrong‟ has been drawn from the idea of justice.  He 
argues that many regard it as an inherent quality - that the just have an existence in nature as 
an absolute, as distinct from the expedient.  His argument is that even if Justice is a peculiar 
                                                 
8        Treatise of Human Nature Clarendon Press 1978 Bk II pp415-16 20 
 
instinct it might still require to be controlled by higher reason. 
    First he asks, is a feeling of Justice sui generis with sensation of colours or a 
derivative feeling.  Is it part of the field of general expediency or does it require a separate 
origin? So he attempts to analyse Justice and Injustice to see if there is always a particular 
attribute or set of attributes associated with it.  He then proceeds to consider what is taken to 
be Just or Unjust in various situations.  He starts by saying that it is considered Unjust to 
deprive anyone of their personal liberty or property.  He then considers whether the law 
involved is unjust or inexpedient, pointing out, as we shall have to consider later, that there 
are :- 
1) Those who maintain that all laws should be obeyed (This attitude he maintains is defended 
on the grounds of expediency);  
2) Those who hold that any law judged to be bad may be disobeyed even though it is not 
unjust but only inexpedient; and  
3) Those who maintain that disobedience should be confined to unjust laws. 
    But of course there are those who maintain that all laws which are inexpedient 
are unjust because all laws limit freedom and to that extent are unjust unless they are 
legitimated by tending to our good.  This in my submission shows the sort of calamitous 
situation one can get oneself in by starting with assumptions such as „any restriction of 
freedom is unjust‟, when we know many freedoms can only be exercised by denying the 
same freedom to others.  However it is universally admitted that there are some unjust laws, 
and that law is not therefore the ultimate criterion of justice.  However he goes on that when a 
law is thought to be unjust it is generally thought so because it infringes someone's moral 
right.  Now this is interesting, because justice is, in my opinion, a set of ethical standards 
derived ultimately from moral judgements. 
    Thirdly  Mill maintains that it is universally considered that each person 
should obtain that which he deserves - „his just deserts‟.  What then, asks Mill, constitutes a 
desert?  To deserve good if one does right, to deserve evil if he does wrong, or to deserve 
good from those to whom he has done good and evil from those to whom he has done evil.  
[This last is obviously not a Christian Morality which, theoretically, waives such justice]. 
    Fourth It is unjust to break faith.  [I would say this is questionable as a feature 
of justice].  However it can be overridden by a stronger obligation.  [It is presumably based 
on the concept that it is not fair to promise something and then not keep the promise.] 
    Fifth It is inconsistent with justice to be partial i.e. one must be influenced 
only by those considerations which ought to influence the decision. 21 
 
    EQUALITY. Many think this to be an essential, but says Mill, the idea of 
Justice differs with different people.  Concepts of equality vary with a person's idea of 
expediency.  [I would argue that it varies with the morality of the time - e.g. slaves should be 
given their rights, such as they are, with the same seriousness as that of their masters.  This is 
of course an Aristotelian viewpoint].  But questions of justice vary with the idea of 
expediency e.g. some communists believe in shares of exact equality; others depending on 
need; and others to those who work the hardest.  [These of course are concepts of distributive 
justice which I maintain are merely an attempt to apply the concepts of justice to a situation 
where it may be completely inapplicable.] 
    In ancient times justice came to be associated with the approved manner of 
doing things - that which should be enforced.  Hence the German Recht (originally 
straightness) now associated with law.  So  Recht and Droit have become associated with law 
and it does seem that the original concept of justice stemmed from conformity with the law 
(at least as to how things ought to be done).  This at least was the Hebrew idea for the simple 
reason that the laws were God given.  But for the Greeks and Romans who used man made 
laws, they were prepared to admit that there could be bad laws [Hence we get the dichotomy 
between laws based on Morality and laws based on expediency.]  So we get to the position 
where justice applies to such laws as are morally correct.  Note for example that our speeding 
laws could be unjust from a moral standpoint but are suffered for the sake of expediency. 
    Mill then considers punishment which we believe is something which should 
apply to those who are unjust.  We do not necessarily feel this about breaking a law if we 
deem that law to be unjust.  We associate our ideas of wrongdoing with something a person 
has a duty to do.  Duty should be exacted from a person.  Mill feels the idea of deserving or 
not deserving punishment lies at the bottom of the concepts of right and wrong (as to whether 
because of expediency one is punished is another matter).  So if a thing is right in the sense 
one ought to do it, one should be punished for not doing it.  On the other hand there are things 
which are laudatory to do but one is not compelled to do them.  This Mill feels marks off not 
justice but morality in general from expediency or worthiness. 
    He then considers moral duties of perfect and imperfect obligation (these latter 
are obligatory, though the occasion of performance is left to our choice - e.g. acts of charity 
and beneficence).  Some say duties of perfect obligation give rise to a correlative right similar 
to a legal right.  Justice he feels also involves a personal right similar to a legal right.  So he 
feels we have a right to claim justice as opposed to a claim for beneficence or worthiness.  
This is a most important distinction and one to which we shall revert later, because, having 22 
 
made this point, Mill does not appear to have appreciated its significance. (see the arguments 
in chapter 5). 
    He then proceeds to examine whether the feeling which accompanies the idea 
is innate, being naturally within man, or whether it grew up from the idea, or whether it is 
derived from expediency.  He feels that the sentiment does not arise from expediency, though 
the moral content may.  He classifies the sentiment as the desire to punish someone who has 
done harm to others.  This he maintains springs from two instincts, self defence and 
sympathy.  Because of his intelligence man can sympathise with his tribe, country or 
mankind generally.  Thus arises a general concept of justice.  And he believes that even anti-
utilitarians such as Kant maintain the fundamental principle of morals is  "So act that thy rule 
of conduct might be adopted by all rational beings" can be put so that „we ought to shape our 
conduct by a rule which all rational beings might adopt with benefit to their collective 
interest‟.  Now I am far from certain that these two necessarily flow from one another but that 
is not the point here. 
    It seems to me that in his anxiety to bring in Utilitarian aspects to justice Mill 
has started to lead himself away from the nub of his discoveries.  He takes justice to be two 
things:  A rule of conduct and a sentiment.  He then says the rule must be supposed to be for 
the benefit of all mankind and intended for their good.  There seems to be no such 
requirement to me, it just clouds the issue.  The sentiment he says is a desire to punish based 
on self defence and sympathy for the person affected by the injustice.  Again these seem 
superfluous additions.  It is unjust to take more than ones fair share or due, but if this is 
accomplished by profiting from many people the adverse effect on the individual may be 
minimal.  For example let us return to the example cited before: that some of the wealthiest in 
the land, who nowadays are mainly associated with food and its production, have unjustly 
taken more than their fare share. We know that on the continent the profit margin of food 
chains is half what it is in the U.K. So the argument could run thus:  It is unjust that these 
people should make themselves the wealthiest in the land by overcharging for a necessity 
(food).  It is doubly unjust that they should then donate (our) money to good works and gain 
themselves knighthoods and baronies for their good works i.e in donating money unjustly 
obtained from us to a charity of which we may not approve and have no say in.  But here the 
injustice has arisen from small injustices to a vast number of people, so it might be argued, 
the injustice falls under the de minimis rule.  It is only when looked at cumulatively that the 
injustice becomes apparent.  23 
 
    It is true that there are those who believe that such wicked Capitalists
9, (who it 
should be noted have done nothing illegal) should be punished, but the majority of people 
have hardly been affected in the sense Mill uses.  And certainly even though their actions are 
unjust in the Aristotelian sense as they have done nothing illegal, so nothing amounting to a 
right to a remedy exists.  Again it may be thought that it is inexpedient that every injustice 
however slight must be redressed. 
    Similarly a speeding law may be unjust when applied to someone who has 
done no harm in breaking it, but the law here is based on expediency.  I feel Mill goes too far 
in his association of justice with a personal right to a remedy similar to a legal right.  And he 
then makes the claim that I have a right to something which society ought to defend me in the 
possession of.  He justifies the reason why it ought by reference to the general utility, and at 
this point he has veered us completely off course back into the wilderness.  My reason for 
taking this approach will become clearer when we consider the whole matter of rights.  I take 
a Hohfeldian view that the type of right which Mill is talking of is a Hohfeldian claim-right 
and these rights are supported by, and exist by virtue of, the law.  Thus they become 
enforceable.  Moral obligations are by definition non jural and as such they are not 
enforceable, however desirable they may be.  Once this distinction is blurred we are in all 
sorts of trouble.  Justice represents a moral viewpoint.  It is not a legal prescription or it 
would not be necessary to add it to the law in the form of equity. 
    Mill attributes the strength of feeling for justice mainly to our universal 
inherent need for security. -  that without security our life would be unbearable.  But this 
utilitarian argument does not really stand the test - it is perfectly possible to provide security 
without justice.  Moreover Mill goes on, rightly, to point out that concepts of justice differ 
widely, but again he says this is based on what is considered useful to a particular society.  
He argues his case by citing the very examples that justice per se cannot resolve and says that 
the „just‟ solutions result from the viewpoint of utility.  My argument would be that it may be 
that a solution is exacted from a utility basis but that does not make it just or unjust - justice is 
just not applicable to some of these circumstances.  I nearly said „hard cases‟ but I do not 
wish to cause confusion with Professor Dworkin's hard (legal) cases.  To equate justice, 
which is based on morality, with distribution based on what is useful, illustrates the point I 
made previously - that to start to draw conclusions as to the nature of justice by working 
                                                 
9        For some unknown reason the holders of such views nearly always place the emphasis on the 
second syllable - an interesting social phenomenon which cannot be pursued here. 24 
 
backwards from purported applications will land you in the soup.  
    Mill regards justice as a name for certain moral requirements which regarded 
collectively stand high in the scale of social utility, but in so doing he castrates justice, and as 
of course is his intent, subjects everything including justice and morals to the base 
requirements of utility and expediency.  For reasons which I hope will become apparent I 
cannot accept this.  However much of what Mill says is of great use to us, what we have to do 
is fillet out the utilitarianism. 
SUMMARY 
    What then of Justice? To me Justice is an equilibrium restored, a balance and a 
fairness.  It is an ethical standard, based on a moral view and as such is based in part upon the 
beliefs and mores of the society of the time.  It is therefore not immutable, though we may 
find that some of the morals and ethics underlying any moral system are virtually timeless.  
To justify this statement completely would require a comparison of relative moralities which 
is beyond our present scope, but I hope to give some examples as we proceed. 
    It is not appropriate to attempt to analyse the basis of justice by reference to so 
called applications to situations with which it cannot cope and for which there may be many 
and varied political solutions, based on expediency, religious dogma, political dogma etc.  To 
be just is to do what appears to be right, but in many situations what appears to be right 
depends on the criteria of the day and the society involved.  One really cannot work 
backwards from current assumptions of what is just and be sure of arriving at a definitive 
analysis. 
  The principles of Justice lie in the rules of its application.  It is required not to be 
partial but at the same time it is required to treat like alike, i.e. it is no supporter of rabid all 
pervading egalitarianism.  It is „just‟ that the best athlete should win even though his ability 
may be inbuilt and he is lazy but has beaten all those of lesser talents who trained much 
harder. 
    Its applications bring it to bear on many situations some of which are not 
solvable.  Attempts have been made to apply it to problems of distribution, law, retribution 
and politics, but its principal function is that of restoration.  It attempts to restore the 
equilibrium of a situation, thus it can prove to be more than an arm of retribution.  In those 
situations to which it cannot apply e.g. distribution in a situation of shortage, the solution is 
arrived at by other means and using other criteria such as expediency, economic market 
control, etc.  That the solution, whatever it is, is accepted by the society tends to cause it to be 
dubbed „just‟.  In fact it is „acceptable‟ or „considered fair‟ but the word „just‟ is strictly 25 
 
speaking, inappropriate.  It is at best quasi just because the solution is regarded as having one 
or more of the aspects of „justness‟ whereas in fact it is merely the best that can be done in 
the circumstances. 
    The greatest and possibly the most informative application of justice is in 
relation to the law.  I hope to show that it is of fundamental importance in the reconciliation 
of Positivism and Natural Law theories.  But even so in law justice has sometimes to give 
way to expediency, for example in many of our traffic laws where the desire is to limit a 
potential danger but the good driver who has caused no harm may be made to suffer.  In one 
sense it is unjust that a man who intended no harm and caused no harm should be punished.  
There is no way that such can be regarded as a just punishment. It may be a necessary 
punishment from society's viewpoint or it may be regarded as an acceptable punishment, but 
it is not strictly an equitable punishment. 
    Similarly Distributive Justice is not a form of justice, it is merely an attempt to 
apply the principles of justice to a situation of distribution.  When one considers for example 
the various tenets of Communism held by differing groups i.e. Distribution of wealth on the 
basis of absolute equality; Distribution on the basis of production; and distribution on the 
basis of needs one really can not claim that justice favours any.  Attempts to work backwards 
to a definition of justice from any of these end positions are therefore doomed to failure. 
Legal Justice  
    This is the principal application of justice in the form of equity.  Even so 
customs occur which distort justice but are accepted by society e.g. as I have mentioned, 
traffic laws.  But it is in the field of equity that the application of the great principles of 
justice are to be found - Such as „No man shall be allowed to profit from his wrongdoing‟.  
No-one considers it just to profit in such a manner.  Yet it is not a general rule of law even 
though it was cited as the reason for the decision in Riggs v Palmer [115 N.Y.506] where it 
was decided that a murderer should not receive the inheritance under the will of the person he 
murdered.  If it were a general rule of law that no one should be allowed to benefit from an 
illegal act then criminals would not be allowed to sell their stories to newspapers for large 
sums. It would appear therefore to be no more than a principle of justice which is why most 
of us feel it is not right (i.e. unjust) when such a thing happens.  However were it indeed a 26 
 
rule of law then presumably the sale would be an illegal act
10.  Similarly it is felt that anyone 
who deliberately creates a dangerous situation should be held responsible for any direct 
consequences.  We shall be discussing some of these innate principles in greater detail later.  
Retributive Justice.  
    There is no doubt that there is an innate feeling that a person should get his 
deserts. He who harms another deserves to be punished.  This feeling however relates in my 
submission to the desire for retribution.  That the retribution should be just is a separate 
matter. The form and nature of that punishment is also the subject of justice - what is right in 
the circumstances.  This also will be the subject of further investigation in chapter 7.  
Rectification Justice.  
    Then there is the further, often neglected, but possibly most important feature 
of justice, the restoration of the status quo.  This requires more than mere retribution, it 
requires compensation to restore the advantage of the wrongdoer.  Thus a person who steals 
would be required in justice to compensate the victim, not just with what has been stolen, but 
to compensate for the advantage or power gained by the stealing (the metaphysical or 
physical subjugation of the victim).  Similarly the State which effects the retribution on the 
part of the victim requires additional punishment to effect this rectification or restoration.  
For example even if the stolen goods had been returned the offence of stealing remains. 
Deterrence.   
    Society also requires something further, namely the prevention so far as is 
possible, of a recurrence of this type of crime.  It seeks by making the punishment of a 
suitable character and by making the punishment known to „warn people off‟ - to deter them 
from the act and to persuade any offender not to repeat it.  This feature  of punishment is 
termed deterrence.  It should be noted that I have referred to „making the punishment of a 
suitable character‟ to effect the purpose.  As we shall see later we do not currently make 
much attempt to vary the character of the punishment, but merely rely on varying its severity.  
From the above it will clearly be seen that deterrence as such is not a part of justice. 
Political Justice.  
    This arises in a consideration of the relatively weak position of the citizen to 
his state, i.e. what is fair for the state to demand from its citizens in each of the various 
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situations which occur.  
    Generally justice is the application of principles of fairness and balance (of 
innate feelings of morality together with those dictums of morality of the times which have 
been assimilated by society) to various situations of imbalance, as only justice attempts to 
restore the balance. 
    It seems that there are certain principles of justice which guide us, but their 
application may vary with the morals of the society and the time.  Justice is the application of 
what is fair and right.  The conception of what is fair and what is right is however something 
that changes with the state of man's knowledge and the morality of the time.  These 
conceptions tend to resolve themselves into ethical principals which guide justice. 
    This is what makes justice such an open edged conception.  Even so it is a 
conception that man cannot easily live without, particularly with respect to Law and 
Punishment.  It is here that the principle application occurs - from the manner of these 
applications (not the end results) we can draw our best idea of current principles and some 
clues as to the possible existence of any universal principles and then, and only then, we may 
attempt to apply these to our non-jural relationships.   
Justice in relation to other virtues. 
    Some philosophers regard justice as the first virtue with respect to political 
issues and argue therefore that it is a basic virtue.  I agree that it is fundamental as to 
civilization and that it is of prime importance politically.  However that does not necessarily 
make it universally fundamental, i.e. I do not believe that it is necessarily true that Justice is 
the virtue from which all other virtues flow.  In fact it would appear to be one of a number of 
virtues such as kindness, charity, honour, etc. which are not always comparable.  Of all the 
virtues it is the most important, and some virtues such as honour may derive from it, or at 
least be dependant. 
    Moreover the idea of justice being a mean in the sense of fairness also has to 
be combined with the concept of rendering to each his due.  This concept is particularly 
important as it is this which distinguishes Justice from equality, and it is most important that 
we bear this in mind as we pursue our quest.  Fairness involves the treatment of equals alike 
and not the treatment of unequals alike, so that, for example, the mentally handicapped are 
not treated as if the were totally competent. 
A digressionary word of warning (for those politically inclined) 
    There seems to be  a failure of logic amongst some political thinkers, in that 
having established Justice as a principal virtue of a society they proceed from this to the 28 
 
assumption that only a just society is valid.  This is about as logical as saying that as beauty is 
a principal virtue of art anything that is not beautiful is not valid as art (and even further 
should therefore be destroyed).  
    Following this further we find that there is a tendency today to take the view 
that only democratic societies are just and that anything else is fair game to be brought down.  
In fact because of this flaw in our thinking democracy is in danger of becoming as despotic as 
the Inquisition.  Democracy, particularly our current brand, is very far from solving our 
problems.  So beware linking justice (however desirable it may appear) with validity. 
The great Justice Myth is that it is Immutable and Universally uniform.  It is neither.  The 
concept of Justice varies from civilization to civilization, and even within one civilization it 
will vary with time.  That variation is slow, so slow that it can give the impression that what 






























CHAPTER 2 JUSTICE IN RELATION TO A CIVILIZED SOCIETY. 
    It is  vital to understand how the concept of  justice  bears upon the various 
aspects of any civilized society.  These include concepts such as Freedom; Law; The State; 
Punishment  etc.  Moreover  it  is  important  to  understand  the  theoretical  and  practical 
relationships and interactions of these concepts.  Therefore we are going to have to face a few 
basic questions such as just what do we mean when we talk about Freedom?  What should 
constitute Punishment etc.? These are matters of great importance and sometimes of great 
confusion because philosophers, governments, economists and everyday people often have 
quite different ideas about these very basic points.  Moreover as they usually forget to let us 
know what their view is, a great deal of bickering and dispute takes place. Lawyers (to which 
I plead guilty) tend to like definitions because definitions have the great advantage that, even 
if one does not agree with them, at least you know what is, and what is not being talked 
about, so that one should not end up arguing at cross purposes.  Therefore, to that end I shall 
set out, wherever possible, the viewpoint from which I shall be starting.  Sometimes it will be 
necessary for me to try to justify to you the starting point I have chosen, particularly where 
there are viable alternatives.  At others I shall just say „this is what I mean when I am talking 
about so and so‟.  As an example let us start with:- 
  Freedom: Now Freedom is a state.  It has nothing to do with the Law and is not 
linked to it in any jural relation
11.  This will come as a shock to many people who are used 
to  thinking  of  it  as  a  right.    However  Freedom  is  rather  like  inter  stellar  space  -  it  is 
everywhere that the law is not!  Kocourek puts it very well:- 
"Freedom is not a legal relation because it is one sided.  A relation always 
involves  two  elements  or two  sides.    Freedom  is  protected  by  the  law  by 
various claims and powers, but in itself it is not within the law.  It is rather the 
end of law.  Where Freedom ends the law begins, and where the laws end 
Freedom begins."
12 
    The law on the other hand involves a relationship.  It involves a situation in 
which the activities of two or more parties affect their relationship, thus making it a jural 
relation. 
    It is arguable that there are only two fundamental types of jural relationships - 
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Claims  and  Power
13.    This  is  extremely  important  because  of  the  confusions  that  arise 
through failure to recognize this, with the resultant tendency to include other things.  We 
shall be going into this in chapter 3 in order to separate and distinguish some of the terms 
which are currently used in a confusing manner. 
    For  the  present  however  we  are  concerned  primarily  with  the  concept  of 
Freedom.  Freedom can of course be curtailed, rather as space can be occupied by stars.  It is 
also interesting to note that in a sense it can never be absolute.  My freedom to remain seated 
where I am is maintainable only at the cost of denying that same privilege not only to all 
other human beings, but to all animals, living things such as a tree, and also ultimately to all 
inanimate objects - one just cannot share the same space with a pile of bricks.  It is important 
to note that I have thereby categorized Freedom initially as a Privilege not a Right.  Later we 
shall be distinguishing between rights (which I define as Claims), Powers, and Privileges etc. 
and we shall see how, why and when a Freedom might become a right. 
The law's relationship with Freedom 
    The law has a double sided relationship with Freedom.  Primarily, it is in fact 
the law which constrains freedoms in the ultimate nature of their being.  Therefore, the more 
law there is the less freedom we actually have.  This must not be confused with the second 
side of the relationship - the fact that the law can be used to protect a freedom.  It does this by 
creating a claim right under which a citizen may claim and enforce his right to that defined 
freedom.  The distinction between the limiting nature (upon freedom) of the existence of laws 
generally, and the individual protecting function of a specific law must kept firmly in mind.  
Certain laws may protect a freedom (within limits) but the nature of law generally is to limit 
freedom. 
The Growth of Society - The Purpose of Law. 
    The next great definitional problem we come to relates to the law, its purpose, 
and  its  parameters.    People  will  talk  of  law  in  many  senses  -  from  the  strict  command 
approach of the Legal Positivist Austin, to the theories of the Natural law school that law has 
its basis in morality.  Here, the great schism lies in determining what might properly be called 
a valid law.  Is its validity derived from its source (positivism), or its content (natural law 
theory)? - But these questions, which we will be going into later, relate to the system of law 
or  jurisprudence,  and  the  justification  of  various  laws.    For  the  moment  I  am  primarily 
concerned with its purpose to determine how it fits into the picture. 
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    In this, Law's purpose, I take the pragmatic view in that I would go along (but 
only this far) with A. V. Lundstedt, one of the more extreme members of the Scandinavian 
realists.  His view is that law is indispensable for the maintenance of human society and that 
it needs no other basis or justification.  It is that term which is used to describe an existing 
phenomena. 
    If we return to our concept of freedom, the hermit is the only truly free man.  
Even  then  he  is  constrained  by  his  very  isolation  which  renders  many  tasks  or  desires 
impossible - i.e our completely free hermit is not "free" to cross an ocean, because alone he 
could not do it.  Mankind does not appear to have been designed to be isolated, we have 
always been gregarious, but not always in large societies.  Originally (it is presumed) we 
were in family units which were ruled by the head of the family.  As they became small tribes 
different means of controlling them developed.  Some no doubt continued to be controlled by 
the head, senior, or most powerful family.  Others would have developed a rule by elders, 
councils or heads of families, some even by powerful religious or quasi religious leaders.  
Some would have been dictatorial, others more democratic.  This variety of itself was a good 
thing, a facet of survival of the fittest in which different forms of society arose and competed. 
    Whatever their  constitution,  it was  still  necessary,  in order to preserve the 
cohesiveness of the group, to provide rules governing the inter-action of its members.  It was 
this that Lundstedt saw so sharply.  Whether they grew up as customs or were imposed, once 
they became enforceable they were laws.  Of course it is possible to effect other objectives by 
means of the law but these are additional, tacked on objectives.  As such they can not be 
substituted for the basic purpose of the law without abandoning that purpose.  No doubt it 
was this that made Lundstedt intolerant of those who lost sight of the basic facts in trying to 
ascribe new basic purposes to the law. 
    Therefore let us take as the starting point - the basic purpose of the law is to 
govern the actions and interactions of people within a society.  This is the raison d'etre of the 
law - no more, no less.  As we shall see many other objectives have been grafted on (differing 
from society to society) but the one fundamental paramount purpose is the thing common to 
all, the governing of actions and interactions within a society.  With our advances and the 
increased contact between societies we find the more sophisticated international law growing 
up, but this is actually no more than an attempt to govern the interactions of different 
societies having different basic laws.  
This brings us to A slight digression (But not without purpose):-  
Society or The State. 32 
 
    While we are looking at the early developments of societies and their laws we 
should perhaps consider why those societies or groups were formed in the first place.  
Basically it was for protection against predators (including other tribes), for strength, and for 
ease of living.  It was no doubt easier to forage, kill one's prey, and obtain food when aided 
by another.  It was also easier to protect oneself.  In short it was an aid to survival of the 
fittest.  Survival of the fittest is an important factor to bear in mind.  It is not a man made 
concept.  Like the wind and tides it is an external immutable regulator, and, I submit, it is 
ignored at one's peril.  
    Man's ability to co-operate gave him a great advantage, and he found that it 
was worth the sacrifice of some autonomy to obtain that.  I appreciate that Aristotle took the 
view that man was innately political and while this may be true, I submit that my somewhat 
more pragmatic approach does not require the same major assumption, though it leads I 
suspect, to the same result. 
    Thus there was a sacrifice in autonomy and a gain in protection and quality of 
life.  The surrender of autonomy can only be effected by upward delegation to a ruler or 
rulers (i.e whoever it is, once they have the power of decision, in practice they become, at 
least for that purpose, a decision maker or ruler). 
  The rulers themselves generally had two interconnected objectives: - 
1) to make their society as strong and powerful as possible, and  
2) to stay in power.  
[It might be noted in passing that good rulers put them in this order, bad rulers have a nasty 
habit of reversing the priorities.] 
    In order to effect these ends, the ruler(s) had to control their people and get 
them to do as the leaders wished.  In fact the objectives were interconnected in that unless 
they were successful in providing a strong and powerful society, capable of resisting others 
and providing for itself, they would be less likely to remain in power.  They would eventually 
be overthrown from within or without. 
    Originally presumably anyone who fundamentally disapproved of the ruler or 
laws of his tribe had the options of:-  
1) Packing his belongings and leaving.  If enough were of the same persuasion they could 
leave and form a separate tribe, or 
2) Staying and overthrowing the rulers.  The new leader(s) would then take over and impose 
his(their) rule upon the tribe. 33 
 
3) The Gorbachov Solution.  This is difficult and rare. It is to join the system, work one's way 
up and then, when in power, to alter it.  It requires someone of very special qualities and 
capabilities, but it is a far better solution than 2.  Although I have said this is rare, it is not as 
rare as at first appears.  Julius Caesar was an early example, and F. W. de Klerk another 
recent one.  Doubtless a little research would produce other examples. 
4) Persuading the ruler(s) to his view. 
5) Simply knuckling under and obeying. 
    Even in the most primitive societies the rulers had to maintain a certain 
acceptance by those governed for the only alternative was imposing themselves through fear, 
ritual or precedent.  Even in the case of suppression there would come a point sooner or later 
when the people would revolt, and by the sheer weight of numbers of those wishing for a 
change, eventually effect it.  However, a powerful leader capable of standing up to those 
outside could, no doubt, get away with more internal repression than others, and for a 
considerably longer period.  
    The most recent example of this must be Hitler and National Socialism.  What 
is generally forgotten is that when he came to power the people had been through a terrible 
time with unimaginable inflation and appalling unemployment.  Hitler set about solving the 
terrible unemployment, which relieved a humiliating burden on the people and must have, at 
best, earned a great deal of gratitude, and, at worst, stifled criticism.  Having thus secured a 
strong position he could subsequently get away with repression of a kind which would have 
been opposed earlier had he been less successful in alleviating the economic ills of the 
country.
14  
    The parallels are still with us today. It is, as before, still the objective of rulers, 
whether elected or not, 
1) to provide a robust society capable of standing up to outside opposition and 2) to remain in 
power. 
    A word must be said about the use of the expression "robust society".  I have 
coined this expression for want of a better because while man was originally governed by the 
survival of the fittest a subtle change took place with the formation of larger groups.  At this 
stage it was not necessarily the "physically fittest" who contributed to survival.  The bow may 
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well have been invented by the original 97 lb. weakling who could not throw his spear as far 
as the others!  Thus societies began to find uses for different talents amongst their members, 
but in the end it was the most „robust‟ group, using its bows as well as spears that succeeded 
against its neighbours.  
    Success after all was the hallmark, and it still is today.  The primary object of 
any government in any society should be success in providing its members with a strong, 
stable, and prosperous ambience.  Again the parallel with the purpose of laws recurs.  One 
may add other objectives but one cannot substitute them for the basics.  For example, those 
who maintain that the primary object of a society is to give the people what they want are 
doomed to failure.  To give the masses what they want - even if they could ever decide what 
that is -  would almost certainly not be good for them.  Equally certainly it would not be good 
for the rest of society.  The reason one can say this without being in the slightest paternalistic 
is that, that great bastion (allegedly) of freedom and equality, the U.S.A. has reached the 
point where advertising has so distorted people's perspective that we have cases of youths 
actually killing each other to possess a pair of trainers with the right name on the outside.  
The fact that they probably would not fit and that their main attribute is to make the feet 
smell, appears not to matter.  Yet to kill for something - surely one must desire it a great deal. 
This would presumably place it high in the utilitarian scale, but that is another matter. 
    Of course the standard answer is to give the people the autonomy to choose 
what they want.  Even so, there must be some overall regulator and, to the extent that this is 
imposed, it must be perfectionist
15 which is theoretically anti-libertarian. 
    In practice the resolution of this dilemma would appear to lie in an 
examination of the State's objectives - the provision of a robust society, one that „flourishes‟ 
in the sense used by Aristotle (i.e. one capable of standing up to and alongside its 
neighbouring or competing societies).  At the same time one must not forget the government's 
secondary aim - that of remaining in power.  The best way to secure this latter object, without 
resorting to oppressive means, is to allow as much freedom to the ordinary citizen as is 
possible within the scope of the first objective.  That is to say, it would appear that the 
optimal form of government should ensure the overall robustness of a society while 
permitting the maximum internal freedom consistent therewith. 
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    Since the earliest times there have been disputes about the nature and purpose 
of the State.  Aristotle's Politics provides us with a great many interesting insights which are 
still applicable today, even though his concern was with the polis or city state.  Even though 
he thought that the true theoretical politician should be of the highest virtue (possibly more 
akin to a statesman in today's terminology), he recognized that most took up political life for 
the position and money [EE I 5. 1216a 23-27]. 
    However, one of the things which I find so intriguing about Aristotle is his 
view of Justice and the importance he attaches to it.  He takes it (in the Politics III 13. 1283a 
38-40) to be a communal virtue from which all others follow, and he took the position that 
political justice involved the rule of law.  He also took the view that humans are by nature 
political animals so that the polis exists by nature, and that human nature requires political 
life for its fulfilment.  This is a view which is often disputed today, most preferring Hobbes's 
arguments  put  forward  in  the  Leviathon,  that  the  political  state  is  a  purely  man  made 
construction and that man is prior to the state and governed by natural law and possesses 
natural rights. 
    However I am not sure that humans are necessarily inherently political.  Even 
so I believe it is possible to retain much of what is left of Aristotle‟s views.  Secondly I can 
not accept Hobbes's baggage of man being prior to the state and governed by natural laws and 
natural rights.
16  These latter concepts have always seemed to me to be epistemologically and 
philosophically totally unfounded.  In most cases they just seem to appear, rather like t he 
Cheshire cat in  Alice in Wonderland [and on top of that they are proving to be inherently 
destructive].  However I do propose to establish a basis for one, and only one, Inherent Law, 
which some might try to construe as a natural law.  I do not claim it to be a natural law as 
such but rather one which we shall see is inherent in the very concept of civilization. 
    I believe, and hope to show, that my view is correct and actually draws some 
substance from Aristotle who regarded politics as being similar to a living organism which he 
viewed as being affected not only by its inner cause but by its surroundings.  Thus it would 
be quite natural for societies to develop in different forms and no-one can say that any one 
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form is of such excellence that it must needs suit every circumstance
17.  Aristotle certainly 
conceived that although there might be a theoretically best form, others could suit the needs 
of different societies. 
    Now I appreciate that there are still many arguments as to what form such a 
state should take.  These may range, even amongst democracies for example, from a welfare 
state providing services and security, to a rigid free enterprise state.  These arguments are 
however all resolvable within the overall parameters of robustness and internal  freedom and 
do not substitute for them.  It is not the purpose here to discuss the relative merits of different 
societies - that is primarily a matter for political philosophy.  We are merely concerned that 
within a robust state (viewed from outside) there  should be the maximum freedom within.  
This would suggest that the body of law governing the citizens should be optimized by its 
simplicity.  Again it is true that the larger and more complex a society is, the greater will its 
governing body of laws be
18, but we should always keep in mind that law for the sake of 
regulation adversely affects the citizen's freedom.  The more a state nannies and over 
regulates its citizens the less robust it will prove to be until it ceases to flourish against its 
competitors, becomes weak and is over-run, or, as in the case of the USSR, it implodes under 
the weight of its own bureaucracy.  Moreover the greater the regulation, with its concomitant 
bureaucracy, the greater is the likelihood is that corruption will become endemi c.  This will 
destroy the society more effectively than any external force. 
    So, while the purpose of law is to provide a means of regulating the activities 
of a group or society, it should not be regarded solely as a means of control, for the manner 
and style of the law itself will have an effect on the society.  The degree of control applied by 
the law will have a direct bearing on the quality of that society.  Additionally, the quality or 
„justness‟ of the laws themselves will have a direct effect on the lives of the people.  Thus the 
law may serve other purposes than the single one  of control.  While its fundamental purpose 
is control, the quality and quantity of its content are of enormous importance. 
Law as a created  body. 
    The law of any society is a created thing restricting freedom even in its most 
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purely regulatory form, e.g even the rules for making out one's will restrict one from doing it 
any way you want.  There are those who will argue that the validity of any law lies in the 
manner of its creation or recognition (Legal positivism
19) or alternatively by virtue of its 
content  (natural  law  theories).    However,  before  considering  a  possible  means  of 
reconciliation of these views (see chapter 5) we shall look to the manner in which law is 
created and then to its content. 
A preliminary caveat: One must be careful to distinguish rules of behaviour from the law.  
Professor  Dworkin's  example  of  the  rule  that  men  should  remove  their  hats  in  church, 
followed by a discussion as to whether baby boys should remove their bonnets [See Dworkin 
Taking Rights Seriously p.50.] is a marvellous example.  The law primarily is that which the 
state recognizes as applicable to its subjects.  Much has already been written on this subject 
and we shall be discussing various distinguishing features as we progress. 
    For example, the law of our Society is created in two ways:- 
1) The directly created enacted statute & 
2) The Common law created by judges and accepted by the Courts.  This latter may include 
some laws accepted by the courts as being derived originally from long standing custom.  But 
it should be noted that, until accepted by the courts or incorporated into a statute, they are and 
remain customs, not the law.  This is why I have not classified Custom as a third way of 
creation of law.  It is, if you like, a third source, but that is subtly different. 
 THE POSITIVIST VIEW OF LAW. 
    Positivists vary and do not all subscribe to exactly the same views. One of the 
most succinct analyses of these was by Professor Dworkin in Taking Rights Seriously. 
Dworkin says:- “These key tenets [of Positivism] may be stated as follows: 
"(a) The law of a community is a set of special rules used by the community directly 
or indirectly for the purpose  of  determining  which behaviour will be punished  or 
coerced by the public power. These special rules can be identified and distinguished 
by specific criteria, by tests having to do not with their content but with their pedigree 
or the manner in which they were adopted or developed. These tests of pedigree can 
be used to distinguish valid legal rules from spurious legal rules (rules which lawyers 
and litigants wrongly argue are rules of law) and also from other sorts of social rules 
(generally lumped together as „moral rules‟) that the community follows but does not 
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enforce through public power. 
  (b) The set of these valid legal rules is exhaustive of „the law‟, so that if someone's 
case  is  not  clearly  covered  by  such  a  rule  (because  there  is  none  that  seems 
appropriate, or those that seem appropriate are vague, or for some other reason) then 
that  case  cannot  be  decided  by  „applying  the  law‟.  It  must  be  decided  by  some 
official, like a judge, „exercising his discretion‟, which means reaching beyond the 
law for some other sort of standard to guide him in manufacturing a fresh legal rule or 
supplementing an old one. 
(c) To say that someone has a „legal obligation‟ is to say that his case falls under a 
valid legal rule that requires him to do or to forbear from doing something. (To say he 
has a legal right, or has a legal power of some sort, or a legal privilege or immunity, 
is  to  assert,  in  a  shorthand  way,  that  others  have  actual  or  hypothetical  legal 
obligations to act or not to act in certain ways touching him) In the absence of such a 
valid legal rule there is no legal obligation; it follows that when the Judge decides an 
issue by exercising his discretion, he is not enforcing a legal right to that issue 
  This is only the skeleton of positivism. The flesh is arranged differently by different 
positivists, and some even tinker with the bones. Different versions differ chiefly in 




    I have set out Dworkin's definition because he is one of the principal critics of 
certain  aspects  of  Legal  Positivism  and  I  find  many  of  his  comments  exceptionally 
persuasive.  However my theories appear to differ in certain respects from Dworkin's and it 
will be necessary later to see how far this produces disagreement, or whether the theories can 
co-exist. 
    Dworkin  then  shows  how  Hart  solved  the  problems  of  Austin's  command 
approach.
21 Hart distinguished rules as being of two kinds: Primary rules such as those of the 
Criminal  Law  i.e.  rules  of  direct  application,  and  secondary  rules  which  themselves 
comprised two groups.  The first of these related to the administration of th e system of law, 
the basis for formulating, varying and repealing laws and administering them through the 
system of courts and judges.  The second related to procedural laws such as how to form a 
contract, make a valid will etc. 
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    Hart also made it clear that not all rules were necessarily commands.  It is 
possible for a rule to be binding because it is accepted as a standard of conduct, i.e. it is 
recognized as binding.  It is also possible for a rule to be a „valid‟ rule i.e that it is enacted by 
virtue of an identifiable rule that provides for its enactment.  In short it is recognized by 
virtue of the „rule of recognition‟.  The rule of recognition of a community is that which 
governs the acceptance by that community and particularly its officials of a rule as valid. 
    Dworkin  then  sets  out  to  establish  two  points  of  distinct  variation  from 
positivism.  Both are extremely important.  The first relates to the making of new law by the 
courts in which the judge exercises „his discretion‟.  The establishment of new law in this 
manner is one which Dworkin disputes.  It is his view that the judge considers Principles, 
which unlike rules of law, are not fixed.  He weighs them and comes to a decision, which 
itself may be right or wrong.  The fundamental distinction is that these legal principles are 
there, and that the judge is required to decide upon them.  Therefore the judge is not making 
new law by an act of discretion.  He feels that most lawyers, if they think about it at all 
(though  he  was  not  quite  that  pointed),  accept  judges  rulings  in  hard  cases  as  an  act of 
discretion and that this is wrong.  Here I totally agree with Dworkin and I believe that with 
some  variations  it  provides  a  major  forward  step  in  our  understanding  which  I  shall  be 
pursuing later. 
    The second and quite fundamental point is that Dworkin feels that the ruling 
theory of positivism, as he has described it, does not accept the idea that individuals can have 
rights against the state prior to any rights that are created by specific legislation.  "Legal 
positivism rejects the idea that legal rights can pre-exist any form of legislation".  I totally 
accept that. Dworkin rejects it.  Stated like this it looks as if an irreconcilable stand off is 
inevitable but part of my task is going to be to question whether such views are necessarily 
irreconcilable.  Positivism has long been at odds with theories of natural justice but Professor 
Raz took the view that a reconciliation might be possible and although he admitted that he 
had not succeeded he has taken the first and most important step, namely that of actually 
pursuing the idea that a reconciliation might be possible.  In a world of opposed views the 
importance of that first step cannot be underestimated.  It is my object to pursue this line, 
inspired by Raz, though not in the same manner.  It is my rash belief that I might have taken 
steps along the path to success.  No doubt in my attempt I shall bring down on myself hell-
fire and brimstone from both sides. 
Justice 
    I believe that a great mistake was made in allowing the concept of Justice to 40 
 
fall from the position of pre-eminence that it had in Aristotle's time.  As a result there was a 
failure to appreciate the influence it actually has on the basis of other concepts with the result 
that when questions arose other explanations and solutions were sought.  Justice was thought 
of mainly in the context of its legal application.  I believe that a study of the vital role justice 
plays  in our thinking can  help to provide answers to problems which  have  been  eluding 
solutions. 
    As we have seen Justice is a concept far greater than its mere application to 
the law.  The great confusion came about in the failure caused by the habit of not separating 
the concepts of Justice from the concepts of law.  Justice is a subject which can be considered 
completely in isolation from the law.  As we have seen it involves concepts such as fairness, 
impartiality, even-handedness etc. 
    While  it  would  seem,  at  first  glance,  that  the  principles  of  justice  should 
override the law this is not always the case.  In a complex society the needs of expediency 
and administration have sometimes been seen to outweigh the requirements of justice.  To 
emphasize the separateness of the two it would be possible, theoretically, to have a legal 
system in which the concept of justice played no part.  One can envisage a society in which 
offences would be defined and no extenuating circumstances allowed.  Such law would be 
rigorous and unbending.  However it could be argued to provide the merit of certainty.  We 
would not like such a system but there is no doubt that it could be made to work.  In some 
instances it could prove to be just, as we define the term, in other instances it almost certainly 
would not.  However the point remains - Law can exclude justice. 
    It  is  important  to  realize  therefore,  that,  because  it  could  theoretically  be 
excluded, justice is not a necessary constituent of either law or punishment.  In practice in 
Western philosophy it plays a considerable part and thus while it is vital for us to consider it, 
it is separable.  A great part of our idea of justice involves intentionality, and this plays a far 
more important part in criminal law than it does in civil law.  In civil law the damages are 
often definable, and whether, for example, the breach of a contract giving rise to damages 
was deliberate or accidental does not necessarily affect the amount of the damages.  In the 
case of punishment much may hinge on the intention involved.  Thus it will be necessary for 
us later to look further into this. 
The relationship of Society, Law, Punishment, Justice, and their various philosophical 
inputs. 
    The time has now come, I believe, to examine the overall picture into which 
the pieces of the jigsaw have to fit.  Most philosophers, with a bravado and ability which 41 
 
leaves me breathless tend to plunge straight into the maze and fight their way through to their 
objective (or not as the case may be).  Possibly because I am a hands on philosopher, or one 
who has come back to philosophy after a life of actually having to deal with engineering and  
law, I like to try to produce a visual image of the puzzle I am working on.  I therefore tried to 
sort out in my own mind a picture of how the pieces related.  
    This is necessary or at least I hope, helpful because, as should have become 
apparent if I have been making my point correctly, we are at the cusp of several distinct areas 
of philosophy.  I have therefore set out in Fig.1. my view of the best differentiation of the 
subjects,  showing  their  primary  philosophical  inputs.   I  say  primary  philosophical  inputs 
because obviously they are not rigidly confined.  For example Moral thinking can have a 
considerable influence on the type of State and the normative law.  Nevertheless it is my 
contention that it is necessary, for example to emphasize that the primary input to Justice is 
governed by moral and ethical concepts, whereas the normative law is governed primarily by 
jurisprudential considerations (legal philosophy) and the manner in which the State wishes to 
control the society (political philosophy). 
In Fig.1 I have made the following assumptions:- 
Law:- 
Law is merely that which is enacted or recognized by the courts
22.  It has no 
substantive per se existence.  It is also Law insofar only as it can be enforced. I 
am not referring here to degrees of failure to enforce a law which could be 
enforced, but rather the basic inability to enforce as for example in the case of 
Rhodesian U.D.I. where we claimed our law to be that of Rhodesia.  The 
Rhodesians merely took no notice and went about their business. 
Punishment:- 
Punishment  is  regarded  primarily  from  the  pragmatic  point  of  view.  It  is 
basically the  sanction  for the  non performance  of the  normative  laws.  Its 
raison d'etre is to ensure obedience to those laws.  The degree to which it does 
so is related to its effectiveness.  Secondary objects may be to indicate the 
offence's severity  in the  scale of things; to provide retribution; to act as a 
deterrent, and even possibly to effect reform or provide a cure. 
Justice:- 
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The concept of Justice involves Equity, the question as to whether the law is 
fair / the punishment is fair.  It involves the Moral and Ethical perceptions of 
the State and the people  of the particular time.  These things are  in  fact 
mutable and change with time. 
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    The State I have used as an illustration is one such as the U. K.  Without 
bearing the above relationships in mind it is very easy to misconstrue or place the wrong 
philosophical interpretation on any situation - see the example in footnote 23.  Unfortunately 
most writings on the subject appear to contain no such analysis, relying on their readers to 
carry it or a similar one in their heads, or worse still not even to formulate one.  This certainly 
adds to difficulties of interpretation. In order to understand any part it is necessary to locate it 
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in the system. 
    Having given ourselves a pictorial view of the overall set up we can return to 
amplify one or two definitions further, because as I have pointed out, many people use the 
same word in different senses and this leads to immense difficulties if the reader is unaware 
of the sense used by the writer.  Dworkin also emphasises this, pointing out, for example, that 
the English only have one word for law, covering that which in both French and German 
requires  two  words.    Generally  I  shall  use  the  term  "Law"  in  the  sense  of  the  body  of 
Normative Law i.e. that which is enacted by statute; the common law which is accepted by 
practice or recognition (per Hart); and the law derived from custom and accepted as above. 
This includes Hart‟s primary and secondary laws. 
    The next area of vagueness relates to the term  "Rights".  This will be the 
subject of considerable discussion in later chapters.  Generally however it is sufficient to say 
at this stage that I am a confirmed Hohfeldian, believing as he did that enormous confusion 
was caused by the use of the one word “rights”when referring not just to legal claims but also 
to privileges, freedoms and even Power.  The fact that we have a number of words that can be 
used to impart precision therefore leaves us a clear path to avoid some of these confusions.  
In most senses when I refer to legal rights I therefore mean a Hohfeldian claim-right
24.  
    Such rights involve a jural relation which itself is a creature of the law.   Thus 
by my definitions there cannot exist claim-rights that are prior to the law.  Hence my apparent 
conflict with Dworkin.  However this conflict is in part brought about by my definitions of 
law and of rights.  Yet we have seen that Dworkin considers the re is something beyond the 
strict legal rules to which I have confined my definition.  The difference appears to be that he 
considers these principles to be part of "the law" though different from a rule of law.  I on the 
other hand would tend to say they  are a part of the concept of justice, not law, for the very 
flexibility he applies to them fits more naturally here.  Therefore it is possible that the 
apparent Mexican stand-off envisaged before may yet be resolved. 
    What I have done is to revert to the old distinction between law and equity.  It 
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is true that since 1873 the court of Chancery was merged with the High Court.  But in the old 
days  the  Court  of  Chancery  dealt  with  Equity  under  the  Lord  Chancellor  and  his  Vice-
Chancellors and was originally a means of rectifying injustices under "the law".  It was also 
variable,  equity  being  described  at  one  time  as  „being  as  long  as  the  Chancellor's  foot‟.  
Nowadays  we  have  become  used  to  thinking  of  the  two  as  one  but  there  are  useful 
philosophical distinctions. 
Man as a Group Animal. 
    While I have outlined a purely pragmatic background to the necessity of man 
living as a group animal, the idea has considerable philosophical backing.  Aristotle's Politics 
are based on the same idea and it is useful to examine the background of the concept. 
    Aristotle's  approach was  based on the premise that humans are, by  nature, 
political, i.e. disposed to live together and co-operate.  He also believed that the polis or city 
state existed by nature and served natural ends.  Moreover he felt that the polis was prior to 
the individual members and that it arose from practical wisdom co-operating with nature.  
Now the modern state has changed completely from the polis that existed in those times but 
some of the underlying ideas persist to this day.  It is interesting to note that Aristotle's idea 
of the polis as prior to its members gave rise to the fact that when Aristotle refers to the good 
of the state he is referring to the good of the whole as a unit and not the most good of the 
individual members making up the state.  Thus he is able to contemplate things which may 
not be to the individual's advantage.  This is important because today the view is often taken 
that what is important and should be the object of government is the happiness of the most 
citizens.  I take Aristotle's view that what is most important is the „robustness‟ of the society 
(as a unit).  
    Within the limits defined by the above one may well look for the happiness, 
autonomy, and well-being of the individual citizens.  That this is in some measure accepted 
by all states is illustrated by the fact that the state expects its citizens to help defend it when it 
is attacked from without.  That this is a restriction on the citizen's freedom or autonomy 
should also be noted. 
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    The state represents the law making body.  Within the political philosophy the 
system of jurisprudence is contained, and the state sets out the laws and sanctions which it 
deems appropriate.  The State may or may not have a constitution.  It is my argument, though 
it would not necessarily be accepted by philosophers such as Raz, and certainly not by others, 
that this  is  irrelevant.    Any  constitution  is,  in  my  submission,  no  more  than  a  series  of 
normative laws which are enshrined with a special status which makes them more difficult to 
amend
25.  But in all cases any constitution can ultimately be changed, suspended, or even 
swept away, however difficult that may prove to be.  This is because Power is prior to Rights 
(a point of view wh ich I agree does not appear to be universally shared, but  for my 
justification see chapter 3), and constitutions merely set out certain desirable Hohfeldian 
privileges or freedoms which, by virtue of their incorporation into normative law, establish 
jural  relations  giving  rise  to  claim -rights  which  are  sometimes  falsely  alleged  to  be 
inalienable.  Inalienability, it could be argued, like equality, is a myth. 
    This question can be important because if one takes a “rights” based approach, 
i.e that rights are fundamental pillars of the fabric of the state, then in that case certain of the 
so  called  "rights"  could  be  held  to  affect  punishment,  and  thus  also  the  philosophy  of 
punishment.  For example, Raz, while a positivist, is greatly concerned with rights, which he 
devolves from interests in a person, such interests being sufficient to create a duty in others.  
This is a definition which, as will be seen later, is one which I totally reject on the grounds 
that it is void for incoherence. 
The system of Jurisprudence. 
    Philosophers often seek to find a  means of answering  basic questions  in  a 
deterministic way - The ultimate society; the best constitution; the definitive system of law.  
Each is to be backed by a theory, and, its proponents will argue, proves its worth as the best.  
Yet the truth is that flux and variation are the background to everything.  Nothing in the 
universe stands still and it often seems that there may be no ultimate answers to some of these 
questions.  Philosophers such as Roscoe Pound recognized this and he set it out for all of us 
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to appreciate even though we seldom do.  The truth of the matter especially with respect to 
Law was set out by him in his Introduction to the Philosophy of Law.  In chapter 2 he sets out 
the position and distinguishes twelve separate conceptions of what the law is, starting with 
the Divinely ordained such as the Mosaic law or Hammurapi's code, through the tradition of 
old customs, recorded wisdom, to a philosophically discovered system of principles relating 
to the nature of things to which man ought to conform (the Roman Jurisconsult), to the more 
strict concept of a body of ascertainments from an eternal and immutable moral code (pure 
natural law theory).  Next he cites the concept of law as a body of agreements of men in a 
politically organized society as to their relations with each other.  Seventh he says law has 
been thought of as a reflection of the Divine reason governing the universe (Thomas Aquinas' 
view which governed and affected English law until comparatively recently).  Eighth there is 
law as a body of commands of sovereign authority (Basic positivism).  A ninth idea he cites 
as a system of precepts discovered by experience enabling  individuals to enjoy the  most 
freedom possible consistent with the freedom of others. (This is in part consistent with my 
contention  that  over  regulation  is  primarily  freedom  destructive).    The  eleventh    is 
particularly interesting in that it regards the law as a system of rules imposed by a dominant 
class for the time being in furtherance of its own interests.  Finally he gives the example of 
law as the dictates of social or economic laws with respect to the conduct of men in society 
discovered by observation and expressed in precepts worked out through experience of what 
would and would not work.  
    The most important point however is that, as he went on to point out 
“each of the foregoing theories of law was in the first instance an attempt at a 
rational explanation of the law of the time and place or of some striking element 
therein."
26 
    At the time Pound first wrote this (1922), law was the law related very much to 
an enterprise society and it reflected the enterprise philosophy.  Since then there has evolved 
a very different concept of society, a society based on looking at people's wants.  This has  
been developed by some into a Welfare society which is very much the law of our current 
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society.    Today  the  enterprise  society,  although  still  encouraged  in  some  quarters,  is 
beginning to take second place to a welfare philosophy, certainly at least as far as the UK and 
the EU are concerned.  The effect of this shows in many ways in what may be considered to 
be Just, i.e it will reflect itself in concepts of justice and what we currently consider to be 
„naturally  just‟.    As  such  this  will  feed  back  in  systems  such  as  our  own  (though  not 
necessarily in other systems such as a dictatorship) as I have shown in Fig. 1 to affect the 
political input to the legal system. 
    Pound did not provide us with the same analysis with respect to justice but it is 
my contention that justice also must be based on the concept of the morality of the time and 
of the particular society at that time. 
    Thus it is my belief, that in  considering any philosophy of law, Punishment or 
Justice, it is imperative to keep two things firmly in mind:-  
  1) The relationship that I have set out in Fig.1. and  
  2) The primary philosophical inputs governing the individual parts.  
    It is  by this  means that I believe we  actually can go  further than Raz, by 
reconciling  concepts  of  „natural  justice‟  (involving  equity  and  discretion)  as  opposed  to 
„natural  law‟  with  the  concept  of  positivist  normative  laws.    Unfortunately  a  detailed 
consideration and deduction of all the principles (rules) of „natural justice‟ is beyond the 
scope of this book but it must be emphasised that in my submission the concept of „justice‟ in 
general may vary in accordance with the morals and ethics of the day and of the society. 
    To give an example, it is no longer considered morally justifiable to set „man 
traps‟ to catch poachers.  A concept of moral injustice will filter through the public reaction 
to a law or judgement, and be fed back, in a society such as ours, to the State, who may do 
something about it - as in the case of man traps, or not - as in the case where it is often 
suggested that the majority might want to reintroduce capital or corporal punishment.  In the 
U.  S.  on  the  other  hand,  some  states  have  actually  re-introduced  capital  punishment  in 
response to such reactions.  Thus the various parts inter-act or to use Raz's words, though in a 
different context, there is an internal relationship. 
    In the case of punishment we have both the Judge's discretion and the reaction 
of the public to sentences.  This is an increasing factor in today's society due largely to the far 48 
 
greater ease of communication.  Unfortunately the very means of communication may also be 
a means of influencing those informed, which is why it may be argued that it is necessary for 
governments to be free to use their own ultimate discretion.  It will be necessary for us to 
consider how this relates to a philosophy of punishment. 
    At this point a brief review of some of the arguments relating to punishment is 
called for. 
The Justification of Punishment. 
    Because of its apparent necessity, its presence in all legal systems, Punishment 
per se is rarely the subject of philosophical justification.  Moreover it is always easy to fall 
into the trap of justifying the particular punishment in terms of its deterrent, retributive, value 
etc.  In addition it is easy to confuse the justification with the legal relationship.  For example 
to confuse the justification of punishment with say the existence of a breached duty on the 
part of the perpetrator of the crime.  It is a subject where the edges seem more blurred than 
most.  Nevertheless a philosopher's attitude to this question will help determine the type of 
punishment which is considered necessary, or indeed, in some cases, whether punishment is 
required at all. 
    J.  S.  Mill  believed  in  securing  the  just  rights  of  others  as  an  aim  of 
punishment
27.  F. H. Bradley who opposed this
28  thought that Mill took the view that 
punishment was justifiable only as a means of benefiting the offender and protecting others, 
and while Bradley thought these aims desirable side effects he took the main characteristic to 
be the destruction of guilt, which created a criminal desert in the offender. i.e. a substantially 
retributive approach.  Later
29 he took the view that punishment was a reaction of the whole 
community  against  an  action  that  wea kened  it.    Moreover  punishments  need  not  be 
„genuinely moral‟, being overridden by the good of the social organism. 
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    It is interesting to note the early appearance of references to “rights”
30.  T. H. 
Green took the view that punishment was justifiable by virtue of the offender‟s violation of 
someone‟s rights
31.  As this was Punishment by the state for breach of publicly supported 
rights this separated it from private vengeance.  Bosanquet also saw punishment as the State‟s 
maintenance of rights by use of force.  It was an annulment of the wrong act, which was 
necessary to prevent the setting of a precedent.  It thus maintained moral standards and acted 
as a cancellation of the wrong act, negating the bad will of the criminal
32.  One could perhaps 
describe this as the atonement justification and there are a great many arguments in its favour.  
It is not strictly bound to morals even though „it maintains the moral standard of the general 
mind  and  will‟,  nor  necessarily  to  „curing‟  the  wrongdoer.    Nevertheless  deterrence  and 
reform are treated as part of the whole of Punishment. 
    Those who argue against the retributive theory often do so on three grounds:- 
1. Pain and sin cannot be equated 
2. An addition to the pain for reform would be unjust and 
3. Retribution makes forgiveness always wrong.  
    I would argue against these on the grounds that in case 1.  Punishment is not 
related purely to sin and morality.  In 2. it is not possible to assess these relative to each other 
(throwing the arguments used in their first proposition back at them), and in 3, Forgiveness is 
for the victim; Retribution is for the state, and in any event the punishment of the criminal is 
an aid towards forgiveness by both the victim and society. 
    There is also the utilitarian approach that punishment is justified in defence of 
the public good, but those who do not accept the utilitarian approach feel that deterrence is a 
result of publicity and Mabbot quotes a criminal as saying  "To punish a man is to treat him 
as an equal.  To be punished for an offence against the rules is a sane man's right"
33.  A 
similar argument to 2) above was used against the lex talionis  by Blackstone who argued that 
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one could not equate for fraud or forgery etc.
34 
    In many respects the views of J. D. Mabbott
35 are particularly helpful, whether 
one is persuaded by them, as indeed I am, or not.  This is because he takes a strong line in 
which he separates retribution from both deterrence and cure.  In accordance with his theory 
punishment relates solely to retribution.  
“The truth is that while punishing a man and punishing him justly, it is possible to 
deter others, and also to attempt to reform him, and if these additional goods are 
achieved the total state of affairs is better than it would be with just the punishment 
alone.  But reform and deterrence are not modifications of the punishment, still less 
reasons for it." 
    In  fact  he  goes  on  to  make  his  point  for  separation  with  extremely  good 
examples, and equates the claim of „right‟ to punish with reparation and places the question 
of forgiveness solely with the victim, and not the court or society.  Like Hohfeld his ability 
for separating disparate issues is acute. 
  But what is the relevance of these different approaches to Punishment? The answer is 
that the approach or underlying philosophy may colour the whole subject.  For example, Raz 
takes an entirely different approach to Mabbott in that he argues that there could be a case for 
disobedience  on  moral  grounds  with  respect  to  a  law  and  this  would  have  a  powerful 
influence on his approach to punishment 
    Hart's views are discussed later.  However it must be noted here that Hart 
introduces us to a useful division of the subject into definition, general justifying aim, and 
distribution.  Distribution covers liability to be punished and degree of punishment.  He also, 
like Mabbott, introduces considerations of Justice, for example that the insane should not be 
punished. 
SUMMARY - A brief look back and a glimpse forward 
    In the course of the above I have attempted to illustrate the differing views 
held with respect to some of the subjects with which we are involved.  At the same time I 
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   Though a great admirer of Blackstone I submit that this is one of his sillier arguments. Because a 
spanner does not fit every nut on my outboard motor, I do not therefore  heedlessly throw it overboard. I use it where it is 
appropriate. 
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have tried to indicate the approach which I favour and the guiding philosophical inputs.  As 
we progress I shall attempt to justify my preferences and argue their benefits. 
    The correct solution is to start from basics and discard a few myths.  It is 
however absolutely essential to distinguish just what it is one is talking about therefore all 
terms should be Hohfeldian, or otherwise clearly defined. 
    Freedom  is  a  state  and  does  not  exist  by  itself.    It  has  a  necessary  and 
irrevocable  corollary.    You  will  recall  that  I  illustrated this  by  reference  to the  simplest 
freedom - My freedom to stay in one particular spot, is maintainable only by denying the very 
same freedom not only to every other human being, but all animals, plant forms (I can hardly 
share the space with an oak tree) or inanimate objects such as a pile of bricks. 
Once  this  very  basic  fact  is  appreciated  the  whole  scheme  of  things  comes  into  focus.  
General freedom of action obtains to a person on their own.  However as soon as there are a 
number of people their interests conflict and restrictions of a general nature (plus operation 
facilitating  procedures  -  e.g  how  to  make  a  valid  will  etc.)  are  defined  by  law.    Thus 
Freedoms do not exist as rights, save only insofar as they are created by virtue of law (e.g. 
constitutional „liberties‟).  In this regard it must be remembered that a Constitution is actually 
only  a  form  of  law  which  has  been  enshrined  with  rules  making  it  difficult  to  change.  
Nevertheless all constitutions can be suspended or overthrown by force.  This is merely a 
practical application of the philosophical point which I maintain is true - namely that Power 
is prior to rights.  This will be developed in the next chapter. 
    Thus  by  definition one  is  free to take whatever action  is  not restricted  by 
normative law. 
    Law is intended to be obeyed. (Here I am taking the strict positivist view but I 
shall show later that this is not necessarily irreconcilable with some aspects of the natural law 
theory). It therefore creates claim-rights and correlative duties.  These duties must not be 
confused with non obligatory moral duties which for the sake of clarity I refer to as moral 
obligations.  (I must point out here that it may have been more logical if duties had actually 
been  termed  obligations  because  of  the  meaning  of  obligo to tie  or  bind  and  the  use  of 
obligatory as synonymous with mandatory, but the die is now cast by usage and any attempt 
to change would further muddy the waters.) 52 
 
    Basic, fundamental, or natural rights to freedom, are concepts which I believe 
to be in fundamental error because one can never define a freedom in terms which will not 
give  rise  to  conflicts  of  interest.    These  necessarily  give  rise  to  some  qualifier  which 
immediately renders the definition void for uncertainty - e.g. Does freedom of speech entitle 
one to enter a crowded theatre and shout fire?  If not, then a qualifier has to be added and so 
on ad infinitum.  Exactly the same criticism applies to Raz's attempt to define Rights.  He 
keeps recessing a step, to duties, then to interests, all with their potential conflicts etc. 
    The correct solution, which I would propound, in the case of the Freedom 
believers is startlingly simple.  It is simply that people are looking at the wrong question.  
The question is quite straightforward.  It is: Given that there is a Restriction on any given 
activity, Is that restriction Just?  The reason why I favour this question is that we can apply 
very simple logic to its resolution, as follows:- 
1. The restriction is ascertainable.  
2. The concept of justice, based on the moral precepts of the day is ascertainable. And 
3. The answer is therefore ascertainable.
36  
  At this point the whole vacillating, vague, emotionally charged and politically tainted 
„Rights  to  Freedom‟  industry  may  be  relegated  to  the  dustbin  of  confused  philosophical 
thinking from which it ought never have been allowed to escape in the first place.  
    The solution in the case of „rights‟ in general is not so simple but it requires a 
proper analysis of the jural relations involved and a clearly adopted set of definitions.  If one 
does not adopt these then frequently one is forced as it were to re-invent the wheel - as for 
example where Raz says „I shall call this a „liberty right‟ having come up with what Hohfeld 
described as a liberty in 1923.  If one adds, as he does, the word right, it merely makes one 
think he is referring to a claim-right. Now claim-rights are jural and a liberty or freedom is 
non jural, and one can't mix the two without landing oneself in the philosophical soup.  Of 
course if the „liberty‟ has been incorporated into the law by some formal means (involving an 
exercise of power) it then becomes a „right‟ properly so called, but at that stage it is no longer 
a „liberty‟, because its status has been transformed. 
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    However in order to understand fully the importance of these distinctions it is 
of the utmost importance to define our terms.  The necessity for this was set out by Hohfeld 
who was worried by the confusions that were being caused primarily by the misuse of the 
word "Rights", and I shall be following his reasoning in the next chapter.  In addition I shall 
be extrapolating from the position he established, 
If one takes these simple initial definitional steps, clarity, brevity and intelligibility are far 
more likely to be accomplished. 
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CHAPTER.  3   RIGHTS, POWER AND JURAL RELATIONS 
 
[For the non specialist: I appreciate that this chapter is not easy.  This is because we 
are going to deal with both legal and philosophical terms in difficult and 
controversial areas.  However it is logical.  What we are going to do is in essence to 
take the word „Rights‟ and show that through sloppy usage we use it to cover several 
meanings.  In fact it turns out that there are six legal and three philosophical ways in 
which the term „rights‟ may be used.  People often point out that the Germans and the 
French have two words covering this term. However, not to be outdone, we actually 
have five quite common words which define the legal uses (Hohfeld introduced a 
sixth).  So each of these meanings except one already has a perfectly adequate word 
which covers the precise use, and after reading this chapter I hope the reader will, 
whenever they see the word „rights‟, say to themselves  „Oh yes, and what precisely 
does he mean by that?‟ In order to understand the analysis we have to master a 
concept which may not be immediately familiar.  We shall be talking of opposites, 
which of course is familiar, e.g the opposite of good is bad, but then we will consider 
correlatives.  Now the best way to understand a correlative is to consider the situation 
where there is some agreement (or relationship usually referred to as a „jural 
relationship‟) between two parties.  The correlation is seen when looking at the 
situation from each party's point of view; for example if A owes B £100, then B has a 
Claim against A for £100, and A has a correlative Duty to pay B . Therefore we say 
the Duty is the correlative of the claim.  Note that: For there to be a correlative there 
must be two parties involved in some form of relationship (a jural relationship) with 
each other.  Once you are happy about this you are 80% home and dry.  It is because 
there are a number of new definitions that the whole thing looks so complicated but 
one really cannot deal with just a part of the analysis.  So, I would suggest that one 
should not attempt to remember them all at once.  The most important concepts to 
concentrate on are: that of a right as a claim; the concept of its relationship 
(correlation) with the attached Duty; the difference between a right and a privilege; 
and the concepts of Power and liability.  One can always come back as and when 
needed to clarify other points later.  
  HOHFELD 
    Many eminent lawyers and philosophers have caused a great confusion to 
exist in considering various jural relations.  In particular they use the term "RIGHTS" to 
cover a multitude of things such as claim- rights, lack of rights (Hohfeld's „no-right‟, 
Kocourek's „inability‟), powers, privileges, duties, disabilities, liabilities, and immunities.  It 55 
 
may be all very well for the public to use one word for all these things but for us to do so 
leads only to confusion and wrong conclusions. These terms and their distinctions are vital to 
any discussion in jurisprudence and the philosophy of law and justice.  They are too often 
misused and confused in current usage.  The problems involved were first analysed by 
Professor Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld of Stanford and Yale.  I have used Hohfeld's 
terminology in trying to separate some of the issues because it seems to be the best and most 
logical.  The definitions have also been used, with minor variations, by Kocourek in his 
minutely detailed analysis of jural relations. 
    Unfortunately his analysis of the terms is at first not easy to follow.  Also 
many of his examples often related to complicated trust laws, that have since been changed so 
that it is easy to overlook the quite vital contribution he made simply to clarity.  Moreover 
because his work was legally orientated and he often used difficult cases to illustrate his 
point, I believe it fails to receive more than scant and often dismissive attention.  
    He had the idea of exploring terms by first seeking out their jural opposites, 
followed by their jural correlatives.  In exploring the meaning of a word he would first seek 
out its similar applications or words ejusdem generis until he was able to separate the 
meanings into logically definable segments. 
    He began by emphasizing the necessity of distinguishing between legal 
relations and the facts that cause those relations to exist.
37  One of the examples he gives is 
the term "property" which is used to denote the physical object to which various rights 
(which as we shall see later includes privileges, powers etc.) attach.  At the same time it may 
also be used to denote the legal interests themselves.  The example which I like to use is that - 
You may believe that you have inherited your aunt's piano but it is in truth impossible to 
inherit a piano.  What you actually inherit is a bunch of legal rights, powers and privileges 
with respect to the piano.  A parallel sort of mistake is made by economists who talk of 
increasing the world's wealth which of course can not vary.  While it is all very well to use 
these words in a vague manner in general conversation the distinctions and their parallels are 
of great importance in the fields of jurisprudence and philosophy.  
    Thus, for example, Hohfeld emphasises that we must be careful to distinguish 
between an obligation and a contract:- 
“The obligation then is not the contract, is not in the contract, nor does it constitute 
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any one of its terms...When the contract is made..the binding law..being the 
obligation on promisor to perform his undertaking, eo instanti attaches...The terms 
..are made alone by the parties...The obligation is the creature of the law" 
(emphasis mine).
38 
    Again Hohfeld stressed that it is necessary to distinguish between Operative 
facts and Evidential facts.  In any jural transaction there may be operative or evidential facts.  
Operative facts are causal, they change the legal relationship under general rules.  For 
example in a contract between A and B the operative facts are that A and B are human, of 
legal age, A has made an offer; B has accepted it.  Also the fact that A has made no 
misrepresentations and B has not revoked are negative operating facts.  An evidential fact is 
one which affords a logical basis, not a conclusive one, for inferring another fact.  
    He then comes to the nub of the problem in that it is generally wrongly 
assumed that all legal relations are reducible to "Rights" and "Duties".  This is a fundamental 
mistake.  In order to illustrate this he broke down various relationships by considering their 
opposites and correlatives.  In this regard any given legal or jural relationship involves two 
people (Referred to as the Dominus and the Servus as we shall see later according to 
Kocourek).  Thus the correlatives in Hohfeld's scheme describe the same situation (jural 
relation) viewed first from one point of view then the other.  It will be seen how these 
compare with the bare opposite of a situation.  
    He sets them out in the following manner:- 
First, the opposites 
                             {   Right            Privilege        Power              Immunity 
Jural Opposites   {    
                             {   No-right       Duty              Disability         Liability 
 
next, the correlatives 
 
                             {   Right            Privilege         Power              Immunity  
Jural Correlatives{   
                             {   Duty             No-right         Liability           Disability 
 
    As they appear above (which is all that is usually quoted of Hohfeld) it seems 
difficult to accept.  They appear to be just an arbitrary grouping, and not really of much use.  
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It is only when we examine the way Hohfeld came to reach these definitions that their 
purpose and usefulness really become apparent. 
    He started by considering the relationship of:- 
RIGHTS & DUTIES 
    First he looked at the way „right‟ was defined by lexicographers to show the 
various meanings it included.  He concluded that in law, and in general practice, it was most 
frequently associated with a correlative „duty‟.  The nearest synonym for right was a legally 
well founded „claim‟ and the synonym for the correlative duty was obligation.  In support he 
quoted inter alia Viscount Haldane L.C. in Howley Park Coal etc. v L.& N.W.Ry.[1913] 
A.C. 11.
39  
"There is an obligation (of lateral support) on the neighbour, and in that sense there is a 
correlative right on the owner of the first piece of land." 
    Thus „Right‟ in Hohfeld's sense should be thought of as a Claim-right 
or well founded claim.  Duty is the associated correlative on the part of the other 
party.  Where X has a right viz a viz Y, then Y has the correlative duty.  So for 
example, if I owe you £100. You have a claim against me and I have a duty to pay 
you.  In short you have a right to the £100 and I have a duty to pay it.  
    However this by no means covered the potential uses of the word rights.  
The first problem we come up against is - What about the case where a so called 
„right‟ involves no correlative duty?  These situations he classified as Privileges rather 
than rights and the distinction is important because as we shall see they do not 
involve the same correlative.  Therefore they are not the same thing. 
 
PRIVILEGES & NO-RIGHTS 
    A right can and must be distinguished, as he did, from a „Privilege‟.  The 
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example he gave was that, Where X owns some land, we know that X has the right that Y 
should stay off his land, and Y has the duty to do so (right and duty as correlatives as above).  
But, in addition X, as the owner, also has the „Privilege‟ of going on the land himself i.e. he 
has no duty to stay off, nor does this „privilege‟ give rise to any correlative duty on anyone 
else's part.  This it would have done had it been a „right‟ to go on the land as we have 
previously been using the word i.e. someone would have had a duty to let him do so.  So the 
proper word for X's ability to go on his own land is Privilege not „right‟ - (if he had a right to 
go on the land, someone, against whom he had that right, would have had to have had the 
duty to let him do so - and that can happen but in entirely different circumstances).  
    Again referring to the example of X's land, - the correlative of X's privilege of 
going on the land is that Y (who does not own the land) has No-right to go on to it.  Hohfeld 
coined the expression „no-right‟ for the correlative of privilege as the only term which was 
not already covered by a word in general usage.  Nor does there appear to be a close 
synonym. 
    This actually is not as surprising as it might seem, for Rights (claims) had 
been used legally to cover both positive and negative claims and the opposite of a right or 
claim was merely its absence, a no-right.  Similarly this is the correlative of A's privilege 
(from B's point of view) i.e. a no-right. (A has the privilege of going on his land; B has no 
right to go on it corresponding to A's privilege).  [In passing we should note that the opposite 
of a Privilege (which if you like is a form of benefit) is in fact a duty]. 
    However, just to complicate the issue, it must be noted that one can have more 
than one of these relationships simultaneously.  For example, if X (the owner) had, say, 
contracted with Y to go on the land to do something for Y, then X would have both the 
privilege and the duty to go on the land.  This is important for the terms right and privilege 
are not mutually exclusive but the privilege is the exact negation of a duty having the same 
content.  
    He illustrated this by considering Professor Gray's example from  The Nature 
and sources of Law (1909), where Gray maintains that it was a right of his to eat a shrimp 
salad for which he has paid.  Hohfeld disagreed and maintained that he had the privilege of 
eating the salad for which he had paid viz a viz A,B,C, & D who have no-right to eat it.  His 59 
 
rights viz a viz A,B,C & D are that they should not interfere with his eating the salad.  Now, 
argued Hohfeld, if X who owns the salad contracts with Y not to eat it, then viz a viz Y, X 
has no privilege of eating the salad.  However his right that Y should not eat it is unaffected.  
This again is important because by virtue of confusing rights and privileges it is often 
erroneously assumed that the alteration of a privilege affects a right and vice versa.  Such is 
not the case but it can erroneously appear so if both are regarded as „rights‟, which is why it 
is so important to make sure we are using the correct word.  
    Another example is that a trader has the privilege of carrying on his business 
as best he sees fit.  The closest synonym of Privilege is perhaps certain uses of Liberty (or 
legal freedom).  However Hohfeld pointed out that, while „Liberty‟ is used, it is not as 
frequent as „Privilege‟ and it is in fact more likely to be used in the sense of bodily freedom.  
Indeed Kocourek emphasises this point and points out that freedom in its proper sense is non 
jural - This is a most important point which we shall be taking up later.  
    To avoid another possible confusion, privilege is not the equivalent of licence.  
Hohfeld did not regard Licence as synonymous with Privilege.  He pointed out that a licence 
merely represents a group of Operative Facts required to create a privilege.  
    The next problem is that „right‟ is so often used when it is intended to mean 
„power‟. e.g. "He has the right to do that", meaning "He has the Power to do that.  Sometimes 
the word authority is used but this is in reality delegated power as „The Sheriff has the 
authority to...‟. So we will now consider:- 
POWERS AND LIABILITIES 
    In analysing POWER Hohfeld felt that 
“Too close an analysis might seem metaphysical rather than useful; so that what is 
here presented is intended only as an approximate explanation, sufficient for all 
practical purposes."
40 
    It must be remembered however that Hohfeld was concerned primarily with 
Legal conceptions and not particularly the philosophy involved.  Later, it is intended to go 
into this aspect of Power as an extrapolation.  Hohfeld defines Power by considering how a 
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change in a legal relation may occur.  This may be due to some super added fact, or group of 
facts, which either are or are not under the volitional control of a human being (or group of 
human beings).  
    However, where the control is volitional then the person or persons whose 
control is paramount may be said to have the legal power to effect the change of legal 
relations that is involved in the problem.
41  In other words where there is some legal 
relationship, it may be altered because of something that happens or is done.  Where the facts 
bringing about the change are under the volitional control of someone, then those who have 
the control to effect the change are in fact exercising Power.  He then proceeds to consider 
the nearest synonym which seems to be (legal) ability, the opposite of which is inability or 
disability.  So he classifies disability as the opposite of power, and Liability as its 
correlative.  This may be illustrated by the fact that, referring back to the case of the piano 
you inherited you have the power to contract to transfer its ownership to me.  I am then liable 
to take up the ownership. 
    He points out that to use „right‟ in this case is as confusing a misuse as is 
„capacity‟ (again this word merely denotes the Operative facts).  As examples he points out 
that X as an owner of property can extinguish his own legal interest by the operative fact of 
abandoning the property - (he takes the piano down to the local dump).  He has the power to 
transfer his interest to Y, to create contractual obligations etc.  He pointed out that the 
concepts are particularly useful in considering Agency cases where the Principle grants legal 
powers to the Agent with the creation of correlative liabilities in the Principal.  Liability has 
a close synonym in responsibility.  Also it must be noted that the liability can in fact be 
positive or negative (because the power itself may be positive or negative - rather in the 
manner of claim rights which can also be positive or negative). 
    Finally amongst our considerations a „right‟ may often be used to describe an 
Immunity. 
IMMUNITIES & DISABILITIES 
    Immunity is the opposite of liability. There may normally be a liability to 
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perform (or avoid) an act, but there are cases where a person may be immune from that 
liability, i.e it is the opposite of the liability.  Similarly Immunity is the correlative of 
Disability.  If the power to affect the relationship lies with X, then Y is under a correlative 
Disability. 
    A Power bears the same general contrast to an Immunity that a Right (claim) 
does to a privilege. i.e. a Right is a claim against another and a privilege is one's freedom 
from the claim of another.  Power is control over a legal relation over another and Immunity 
is freedom from that control (power).  The best synonym for Immunity is exemption or 
Impunity. 
    As an example Hohfeld states that X, as a landowner, has Power to alienate to 
Y.  But X has Immunities against Y .  Y is under a disability in that he has no power to 
alienate the land. [or X has the power to sell or give/lease etc. the wretched piano to Y, but 
Y‟s disability is that, much as he may want it, he has no power to cause X to let him have it.] 
    If a sheriff has a writ of execution to sell X's land, the Sheriff would have the 




    The reason for all these distinctions is by now I hope apparent.  We are talking 
about different things and they have different legal and philosophical ramifications.  I take 
Hohfeld's view that the word "right" should properly only be used when referring to a claim-
right and that this involves a correlative duty. 
    It should not be used to refer to a Privilege because this does not involve a 
correlative duty.  The correlative here is a mere no-right. 
    Again, "I have the right to do that" should not be used when referring to an 
immunity from a duty (e.g. a duty not to do something).  So where I have a licence to come 
on your land, say to do a job, I am immune from the duty to stay off your land.  Of course if 
questioned your response would be „You can't throw me off, I have a right to be here!‟ but we 
are being legally and philosophically technical here and what you actually have is an 
immunity, i.e. “I am immune from the duty to stay off”. 62 
 
    Also, and most importantly, "I have the right to do that" should not be used 
when we mean "I have the Power to do that".  Remember Power involves the ability to affect 
legal relations.  It does not involve the correlative duty , the correlative is the liability of the 
other party.  An exercise of Power forms a new jural or legal relationship.  A „right‟ properly 
so called is just a claim under an existing jural relation.  Power is prior to right (this will be 
discussed later). 
    These distinctions become very important when dealing with the philosophy 
underlying so much of what are loosely termed "rights" and therefore affect our approach to 
some of the subjects we are going to discuss in the following chapters.  For example when 
there was a general duty to be called up for national service, the State had the Power to call 
you up and you were liable to join the forces.  If you were at University say, you might be 
deferred, so that for that period you were immune from the call up.  However you did not 
acquire a general right not to be called up. 
    The shades of difference are not always easy to illustrate, which is why they 
tend to get blurred under the one word.  The most important distinctions however are those 
between Power and rights, and Rights and Privileges.  These are particularly important when 
people start talking about „Natural rights‟ when probably they may be referring to some form 
of privilege. 
EXTRAPOLATION. 
    Utilizing the same terminology I have re-arranged Hohfeld's categorization 
into RIGHT'S based subdivisions and POWER based subdivisions as follows:- 
 
  I.  A RIGHT is one person's lawful claim against another. 
    e.g. One has a RIGHT: 
    - not to be assaulted 
    - to light 
      It is interesting to note in passing that a RIGHT IS SECONDARILY 
something created by the exercise of A POWER. 
               There is no antithesis of a RIGHT in the sense that a right can be both Positive and 
Negative and a further word for a negative right is therefore not required. 63 
 
    The Opposite of a right is a NO-RIGHT. 
    The exercise of a right brings about its correlative DUTY for the other party 
involved 
    e.g. one has a DUTY: 
    - not to assault others 
    - not to obstruct light 
    SECONDARILY to do whatever has been imposed as a result of the exercise 
of the power. 
      A PRIVILEGE is an EXEMPTION from a DUTY. 
      i.e is a freedom from a RIGHT. 
 
  II.  A POWER is the ability to alter the legal status quo. POWERS are accorded 
under the Law 
 
    e.g. one has the POWER: 
    - To make a will 
    - To transfer property 
    - To make a contract 
      The lack of power or its antithesis is a DISABILITY. 
    The exercise of a POWER brings about its correlative LIABILITY for the 
other party. N.B. LIABILITY as used by Hohfeld can be both positive and negative. 
    e.g on the other party there is the LIABILITY: 
    - to inherit under the will  
    - to receive or take up the property 
    - to perform the contract
42 
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      An IMMUNITY is an EXEMPTION from a LIABILITY 
                           i.e is a freedom from a POWER 
 
This may be summarized another way:- 
  A RIGHT is a claim v. another [+ or -] 
  The exercise of a  RIGHT  induces a   DUTY (Correlative) 
                    Lack of a       RIGHT           is a   NO-RIGHT (Opposite) 
            Exemption from a DUTY             is a   PRIVILEGE 
 
 
  A POWER is the ability to alter Legal Relationships 
  The exercise of a  POWER induces a   LIABILITY [+or-] (Correlative) 
                   Lack of a        POWER         is a     DISABILITY 
         Exemption from a   LIABILITY   is an   IMMUNITY. 
 
    It is important to note that in choosing to categorize the definitions under 
RIGHTS (i.e. claim-rights) and POWERS I have chosen the two capacities the exercise of 
which involves a Jural relation.  Hohfeld is not primarily concerned with the detailed analysis 
of jural relations.  This is the province of Kocourek, and we shall examine this later.  This 
manner of categorization is also important when considering the underlying philosophy, 
because it is my position that power must be prior to rights. 
 
RIGHTS IN REM AND RIGHTS IN PERSONAM. 
    Before amplifying on the nature of Power it is extremely useful to consider 
Hohfeld's subsequent analysis of Rights in rem and Rights in Personam.
43 
                                                                                                                                                  
well have argued that there is a general duty to perform agreements (Stemming from the right to make them) and 
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forceful because there are no lines of absolute demarcation. 
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‘Rights in rem’ (i.e. rights which avail against persons generally) ‘Rights in personam’ 
(rights which avail exclusively against certain persons). 
    Again Hohfeld points out how the expressions in personam and in rem have 
been used in a confusing manner and he introduces the phrases „paucital‟ relations for 
relations in personam, and „multital‟ relations for relations in rem.  I shall be adopting these 
definitions. 
    The first misuse that Hohfeld clarifies is that a Right in Rem is not a right 
"against a thing", and he quotes Holmes C.J. in Tyler v Court of Registration (1900) 175 
Mass. 71,76 
“All proceedings, like all rights, are really against persons.  Whether they are 
proceedings or rights in rem depends on the number of persons affected." 
Again the correct interpretation was set out by Austin in his Lectures on Jurisprudence or 
The Philosophy of Positive Law 1832:- 
“The distinction between Rights....is that all pervading and important distinction 
which has been assumed by the Roman Institutional  Writers as the main groundwork 
of their arrangement: namely the distinction between rights in rem and rights in 
personam; or rights which avail against persons generally or universally, and rights 
which avail exclusively against certain or determinate persons." 
 
  Thus in rem indicates a general application and in personam a limited or specific 
application.  Hohfeld uses the expression Multital right for a right in rem and Paucital right 
for a right in personam.
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  He states that the Multital right or claim (Right in rem) includes:- 
1. Multital rights or claims relating to a definite tangible object e.g The landowner's 
right to prevent entry; chattel owner's right that the object shall not be harmed. 
2. Multital rights in relation to non tangible things Patents etc. 
3. Multital rights with respect to his own person. (no false arrest etc.) 
4. Multital rights residing in A but relating to B. Alienation of affections etc. 
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5. Multital rights not residing in the person or object. Right not to be libelled, not to 
have privacy invaded etc. 
    Hohfeld took the position, which I support, contrary to some other legal views 
that a „right in rem‟ does not comprise a single right with a single correlative duty resting on 
all persons against whom the right avails.  Instead he took the view that it comprised many 
separate and distinct rights, actual and potential, each one of which has a correlative duty 
resting upon some one person.  He proved this by reverting to the example in which A owns 
Blackacre and X is the owner of Whiteacre.  A pays B $100 in consideration of which B 
agrees with A never to enter on X's land Whiteacre.  C & D for separate considerations also 
make similar agreements with A.  In this case A clearly has rights in personam (paucital 
rights) against B, C & D.  No one would assert that A had only a single right against the 
three.  One of them could breach his duty without involving the others.  Only if B, C & D 
agreed to be responsible to see that the others did not breach their duty could there be said to 
be a common or joint duty.  Similarly he deduces that the same considerations apply to A's 
respective rights in rem (multital rights) against B,C,D and others.  
    He quotes Collins M.R. in Thomas v Bradbury, Agnew, & Co. Ltd. [1906] 
2 K.B. 627 at 638 
"The right" [privilege] of fair comment, though shared by the public is the 
right" [privilege] "of every individual who asserts it, and is, qua him, an 
individual right..." 
    Similarly he maintains a duty in rem, or multital duty, is merely one of a large 
number of fundamentally similar duties residing in one person.(e.g. our duty not to trespass 
on any of the land of others).  Again this is not a single duty - imagine the case you are under 
a duty not to strike people but if X threatens you his right is extinguished and becomes a no-
right, and you acquire the privilege of self defence. 
  A Multital right or claim should not be confused with any co-existing privileges, or 
other jural relations that may co-exist with it with respect to the same subject matter.  For 
example A is the owner of Blackacre: A has multital legal rights that others should not enter; 
He himself has privileges of entry, user etc; Power to alienate; Legal Immunities etc so in fact 
he has multital (in rem) right-duty relations; multital (in rem) Power-Liability relations; etc 67 
 
and they should not be confused as, for example, his privileges are totally independent of his 
rights etc. 
  Finally a Multital primary right or claim (Right in Rem) must always be carefully 
distinguished from the Paucital secondary right (Right in Personam) which arises from a 
violation of the former. 
EXTRAPOLATION WITH RESPECT TO POWER. 
  From a review of the above it becomes apparent that from the point of view of 
Jurisprudence as opposed to a discussion of fundamental legal conceptions POWER also can 
be Multital or Paucital.  In jural relations between individuals powers arise under the laws of 
a particular society and these powers are in effect paucital.  It is the Multital Power to affect 
the Laws (not the jural rights and relationships under the laws) that is the primary power of 
the society.  That power may have its source in a military regime, a religious order of society 
or a democracy etc. These latter are merely the politico social set ups for the relevant society.  
They  may be varied depending on the body possessed of the multital power to vary the 
substantive laws, as opposed to those possessed of the paucital powers and multital rights 
created by the laws.  It does not matter whether the source of these powers is as Hart 
describes them or otherwise, at least so far as the resulting paucital powers are concerned 
once they are established.  It may however have a marked effect on the manner in which 
changes are made. 
      A right (claim against another) is activated by virtue of enabling facts 
(I trespass on your land).  The potential right is created by the exercise of a power i.e. the 
Normative laws under which rights in rem and rights in personam may arise are the result of 
the exercise of a multital power by the rulers of the society.  Therefore it might be argued that 
rights (claim rights) are power dependent and can thus never exist in their own right, i.e. they 
can not be prior to the power to create them.  Thus we can never have claim rights that are 
prior to the law that creates the jural relation under which by virtue of the operating facts they 
are activated.  Of course that does not prevent the creation of whatever „multital rights‟ (or 
„unpolarized rights‟ as Kocourek  might describe them) that the state wishes to create under 
the law, nor does it prevent such rights being given the added protection of being written into 
a constitution, if so desired.  What cannot be supported however is the existence of any such 68 
 
right prior to its creation, which is really what is being alleged by the eternal inalienable 
rights brigade.  I suppose the closest one could get would be that one has the „right‟ to think 
whatever one wants.  But again it will immediately be perceived that this is not a right 
properly so called.  There is no jural relation, no right to voice the thoughts without possible 
reaction and retribution.  It is at best a Privilege.  The idea of rights existing prior to the 
power to create them is what I call “The Great Rights Myth”.  Later I shall be introducing the 
concept of an Inherent right but I shall seek to show that it is not a pre-existing right. 
GENERAL 
      There are of course further uses of the word RIGHT that Hohfeld did 
not consider and these relate to its use in the moral sense of right as opposed to wrong.  Even 
here it contrives to be a slippery word and may be used in the sense of:- 
1) Just, the Latin justus (= just, equitable, honest, lawful, proper, right);  
2) Meritus (= merited), or  
3) Aequus (= equal, level, fair). 
    So for philosopher or lawyer RIGHT is a word which should only be used 
when its meaning is clear i.e generally as a Hohfeldian claim-right.  As failure to be explicit 
can undermine both philosophical arguments as well as legal interpretation I would suggest 
that we could do a lot worse than adopt Hohfeldian definitions which are to my mind 
amongst the clearest and most logical, as well as legally and philosophically supportable, so 
far produced. 
THE APPLICATION OF HOHFELDIAN PRINCIPLES TO OTHER ASPECTS. 
    A further problem often arises outside the field of law.  People often speak of 
Moral rights and Moral duties.  This again leads to confusion as a „moral right‟ is not 
enforceable  by law and might therefore be best distinguished from a right, unless we are 
prepared to realise that the addition of the prefix moral nullifies the enforceability.  My view 
therefore is that in this case we might be best to refer to a „Moral Claim‟.  The correlative 
would be a moral-duty.  This is of course unenforceable as it is not covered by law. 
I. CONSIDERATION OF MORAL RIGHTS, DUTIES ETC. 
 First restating Hohfeld we have:- 
    {Right                 Privilege                Power                       Immunity 69 
 
Jural Opposites   { 





                              {Right              Privilege                  Power                  Immunity 
Jural Correlatives { 
                              {Duty               No-Right                 Liability          Disability 
 
So we might have when considering MORAL RELATIONS :- 
 
                    {Moral Claim            Freedom                  Authority         Dispensation 
Opposites   { 




                      {Moral Claim          Freedom                    Authority            Dispensation 
Correlatives  { 
                      {Moral Duty           No-Moral Claim        Obligation          Inability 
 
CONSIDERING NOW MY PREVIOUS RE-ARRANGEMENT:- 
 
I.  A RIGHT is a claim v. another [+ or -] 
     The exercise of a claim-Right   invokes a   Duty    (Correlative) 
             Lack of a       Right             is a           No-Right (Opposite) 
   Exemption from  a  Duty              is a           Privilege 
 
II.  A POWER is the ability to alter Legal Relationships 
     The exercise of  a     Power  invokes a  Liability  [+or-]  (Correlative) 
          Lack    of  a          Power     is  a       Disability    (opposite) 
     Exemption from  a    Liability   is an    Immunity. 
 
WE CAN NOW APPLY IT AS FOLLOWS TO THE MORAL EQUIVALENTS:- 
III. A MORAL-RIGHT is a moral-CLAIM against another. 
  The exercise    of a    moral-Claim    invokes a    moral-Duty. 
          Lack         of a     moral-Claim     is a              No-moral Claim or  NO-CLAIM. 70 
 
 Exemption from a       Moral-Duty     is  a            Freedom. 
 
IV. Moral Authority is the ability to influence moral relationships. 
    The exercise of moral-Authority          invokes an   Obligation. 
         Lack of         moral-Authority         is an              Inability (to influence) 
Exemption from an          Obligation        is a                Dispensation.    
    The adoption of the above, or a similar set of distinctions would provide a 
useful tool in clarifying the problems, and might thus aid in their resolution. 
 
  KOCOUREK 
For the non specialist: Kocourek was another of the great legal/philosophical 
geniuses of the twentieth Century, and as such dealt with very complicated issues.  In 
fact he devoted a whole work to the definition and analysis of jural relations.  So 
detailed is it that he required a great many extra definitions.  As these contained terms 
such as „Allophylaxis‟ and „Autophylaxis‟, „Biactive integral conflicts‟ and 
„Polypolic‟ relations you may well breath a sigh of relief that I shall be referring to 
only two of them namely zygnomic and mesonomic jural relations, and like 
everything else about Kocourek they turn out to be exceptionally logical.  They will 
be further explained when we need to use them. 
    The importance of Kocourek is that he followed Hohfeld and provided an even 
more profound analysis particularly of jural relations.  Like Hohfeld, Kocourek starts by 
analysis and definitions.  Thus the reader always knows what a word is intended to 
encompass and is not met with sudden re-definitions halfway through a theory.  The first 
thing he points out is that legal phenomena involve three things:- 
1. A system of potential rules.  They await application in concrete cases. 
2. Situations of fact upon which the rules operate, and  
3. Jural relations - The connecting link between the law and the social activities upon which 
the law is to operate.  
“ It is not enough that there be law in the abstract, set over against a material content 
of social activities.  It is just as necessary here that there be a connecting principle, as 
that the steam compressed in a steel tank be connected with a system of valves and 71 
 
levers...... The connecting principle between the force of the law and the material 
social context upon which it is to operate is the jural relationship, `juris nexus,' or 
`juris vinculum'.  Since the law does not govern every possible situation of fact, it 
follows that jural relation, likewise, does not attach to every situation of fact.  Jural 
relations come into existence, are subject to modifications during their existence, and 
lastly they submit to destruction.  There are always large fields of social activity 
where jural relations do not exist. These are the fields of liberty where legal 
regulation does not extend except in a negative sense.(emphasis mine).
45 
 
    He goes on to point out that there are only two ultimate jural relations - claims 
and power.  Thus Kocourek takes up from the point I had extrapolated from Hohfeld by 
dividing the generic concept of rights into the two basic categories of a) rights (Hohfeldian 
claim-rights) and b) power. In addition I had shown that power was prior to rights which is 
of vital importance philosophically, though possibly not from a jurisprudential viewpoint, 
where I suspect it is quite naturally assumed. 
    Like Hohfeld, he takes immunity to be the reciprocal of claim, and privilege 
to be the reciprocal of power.  However as we shall see he makes a greater distinction than 
Hohfeld did with respect to freedom.  He maintains  that the capability to claim an act from 
another is a right (in a strict sense).  The capability to act against another being a power.  
“If the word right is given a strict meaning it is never correct to say that one has a 
„right‟ to do this or that. One may have the „liberty‟ to act or the „power‟ to act."
46  
    So he too maintains that the correct use of right is a claim even though 
in general use it encompasses other things. 
    One of the most important points Kocourek makes very early on is that jural 
relation may be roughly described as  
“a situation of fact by which one person presently or contingently may affect the 
natural physical freedom of another person with legal consequences." 
    Freedom however is non jural.  One may act for himself and this is freedom.  
As freedom is a non jural act it is not protected as such.  If freedom is exceeded it becomes a 
wrong. 
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    According to Kocourek the central idea of law in a formal sense is power (in 
its technically restricted sense).  This is translated to all jural relations.  The example he gives 
is the best explanation:- A has the power to make an offer of contract to B.  B has the power 
to accept (or refuse).  A has the power to revoke his offer before acceptance.  B has the power 
to perform the contract and the power to destroy it by non-performance.  Thus even though a 
duty may flow from the Servus
47 its performance is by way of power.  In short power is the 
fundamental determining factor.  Thus as I have argued, the concept of power, (and also in its 
unrestricted sense), is prior to claims (rights) because no jural relation can come into 
existence without its operation.  In these circumstances I believe my assumptions are fully 
supportable. 
        To Kocourek a right, in its broadest sense, is the generic term 
for the dominant side of a jural relation.  It may include a claim, immunity, privilege, or 
power.  It excludes Liberty, Freedom, and all general negations of ligation (the servient side 
of a jural relation).  Here Kocourek distinguishes liberty and freedom in greater detail than 
Hohfeld. 
The important thing to note is that some of these terms involve jural relations, and others do 
not. 
     Thus it may be said that, given the necessity for recognizing the different uses 
of the word rights and given the necessity for distinguishing between jural and non jural 
relations, it is possible to argue that rights involving duties are not derived from interests.  
Jural rights are creatures of the law.  As such they are politically derived and the concomitant 
duties have a totally different source from moral duties. 
    What I propose to do now is to take a more detailed look at the analysis of 
jural relations which involve inter alia claim-rights and their correlative duties, because I 
shall be arguing later that there is a positive duty to obey the law which means that I shall 
have to establish that there is a jural relation between the citizen and the state. 
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  JURAL RELATIONS 
For the non specialist: The following is going to appear difficult at first blush. 
Kocourek is generally regarded as very difficult.  However most of the trouble comes 
about because he uses unfamiliar terms to refer to concepts which we haven't dealt 
with before.  In fact his logic is as smooth as silk and he is a joy to follow once the 
initial feeling of drowning wears off.  We are not going to go into his full analysis of 
all the possible legal relations as this is not necessary for our purposes.  This has the 
advantage of cutting down the number of new definitions or terms which will be 
used.  Fortunately it also cuts out the more horrendously complicated ones, and what 
I have done is to put the definitions of the new terms in bold print so that one can 
find them easily whenever that sinking feeling comes on. 
    Kocourek goes beyond Hohfeld in establishing a mathematical relationship of 
jural functions.  Not only does he analyse the constituent parts of terms such as rights, 
defining them largely in terms similar to Hohfeld, but he proceeds to define the basic terms.  
Thus he defines a right properly so called as the capability to claim an act from another.  This 
is a Hohfeldian claim-right.  Power he defines as the capability to act against another.  
Immediately he distinguishes Power, Liberty, and Rights by saying
48 one may have the 
liberty to act, or the power to act but never the right to act.  He points out that one may act 
for oneself which is freedom, and that jural relations are situations of fact by which one 
person may affect the freedom of another with legal consequences. 
    Freedom itself is non jural and is not protected as such.  Protection he says 
comes through the armour of legal ideas and directly through claim rights.  This is another 
way of arriving at the conclusions I put forward earlier that the only „right to freedoms‟ were 
those specified by virtue of the normative law (which by definition includes a constitution).  
He uses the same example as Hohfeld: One has the freedom to walk on one's land (Hohfeld 
tends to refer to this as a privilege) but one has no claim right to do so.  He also correlates 
duty to the existence of a claim. 
    However he points out: 
“The claim that one has to an act from another must not be confused with the physical 
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power of a person to act on his own account.  A landowner has freedom to walk on 
his land.  This is the landowner's act.  He may have a claim not to be molested by 
another, but that claim is to the act of another. 
  Freedom is not a legal relation because it is one sided.  A relation always 
involves two elements or two sides.  Freedom is protected by the law by various 
claims and powers, but in itself is not within the law.  It is rather the end of law.  
Where Freedom ends the Law begins, and where the law ends Freedom begins".
49 
    A relationship according to Kocourek can be seen in two ways:- 
  In the „Wide sense‟ it is any fact that is shared between any two things e.g. A is red 
and B is blue.  The concept of colour is a shared concept.  However in the „Narrow sense‟, 
which is where our interest lies, it is an interconnection between two things with no third 
point of reference.
50 
    In Chapter IV he defines JURAL RELATIONS as:- 
  "The conceptual fact of domination of the legal personality of one person 
in favour of another.  The term is used interchangeably with Legal relations.  
The proper distinction is that a legal relation is a concrete relation while a jural 
relation is the legal relation considered abstractly.  Courts deal with Legal 
relations. Jurists and theorists deal with Jural relations".  
    I have quoted the above rather more complex definition in detail because, 
although it is phrased in the way of legal personality this is merely designed to include such 
things as bodies corporate.  Our concern is with jural relations and legal relations, primarily 
between people.  However it is interesting to note the closeness to legal relations.  In every 
relationship there must be two parties, a Dominus and a Servus and a single, although at 
times highly complex relationship.  
 
    At this point one should clarify a few more of Kocourek's terms:- 
DOMINUS   ="The legal person who controls a Right". 
SERVUS       ="The legal person who bears a LIGATION". 
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LIGATION  ="The generic term for the servient side of a jural  relation.  It includes 
duty, disability, liability, and inability; it excludes such terms as no-duty and no-
liability since they are not relational in a jural sense". 
    N.B. Rights and Duties involve a relationship between the Dominus and              
Servus.  
RIGHTS   =  "The capability to claim an act from another". 
POWER    =  "The capability to act against another". 
    In practice Kocourek's analysis is comprehensive, and breaks jural relations 
into 22 different types requiring 17 pages of Glossary of new terms, but for our purposes
51 it 
is really only necessary to consider the two which I mentioned before; Zygnomic and 
Mesonomic relations- 
ZYGNOMIC    are those where there is a constraint on the Servus with the support of the 
law. 
MESONOMIC where it brings about a result of which the law will take notice. 
 
    To use Kocourek's example:- D makes an offer of his promise for the act of S. 
  This creates a power in S to accept (and the law takes notice of this) but there is no 
physical contract implied.  So far the relationship is mesonomic. 
  The acceptance by S will constrain D into a zygnomic relation. 
    Now the whole point of this, as far as I am concerned, is that it shows by 
virtue of Kocourek's very detailed and consistent theories that the duty when it arises, arises 
as the result of the zygnomic relationship, which is, as I propounded, a creature of the law, 
and is brought into being by an exercise of power.  It is not, as Raz alleges, created by 
someone's interest creating a duty which in turn gives rise to a right. 
    It is possible that Raz would argue that his proposals relate to moral duties and 
that the law is, at least in part analogous.  I would counter by saying that moral duties are 
only analogous, in that while the law acts upon a zygnomic duty to enforce the same, a moral 
duty is one which may be regarded as being voluntarily self-enforceable.  It is not even 
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mesonomic so it stands no chance of becoming zygnomic.  For example:- if I am a member 
of a religious organization which maintains it is one's moral duty to give X % of my income 
to the organization, I may so do.  The reason that I do is because I wish to belong and be 
deemed a proper member of the group.  Let us say that it is also regarded as one's moral duty 
to eat only raw root vegetables and wear jute underwear to scourge the flesh.  Hell fire and 
immediate plague is threatened to those who disobey.  Unfortunately I become allergic to raw 
root vegetables and my jute underwear is causing other problems.  I give up both and find 
that rather than fire and plague I am no longer plagued with flatulence and my sores heal up.  
Vastly disillusioned I reject the religion, i.e. I no longer wish to be associated with them in 
any way and as for having another penny out of me... 
    Now in both cases, that of my belonging and being bound by a duty, and that 
of no longer belonging and rejecting the duty, the governing factor has solely been my desire 
to belong or not.  There may have been ancillary inducements (such as the threat of hellfire 
and plague) but these are indirect.  Raz may argue that my desire (one way or the other) is an 
indication of my „interests‟ but there is no way that these give rise to a duty to wear jute 
underwear.  Even if I am the high priest and it is in my interest that my flock have sufficient 
faith to endure the hardships, this cannot possibly be said to give rise to a duty in others.  The 
whole question of moral duty involves intentionality, and intentionality is one thing that Raz 
omits from his „reasons‟ for obeying the law. 
SUMMARY 
    What we have done is to provide several very useful definitive words to 
enable us to avoid confusion by using the word „rights‟ in a sloppy manner.  More important 
still we have shown by investigating „jural relations‟ that words such „right‟ properly so used 
i.e. as a claim-right involves a jural relation.  „Power‟ also involves a relation, but a word 
such as „privilege‟ which is frequently described as a right, in fact does not involve a jural 
relation.  And it is this that makes the distinction important because it shows that we are 
talking about entirely different concepts.  Moreover this extends to other concepts such as 
„Freedom‟.  One simply can not lump concepts that involve a jural relation and concepts that 
do not under a single word without causing confusion and inaccuracy.  Therein lies the great 
Rights Myth. 77 
 
    We have also seen that as Freedom is a non jural state there are no natural 
Hohfeldian rights to freedom.  There are only those „rights‟ created by law.  It is the failure to 
realize this that has given rise to the great rights myth. 
    We have also noted for the first time the importance of intentionality, which 
will feature in later discussions, particularly with respect to criminal law. 
    Having dealt at length with the factors involved and analysed some of our 
more difficult terms we can proceed to the more practical aspects of the various inter-
relations between the subject and the state. 
  (8681- 05 -05-06) 
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CHAPTER 4.   
  OBEDIENCE  TO  THE  LAW  &  CONFLICTS  OF  LAW  AND  MORAL 
OUTLOOK. 
    Having established a proper meaning for certain words it is now possible to 
start considering questions of conflicts between obedience to the law and moral outlooks.  
Often these are incorrectly expressed in terms of rights; rights to freedom, animal rights, the 
right to do what you earnestly believe etc. 
    Because  of  the  frequency  with  which  attitudes  or  alleged  freedoms  are 
presented in terms of "rights" it was imperative that we conducted the investigation of the 
previous chapter.   Without that understanding, false claims can appear more logical than they 
really are.  We have also established some ideas about the philosophical difference between 
law (as I define it in a positivist fashion) and justice.  However definitions do not always cure 
problems, even though they may help define them, and there are a few problems quietly 
ticking away.  The first is really exemplified by the exponents of Natural Law theories.  The 
fundamental proposition here is that the validity of any law is founded in morality.  If it can 
be claimed that a law is invalid because it is grossly wrong then presumably it does not have 
to be obeyed.  This of course strikes at the roots of legal positivism and is the reason for the 
apparent  irreconcilability  of  the  two  theories.    Even  the  positivist,  who  may  accept  the 
validity of an objectionable law is faced with the problem of how far it is permissible to go in 
disapproving or fighting a law which he believes to be morally wrong. 
    Now  the  interesting  thing  is  that  while  people  often  talk  of  things  being 
morally wrong they quite frequently fail to link that with justice.  A morally unsound law is 
bound to be an unjust law.  In this chapter we will look at the practical aspects of obedience 
to the law and moral conflict.  In the next we shall examine  the fundamental role that the 
concept  of  justice  has  to  play  in  two  areas  namely  1)  Reconciliation  with  Natural  Law 
theories and 2) How the law deals with those cases where it does not actually cover the 
situation before the courts - Dworkin's “Hard cases”.
52 
    To  look  at  why  anyone  should  obey  the  law  it  is,  in  my  submission, 
insufficient to say that the law is a reason for its obedience.  Facts are never reasons.  One has 
to look at the „objects‟ of law generally (as opposed to its specific purposes).  Laws came into 
being  with  societies  as  a  means  of  regulating  the  behaviour  patterns  of  those  societies.  
Originally  such structures were purely  and  simply top down structures  i.e.  the  law was 
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decided by the rulers with virtually no input from the governed.  Despite libertarian theories 
such as those of Rawls, today's societies are still essentially top down structures.  Even with 
the most advanced democratic society once the government is elected it puts its policies into 
practice.  It is true that there is a regulating factor in that if it goes too far it is unlikely to be 
re-elected.  Even so, the government that is elected in its place will essentially carry out its 
own program and there is no guarantee that any, let alone all, of the wishes of the people will 
be met.   
    The relationship of a government with the governed is that the object of the 
government (apart from remaining in power) should be to run the society in a manner which 
will  be competitive and preferably  better than those of other societies with which  it  has 
contact, i.e.  so that it is just, and flourishes in the Aristotelian sense.  If it does not so flourish 
the society will fail, its people will suffer and ultimately it stands in danger of being taken 
over by another stronger society.  In order to carry out its policies the government provides a 
behavioural  framework for  its people.  This  framework  ideally  has to be consistent with 
providing them with protection and, at the same time, giving them as much freedom as is 
consistent with safety and competitiveness with respect to other societies. 
    From this approach it may be argued that people in a society do have a moral 
obligation at least, though many would argue that it is more, i.e.  a duty, to obey the law.  
This is because that society represented by its government, offers the people protection, it 
offers them law and order, and in return the people who accept that offer, have a jural relation 
with the society, to obey its laws.  So long as they are free to leave and do not, that duty 
prima facie remains extant.    Moreover it would seem that this argument is accepted in 
practice.  Every society expects its citizens to obey the law.  If they do not, punishments are 
imposed.  If there were not a duty to obey the law the punishments themselves would be ultra 
vires. 
    This is an extremely simplified resume of one argument allowing for a duty to 
obey the law.  It is enough merely to show that it is possible and logical for such to exist.  
The important issue is that however such a duty arises it brings about a jural relation between 
the individual and the state.  This means that the whole system of rights of the type that a 
philosopher  such  as  Raz  would  describe  them,  as  arising  out  of  „interests‟  (which  are 
undefined) of a „sufficient‟ (without a means of determining the quantum of sufficiency) 
nature as to create a duty (but with no parameters governing the manner of their formation), 
falls away.  The frequent confusions between duties and moral obligations also falls away for 
we are now dealing with the jural relations of the law, and as both Kocourek and Harris J.  (in 80 
 
Aycock v Martin) recognized it is the law which creates such duties. 
    Indeed as Raz acknowledges, though for different reasons (i.e.  because he is a 
positivist), morality is not directly relevant to the law.  However it is my argument that it is 
highly relevant to concepts of „justice‟.  Thus if there is a prima facie duty to obey the law, 
Civil Disobedience would be illegal and it would not be necessary to have to contrive to 
make  it  illegal,  as  Raz  does,  by  suddenly  introducing  the  concept  of  having  a  legally 
protected right to political participation as a form of justification. 
    There is another argument, which is the one I prefer, which goes as follows:- 
  In  any  society  in  which  there  are  laws  which  provide  for  punishment  for  non-
compliance therewith, those laws have established an unpolarized jural relationship between 
the State and the people.  The law specifies the duty to obey by virtue of its provision that the 
specified acts are unlawful.  Moreover the law provides an indication of the sanction to be 
applied if it is breached.    A breach of the law causes it to become polarized as a legal 
relationship between the State and the criminal.  The State has a right to punish, and the 
criminal a duty to accept the punishment.  Looked at the other way, from Society's point of 
view,  having  accepted  the  State's  protection  in  return  for  society's  compliance,  it  then 
becomes the State's Duty to punish and the criminal has a Right to be punished.  At first 
blush, the idea of a right to be punished may seem strange.  Nevertheless you will recall my 
quote from Mabbott (See ch.2. p.41).  This is in fact the same as saying that the criminal has 
a No-Right not to be punished though I feel it is more difficult to follow when put this way. 
    It should perhaps be noted that the criminal law which is what we have been 
talking about is negative and is thus reflexive, and involves two relationships a) Society and 
the  State  and  b)  The  State  and  the  Offender,  which  makes  following  the  jural  relations 
difficult.  In the case where there is no law relating to an action the citizen is free to do or not 
do it.  As to any moral duties he may feel, they do not, as I have argued elsewhere, create any 
jural relation. 
    In case all this sounds rather theoretical and not frightfully relevant it might be 
wise to consider two very practical matters that our decisions with regard to point a) above 
will bear on, i.e.  1) Civil Disobedience and 2) Conscientious objection.  In order to examine 
these thoroughly let us examine the position taken (and the difficulties encountered) by Raz 
who has written extensively on the subject.  His view is that of a positivist but also that of a 
dedicated libertarian.    I have particularly chosen Raz because although he is a positivist, his 
views on the nature of law and particularly of „rights‟ are developed on a completely different 
basis from mine.  In his first work he dismisses Hohfeld with an uncharacteristic attack, and 81 
 
pursues a course of „practical reason‟ to build up his theories.  However to:- 
A.  CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE. 
    Prior to dealing with this subject Raz has argued for and concluded that ‘there 
is no moral obligation to obey the law’
53.  He then asks whether there is a moral right
54 to 
break the law. 
    He is anxious to emphasize that his argument for denying a moral obligation 
to obey turned in part on the fact  that on numerous occasions a breach of the law has no 
adverse effect.
55 
    However he states that this is hardly ever true of Civil Disobedience which 
almost invariably has some adverse consequences.  So we see that he has perceived a need to 
deal with conflicts which he foresees will arise from the extraordinary starting point that there 
is no moral duty to obey the law.  Nevertheless (it gets worse) he goes on:-  
“No doubt, civil disobedience is sometimes justified and occasionally is even 
obligatory." 
56 
    But he then hastily steps back and adds that it is not his intention to justify 
disobedience but question whether there is, in certain circumstances, a moral right to disobey.  
Nevertheless questions still abound.  For example, one finds this somewhat difficult to square 
with the preceding statement. 
    Raz's argument for denying an obligation to obey, stems, as we have noted, 
from the rather curious reason that certain breaches of the law have no adverse consequences.  
In an attempt to get out of the dilemma which this approach immediately conjures up Raz 
introduces a distinction between an unjust state and a reasonably just one, so that  
“in  a  reasonably  just  state  any  consideration  in  favour  of 
disobedience has to overcome a presumption against it based 
                                                 
53     A position with which I fundamentally disagree. 
54   This in my submission would be at best a privilege, unless he is going to argue that there is a correlative duty 
on the part of society to let people break the law on moral grounds. 
55   So does closing your eyes and firing a gun.  However on the odd occasion you could kill someone.  Not 
exactly the best argument for no moral right not to indulge in the random firing of guns.  So much for practical 
reasoning, which is how Raz arrived at this strange conclusion. 
56   A. of L.  P.262 82 
 
on the accompanying undesirable results."
57   
But  to  this  one  must  ask  What  results?  and  judged  by  subjective,  utilitarian,  or  whose 
standards?  Raz does not say. 
    The question Raz seeks to answer is:-„In certain circumstances is there a moral 
right to disobedience?‟  He starts from the presumption, with which he agrees, that civil 
disobedience, which he defines as 
 “a  politically  motivated  breach  of  law  designed  either  to  contribute  directly  to  a 
change  of  a  law  or  of  a  public  policy  or  to  express  one's  protest  against,  and 
dissociation from, a law or public policy". 
is sometimes justified or even obligatory
58.  He says that many authors favour a stronger view 
that there is a right to civil disobedience.  Here, it is not altogether clear as to whether he is 
referring to a right as something which one is entitled to do, i.e a privilege (equivalent to 
walking on one's own land) or a full blown claim -right (entailing correlative duties on the 
part of the law to allow such disobedience to take place).  No doubt there are those who hold 
the full range of views.  He attempts to distinguish between the two degrees of right by 
discussing the moral right to freedom of speech
59.  Now again it will be noted from our 
previous findings that whereas there may be Moral argume nts in favour of this or that 
freedom, there can be no moral rights in favour of any freedom.  Once the freedom is 
enshrined in a law it becomes a right (moral, immoral or amoral!). 
    Again he is anxious to preserve the idea of a right to disobedience as h e says 
(at p.  266) 
 
“  At first blush it may be thought surprising that one should have a right to do that 
which one ought not.  Is it not better to confine rights to that which it is right or at 
least permissible to do?  But to say this is to misunderstand the nature of rights.  One 
needs no right to be entitled to do the right thing.  That it is right gives one all 
the title one needs.  But one needs a right to be entitled to do that which one should 
not.  It is an essential element of rights to action that they entitle one to do that 
                                                 
57   A.  of L.  p.262. 
58   Ibid. p.266. 
59   Here again Raz uses „right‟ where in some cases the word freedom would be more appropriate, and in others 
where „privilege‟ would be better. Unless the Hohfeldian distinctions are maintained, the only result is confusion. 83 
 
which one should not." (emphases mine)
60  
and (at p.267) he says:-  
“The evil the disobedience is designed to rectify may be so great, may indeed itself 
involve violence against innocent persons (such as the imprisonment of dissidents in 
labour camps in the Soviet Union), that it may be right to use violence to bring it to 
an end." 
    He starts from the idea that everyone has a right
61 to political participation.  
He maintains there are limits to that right, i.e.  to respect the right of others to participate.  It 
is, he says right that the restrictions should exist and it is best that they should be enumerated 
by the law.   Then he says, to the extent that they are reasonable they become morally 
binding.  His argument is similar  to saying that insofar as the restrictions are just they are 
valid but, in my view, it is very far from being the same thing.  He then says, States divide 
into those that are liberal (allowing adequate recognition to the principle of participation) and 
illiberal when it does not.  Unfortunately there is no definition of „adequate‟ participation and 
we are still faced with the fact that it is quite possible to have a benign dictatorship with just 
and reasonable laws which would apparently fall into Raz's „illiberal‟ definition.   
    Nevertheless, Raz concludes, as a result of his stated preference for a liberal 
state, 
 1) That all states ought to be liberal and 
 2) while there is no right to civil disobedience in a liberal state there is in an illiberal one.  He 
argues that, given that an illiberal state violates its members "right to political participation", 
then people whose „rights‟ are violated are "other things being equal" entitled to disregard 
offending laws and exercise their moral right as if it were law.  One must point out however 
that this reasoning, though sometimes accepted as politically correct today, has certainly not 
always been so, even in acknowledged liberal societies. 
    Raz maintains that the case is reversed in a liberal state.  This is because one's 
right to political activity is protected by law. - “It can never justify breaking it."  However, 
apparently frightened by such a forthright statement, Raz immediately pulls back from the 
                                                 
60     Unless it is very clearly qualified, the underlined statement is quite terrifying.  It is the underlying philosophy 
of every fundamentalist and terrorist that has ever existed.  Yet nowhere has Raz imposed a qualification, or 
managed to establish objective criteria for what is right.    This is hardly surprising, such a definition having eluded 
mankind to date.  According to this statement one could justify the murder of Salmon Rushdie, etc.  Moreover it 
seems quite apparent from the words in bold print that he really does appear to be talking about a right i.e a claim 
right. If he really means what he has said, then libertarianism has acquired a deeply seditious new aspect. 
61   A.  of L.  p.271. But as to whether this is a Freedom or privilege, or a claim right he does not say.  If the latter it 
would, in my opinion, have to be based upon an interpretation of our adherence to conventions, or a long standing 
aspect of the common law.  This again shows the weakness of using the term „rights' in an undefined way. 84 
 
brink and says  
“this does not mean that civil disobedience is never justified" and he points out that " 
a liberal state was defined in a rather technical narrow sense .  It may contain any 
number  of bad or  iniquitous  laws.  Sometimes  it  will be right to  engage in civil 
disobedience to protest against them or against bad public policies."   
    Thus presumably only in liberal states where all the laws are good laws, is 
civil disobedience wrong.  However Raz maintains that a person, to justify his act can show 
that the act is right.  Or, says Raz, he can show that he has a right to perform the act (even if it 
is wrong).  Raz says in a liberal state that the second argument is not available.  The only 
moral claim must be based on the “rightness of the act".  But as I have pointed out it may be 
possible to hold the view, and it certainly was held, even at the beginning of this century, that 
much  of  what  Raz  may  think  is  right,  was  then  considered  wicked,  pernicious,  evil  and 
wrong.  He does however reject the concept that civil disobedience is a matter of last resort. 
    This  subject  is  important  because  the  question  of  disobedience  and  its 
„justification‟ must ultimately affect one's basic approach to the law in general, punishment, 
and the whole society one lives in.  Whereas the attitude of the disobedient to the acceptance 
of punishment (because of the so called „justification‟ of their actions) may be irrelevant to 
the  principles  underlying  the  disobedience,  they  certainly  are  relevant  to the  question  of 
punishment under the law. 
    Raz's whole philosophy on Morals and Ethics is subject to his determinedly 
libertarian stance.  One gets the impression that he has very fixed ideas of the end position he 
intends to reach and he attempts to get us there largely by Practical Reasoning
62.  However 
when he feels he is headed in the wrong direction he tends to bring in a qualifier to bring us 
back on course.  A perfect example of this is the requirement for a state to be liberal, and 
provided it is, then one should not break the law.  I am afraid that I find making up the rules  
as one goes along a) highly disconcerting and b) philosophically disingenuous.  It leaves me 
with the feeling that I am being led to a predetermined destination, and if the road we are 
going down heads in the wrong direction we merely throw in a traffic d iversion to bring us 
                                                 
62   „Practical Reasoning‟ to the uninitiated is something which started out in good shape under Aristotle but which 
of late has become a specialist subject in its own right and has now a very high I.Q.(which here stands for 
Incomprehensibility Quotient).  I attended a four day symposium on the subject and was about to throw myself 
over a cliff when a very learned head of a philosophy department quietly admitted that he had been completely lost 
after the first ten minutes.  There are several good books on the subject, but whatever you do don't hang around 
when the „Cabots‟ start speaking to the „Lodges‟.  A postal course on quantum mechanics is much more fun. 85 
 
back on course. 
A Different View 
    How are we going to deal with these problems? Perhaps they are not 
resolvable, or perhaps we can only get somewhere by looking at a different set of questions.  
The intractability seems to stem from this question of the validity of various laws.  Now I 
have made my position plain, I am a positivist who believes that a properly constituted and/or 
recognized law is valid - period, full stop, end of message!  There is therefore in my view a 
prima facie duty on people to obey that law.  Break it and you render yourself liable to the 
consequences. 
    However the law already has the power to ask, though it does not make much 
of a show of doing so, two further questions, namely 1) Is this law Just? and 2) Is the 
application of this law just in this case? Judges have been known to say „I find you guilty of 
the offence as charged, but justice will not be served by sending you to prison..etc.‟ This may 
well happen in the case of extenuating circumstances, or of course as is already incorporated 
in the law, where a person is mentally incapable of realizing the effect of their actions. 
    So by granting a prima facie duty to obey the law we do away with 
considerations of whether the state is moral or not, or whether the law might be invalidated 
because someone doesn't like it.  But we do have two slightly different questions to ask in 
relation to Justice.  So you may ask What have we gained? The answer is - a lot.  As I 
indicated earlier, when faced with a restriction on liberty, i.e.  in this case the law we are 
concerned with, the question to ask is, „Is this restriction (law) Just‟?  At that point we know 
the following: 
1) The law is ascertainable. 
2) The concept of Justice based on the moral precepts of the day, is ascertainable, And 
3) The answer is therefore ascertainable.   
    Note however, the fact that we may have determined that a law is unjust does 
not necessarily mean that it is invalid, that it ought to be repealed or that we have any right 
to defy it.  Other factors come into play at this stage, e.g.  wartime emergencies, the public 
good, etc.  etc. 
    Moreover, even having ascertained that the law is just, there still remains the 
question „Is the law just in respect of this person in the light of the circumstances of this 
case‟?  The law is already used to answering that question and the practice, at least in the case 
of mens rea, or intention, or the defendant's capacity, is well established. 
    So let us look at a some practical examples - First:  86 
 
The case of Twyford Down.  Here the new Winchester by-pass was finally determined.  
There had been twenty years delay while every conceivable objection had been heard at 
innumerable public hearings.  Even the fate of flowers, moths, and the possible extinction of 
sundry creepy crawlies had been mulled over.  The European commission had been brought 
in and very probably the Parson's cat had been consulted as well.  Nothing of course is 
mentioned of the injustice done to those who were killed and maimed over the twenty years 
that the old and highly dangerous road had to remain unaltered.  Finally after the most long 
winded and thoroughly democratic and expensive consultations a decision was made.  Those 
who didn't like it promptly took to the trees and at great expense and after further delay (in 
which no doubt further road deaths occurred) were finally removed.  What should have 
happened of course was that a declaration of „fair Judgement‟ should have been made; the 
tree dwellers should have been informed that the trees would be cut down at a certain time 
and the rule of Volenti non fit injuria
63 should have been invoked so that anyone being felled 
with a tree who broke their arm (or preferably their neck) would have to pay their own 
hospital bills/funeral expenses.  That would have stopped what has now become an anti 
establishment game. 
    Of course Twyford Down was a very clear cut case in that the consultations 
were extraordinarily thorough.  So let us look at a far more difficult case, a case where 
tempers (and fists) can really fly: What about Fox Hunting, where saboteurs seek to disrupt 
and smash the property (and sometimes the person) of wicked people who chase cute looking 
cuddly little foxes on horrible great horses with hounds that tear the cuddlies to bits with their 
blood smeared fangs? - (View 1 complete with poetic licence). 
    The fact that these cute little cuddlies are in reality verminous, mange ridden, 
tick carrying, highly offensively smelling, cold blooded multiple killers (and not just for 
food) in their own right and the best potential spreaders of rabies were it ever to appear here - 
(View 2 complete with poetic licence) is not allowed to enter the equation.  So, there is not 
much agreement here.  The case has not been adjudicated or subject to Public enquiry.  Nor 
would a public hearing do much good.  The views of both sides are largely entrenched, 
though not necessarily always as vehemently as I have tried to put them in the interests of 
establishing a case of maximum conflict.   
                                                 
63   Volenti non fit injuria: That to which a man consents cannot be considered an injury, or a volunteer shall not 
complain of his injuries.  So for example participating in a boxing match.  So also no-one can enforce a right 
which they have voluntarily abandoned.  Unfortunately the law is making inroads on a previously robust principle. 87 
 
    For the Hunt Saboteurs it is a matter of Active civil disobedience in pursuit of 
a cause about which some of the participants feel very strongly morally justified.  In my 
submission there is a moral obligation to obey the law and therefore active law breaking (let 
us not pussy foot about calling this civil disobedience) is not to be countenanced and should 
be put down particularly harshly „pour encourager les autres‟.  If one objects to a situation, 
there are many ways of making out one's case, and the excuse that Civil Disobedience 
(lawbreaking) is an effective way of publicising one's cause is not sufficient.  One can 
imagine the reception one would get to smashing a windscreen of a car, and leaving a notice 
inside saying "Don't buy Bloggo Trainers"! Yet the only difference here is the depth of 
feelings involved.  But need it be? The person wielding the brick may earnestly believe his 
children's feet have been ruined by Bloggo Trainers and he believes it his duty to save others.  
If passion of belief justifies crime, then we must exonerate Hitler, and allow Salmon Rushdie 
to be murdered.  You simply can not have it both ways. 
    But so far we have considered a society such as ours where there are alternate 
means even though they may be less effective.  What about the Suffragettes fighting for the 
right to vote?  Here often the main harm was self inflicted e.g.  chaining oneself to railings, 
and yes this is a privilege that everyone has (providing you do not block a right of way).  
Note this is quite different from active civil disobedience.  In some countries people go on 
hunger fast to publicise their beliefs.  This too is a Privilege which is not denied to one, and it 
is all the more effective because it shows the depth of the feelings held.  Setting fire to 
oneself is somewhat more flamboyant and of course there is less chance of being around to 
see if it was effective.  Nevertheless it is a recognised and practised form of protest.   
    If a person is prepared to endure hardship their views must command some 
respect.  If they are merely prepared to play costly and obstructive games with a soft hearted 
administration then they should be forcibly quashed.  That is just, but to punish a man who is 
on hunger strike for his beliefs would be quite unjust.  So the protesters could go on public 
fast, or set fire to themselves.  Instead they choose the soft option of playing games at public 
expense.  That option should not be available. 
    However the problem becomes difficult when there is a substantial minority, 
often well organized, pressing a claim e.g. to ban fox hunting, which they maintain, rightly or 
wrongly, is in reality the majority view.  When things have reached such a pitch the only 
thing to do is to put it to the test.  Where there is a large and powerful group making such a 
claim the Government could challenge them to put up the finance (possibly with some fiscal 
aid) to cover a referendum.  The result would be acted upon by the government. If the result 88 
 
were positive the law would be changed and if not no further referendum would be accepted 
for say seven years.   
 
B.  CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION. 
    In considering conscientious objection Raz says one must distinguish between 
the private act and the public one.  However in the case of the conscientious objection the law 
has to be assumed to be morally valid (e.g.  conscription) and the person's view, though 
deeply held, as wrong.  As he very correctly points out one cannot give such a morally wrong 
view priority just because it is intensely held.  However this, he maintains, is directly 
distinguishable from the situation above, where he allows that a deeply held moral conviction 
may permit disobedience.  The distinction appears to be in the moral validity of the law.   
    Raz maintains that society is right in that it requires a person to shoulder the 
responsibility of his own convictions
64.  However he foresees the difficulties of providing a 
law recognizing a right to conscientious objection as threefold: 1) It is open to abuse, 2) It 
encourages self doubt, and 3) Unless the basis of a simple declaration is allowed, there will 
have to be a necessary invasion of privacy of the objector
65.  His solution is that the laws 
should wherever possible be framed so as to avoid conflicts with justifiable minority views.  
He concludes that this is not an ideal solution and that any right not to have one's conscience 
coerced must remain a prima facie one.  The trouble that occurs when he considers Civil 
Disobedience was that he allowed for a case in which the laws may not be morally valid.  
Regrettably, nowhere has he given us any parameters for distinguishing between the two. 
    In considering the case of Conscientious objection, we have the reverse case to 
Civil Disobedience.  Here a person refuses to perform a positive act on the grounds of a 
firmly held conviction.  Here the question, to my mind, is not, Is the law just?, but rather - Is 
it just that the law should be applied to this person in these circumstances? Both Raz and I 
obviously feel that the law is just.  Raz feels that unless a simple declaration is accepted there 
will have to be an invasion of privacy of the objector.  Not so in my submission.  Once the 
objector refuses to obey the law, which Raz acknowledges to be morally valid (and therefore 
just), the onus shifts and it lies with the objector to show that his views are long held and 
genuine, not merely a temporary convenience.   
                                                 
64   A. of L. p. 281/282. 
65   A. of L. p.287. 89 
 
    However the case that Raz did not consider is that which happened in the 
U.S.A.  There, many youngsters who might well have fought for their country had it been 
attacked, refused to take part in a war which they felt was unjust and none of their country's 
business.  In this case they would be unable to justify their stance on the ground of long held 
general moral principles of non violence.   
    It seems to me that this is a most difficult case and that the objectors only 
options were to leave the country or go to gaol.  This is not a good solution and it leaves the 
problem of what the state's attitude should be when those who left try to return.  It is possible 
that the state could refuse to have them back unless they served their prison sentence.  On the 
other hand it could be argued that this is not the proper punishment.  So my argument would 
proceed - What has the state lost? - The services of a soldier for say two years.  So perhaps 
the punishment should be the cost of replacing that soldier e.g.  by a mercenary.  This would 
then be imposed as a fine and the person not allowed re-entry until the fine plus interest, were 
paid.  Of course this could result in the objector having to remain outside the country for 
some time but they took the decision to flee, and can hardly expect to be welcomed back. 
    Presumably a person might always be likely to disobey a law if that law were 
regarded by him as being so unjust as to be morally repugnant.  And if there were sufficient 
like minded people the disobedience of the law would become apparent.  But in such an event 
each agent's reasons would include his attitude which would have to be such as to overcome a 
positive duty to obey.  There would be no question but that such disobedience would be 
punishable.  Of course such a system would be more strictly positivist, in one sense, than 
some positivists would wish, but it would still allow the courts to apply „justice‟ to each 
situation within the law.   
    This still leaves us with the problem of can we break the law? if so when? and 
Why? Now it seems to me that the answer to the first question should always be - Prima facie 
No.  Raz would agree if the state is a liberal one.  But this seems unsatisfactory to me because 
he indicates that this is because the subjects are assured of political participation.  But at least 
in our society that does not mean that the people get what the majority may want (e.g.  the re-
introduction of capital punishment even if a majority wanted it), nor does it cover the case of 
the benign dictator.  It seems to me that a straightforward prima facie No, based on a duty to 
obey the law is much clearer and more effective.  I think the Great Law Myth is that I only 
obey if I like it (oh well if you want to be unctuously sanctimonious - if I morally approve).  
To which the reply is - And who is to say your moral high ground is right? Not necessarily I 
for one!. 90 
 
    This gets us only so far, but the problems arise when we start to take in moral 
viewpoints, because for example in the case of Conscientious objection Raz assumed, and 
rightly I believe, that the law [requiring military service] was a justifiable one.  However the 
pacifist could well most earnestly believe that it was a total moral affront and an iniquity.  Of 
course we could argue that acceptance by the majority, or by officialdom (per Hart) justifies 
the law.  But that might let in the situation in Germany or Russia, so we are back in trouble 
whenever we try to place an objective assessment on the law as a criteria.  What I think we 
have to do is accept that the law, if it is not ultra vires, must prima facie be obeyed. 
    Even so there remains the question raised at the end of chapter 2.  i.e.  with 
respect to the question as to whether a restriction of freedom (or a law) is just.  It will be 
recalled that I suggested:- 
1.  Ascertain the restriction (or legal requirement). 
2.  Ascertain the current moral ethical view as to what might be just in these circumstances. 
3.  The answer as to whether the restriction (law) is within the parameters of the moral 
precepts of the day is then ascertainable. 
  If according to the moral precepts of the day, as currently accepted, the answer to 2 is 
that it does not conflict, then the answer to 3 is that the restriction (law) is just.  If the answer 
to 2 is that it is no longer considered just, then we have a different situation. 
    Perhaps it is best to explain with an example.  Take the change in the laws 
against homosexuality:- 
In answer to 1 there was a very definite restriction on freedom. 
In answer to 2 for many years the prevailing moral attitude was that these laws were morally 
correct, and just. 
Therefore in answer to 3 the laws were regarded as just. 
    Time passed and the time came when the answer to 2 became „No‟.  This does 
not mean that those who felt this way necessarily approved of homosexuality.  Many did not 
but they came to realize that the laws were not just.  Thus they came to be changed. 
    Now let us take an interim stage where there is a law and some people start to 
believe it is unjust.  The majority still believe it is right.  This actually occurred in the above 
situation and it was gradually appreciated that imprisonment was unjust.  It took time but the 
change was effected by persuading parliament.  A similar case obtains today for example 
with respect to smoking cannabis.  Arguments are being presented that in some cases it has a 
medical benefit etc.  Changes in this fashion are slow, particularly if they are brought about 
by a change in the moral response to question 2.  In the meantime those who feel morally 91 
 
justified in their disagreement may or may not break the relevant law (not any other law) at 
their own discretion depending on the strength of their feelings.  They do however pay the 
consequences if caught.  As public opinion changes there comes a tendency for the law to be 
less rigorously enforced.  Moreover these days, because of the access to information and 
speed of communication, changes in attitude are liable to be somewhat faster than in the past.  
As to whether that is a good thing or not is an interesting question, but not one that can be 
pursued here. 
    But  what  about the  case  of  Animal  Rights?  This  is  a  hard  case  for  some 
because the minority are not acting for themselves but for a group that can not express its 
own feelings.  Here a vociferous minority believe that society's actions amount to an outrage 
against the animals concerned.  Admittedly they couch this in terms of Animal's rights, which 
I maintain is a philosophical error.  My view is that it is arguably a breach of the fundamental 
responsibility which goes with the power of the dominant party in any relationship.  This will 
be  developed  later  but  even  this  theory  gives  rise  to  cases  where  I  would  side  with  the 
unjustly treated animal.  So the minority feel that although society is currently answering 
question 2 as „yes‟, it should properly be answered „No‟. 
    It  is  still  my  view  that  their  proper  recourse  is  to  persuade  parliament  to 
change its mind.  Here I am completely at one with Raz, because we know that this can be 
done in our society, therefore there is no excuse for breaking the law.  If they wish to go on 
hunger strike, or set fire to themselves, or any other thing which may persuade but does not 
violate the established or normative claim-rights of others that is one thing.  To take the law 
into their own hands is not acceptable.  When they feel they represent the majority they 
should organise a referendum to prove it. 
    When, if ever in our society, does breaking the law become acceptable?  What 
if I perceive an immediate danger to society from toxic waste for example?  It is still my view 
that in a society such as ours the solutions are persuasion or the Gorbachov solution.  This 
does not rule out, nor is it the same as saying that there are situations when one can justify a 
breach of the law - e.g. assaulting a person in self defence, but this involves a justifiable over-
riding of the law, not a moral objection to it. 
    If then the law should be broken, that decision of necessity must be made on a 
subjective basis.  There can be no objective external measuring scale.  For example, I believe 
law X is evil.  Therefore a) I will not obey it.  Or b) I will fight it.  In case a) we fall into the 
conscientious objection category as before and the court will have to consider whether the 
law is just in its application to this particular person. 92 
 
    In case b) fighting a law.  There are many ways this can be done: In chapter 2 
I set out the five reactions to living in an unjust state.  In a just or substantially just state the 
parallels are not exact and the order is reversed, so that we have the following:- 
 1) Giving in and complying, which the majority follow; 
 2) Leaving (Tax exiles); 
 3) Disobeying where it affects you (Conscientious Objection); 
 4) Persuasion (Lobbying etc.); 
 5) Joining the system and altering it, 
     Here, we wish to oppose the law.  In a civilized society this reduces us to 
options  4  &  5.    There  are  still  many  ways  to  do  this.    One  can  petition,  lobby  one's 
representatives both local and national.  One can form a party with ones objectives clearly set 
out and persuade others to join you until you become powerful enough if your cause is right.  
This is moving towards the Gorbachov position and is a less dramatic version of it.  Finally 
you can protest, go on hunger strike or set fire to yourself.  All these are available to you in a 
democracy.  What you do not do is break the law or another law to make your point.  Once 
this is acknowledged as legitimate or even acceptable, you are started on the slope to anarchy. 
    Very well, I hear the Rights lobby say, even if we accept this (which isn't half 
as much fun as joining in and encouraging rent-a-mob and sitting down and being carefully 
carted out of the way by policemen and subsequently appearing on Television), what about 
the really serious case which Raz cited about people being arrested without trial and sent off 
to the gulags.  Well what about it?  In a society such as that was at the time, sitting down in a 
frozen Moscow street would  not have got you very  far.  The rules of  such societies are 
different, and the cases are just not analogous.  You would merely have ended up in the gulag 
without trial.    All  you  would  have got for  your trouble was arrest and possibly piles or 
frostbite.  Of course you are justified in resisting such a law, but in this sort of society it 
seems to me that passive non conformity or civil disobedience will be ineffective.   
    One is then faced with a more active alternative and a drastic one.  Perhaps if a 
number of people had set fire to themselves it would have had an effect.  More likely it would 
not, the deaths would have been covered up and not reported.  As I say the whole situation is 
different.  The only course in the case of such repression appears to be to take up arms, go 
under ground if necessary, and fight.  But it is disingenuous to use it as an example to support 
a „right‟ to resist by breaking the law in lesser situations. 
    In fact in some of our end conclusions Raz and I are not as far apart as I may 
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“The evil the disobedience is designed to rectify may be so great, may indeed itself 
involve violence against innocent persons (such as the imprisonment of dissidents in 
labour camps in the Soviet Union), that it may be right to use violence to bring it to 
an end." 
    I would agree.  There definitely are evils against which one is right (morally 
justified) in taking up arms and committing violence in so doing.  Where I disagree is that 
this should in any way be related to the normal disobedience designed to change a law which 
morally offends some (but not everybody - e.g.  fox hunting).   
    A better example, I feel, is the one I cited, the use of animals for experiments.  
The situation Raz gave as an example where people are being tortured is virtually a situation 
warranting violent action if only in self defence.  On the other hand the example I chose is 
something that also deeply disturbs me.  Yet I believe my duty to obey the law is such that I 
would not participate in the actions of Animal rights activists, which have been on occasions 
robust to the point of violence. 
    Perhaps what is needed is a means of distinguishing between the two.  In one 
sense  Raz  has  already  given  us  this  when  he  says  that there  is  no  justification  for  civil 
disobedience in a society that is liberal (which in this case he defines as one in which political 
participation is guaranteed).  For the reasons I have given I do not agree with this criterium, 
though I agree with the conclusion. 
    There are plenty of ways in which we can attempt to get the law changed 
without disrupting other people from going about their legal activities (however abhorrent 
they may be to one personally).  In short even where it is not possible to get the law changed 
as quickly as one would wish I believe that there is still an overriding duty to obey the law.  
There is little short of a quasi war situation which would morally permit us to break other 
laws. 
    This may sound unduly harsh but I am convinced that the imperative of 
maintaining the rule of law in any society is of the highest priority.  Only where the means of 
changing the law by legal means is absent, and where the government cannot be changed (i.e.  
not because it has an overwhelming majority, but rather because there is no legal means of 
changing it) may there be a case for breaking the law, and as I said previously this will be 
tantamount to a civil war situation. 
    However there seems to be a case which slips through the net we have 
considered, and it comes about because most people take a liberal society as being 
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society to favour freedom for the individual in principal but in practice the opposite can 
easily be true.  Under the banner of utilitarianism, and pandering to and protecting the masses 
against their own stupidity, there can grow up a vicious and evil bureaucracy, benevolently 
conceived but which then grows like a malignant cancer, convinced that its knowledge of 
what is best is absolute, and red in tooth and claw in its determination to maintain and expand 
its control.  In the name of what is „right‟ this army can inflict hideous injustices on the 
individual.  Already we have seen children torn from their parents in the dead of night, and a 
man who shot a bureaucrat who ordered him to pull down a house he had built on his own 
land because it apparently had not been granted „permission‟. 
    A few years ago there was a case of a cheese manufacturer, Duckett's Dairy in 
Somerset, whose whole business was destroyed, not because there was anything wrong with 
it, but the ministry had found a means of doing so without resorting to the courts and they 
could not resist the exercise of power.  The case was described in the press as “a saga of 
official incompetence which promises to break all records"
66.  Otherwise it seems to have 
been ignored.  There need apparently be no compensation and the man and others were 
presumably destroyed.   
    Now that sort of injustice does not bring me out in favour of Civil 
disobedience, it practically brings me out in favour of armed revolution.  So great are the 
injustices committed by bureaucrats that I can sympathise with the man who shot the 
planning official, and had someone tried to remove even my dog in the dead of night there 
would in all probability have been another dead or seriously wounded bureaucrat lying in the 
gutter.  It seems that in this monstrous world where planning and regulation transcends 
justice there is no recourse for the individual who is not in a position to defend himself.  This 
appears to me to be a primary cause for the deterioration of the standing of the law, with a 
consequent growth in the incidence of Civil Disobedience.  Now it seems that if we are to 
discourage Civil Disobedience and encourage obedience to the law in general we have, inter 
alia, to provide a means for the citizen to counter the deadly bureaucratic hand. 
    There are of course a number of solutions, but in order to correct these 
injustices it would virtually be necessary to re-establish a separate court of Justice, where a 
wronged person may go to plead that the law in its present application to him in these 
circumstances results in an injustice, or that the remedy decreed is unjust.  Moreover such a 
court would have to be free to all citizens, but to prevent its abuse there would have to be a 
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preliminary hearing rather like the former grand jury to establish a prima facie case.  The case 
ultimately would have to be heard by 1-3 Appeal Judges (or their equivalent) aided if 
necessary by experts.  The proceedings would be simplified as to evidence and 
documentation.  The result, being specific to the circumstances would not necessarily set a 
precedent, though it should be free to the court to award damages against the authority or 
even the specific bureaucrat responsible. 
    However these are political solutions, long overdue, and they can not be 
pursued in depth here, except that they emphasise the overriding importance of justice and 
the need for an individual to be assured of obtaining it.  Where an individual's life can be 
virtually destroyed without recourse it is but a short step to the gas chambers. 
    I believe that the individual may be  justified in fighting back in the case of 
monstrous personal injustice, and that this, like self defence, may over rule the prima facie 
obligation to obey the law.  However I maintain that this is excusable only in extreme 
circumstances, and that the need for general obedience is paramount in order to prevent a 
reduction to chaos. 
SUMMARY 
    We have seen that there are two specific areas of disobedience: 
1) The moral defence of conscientious objection to a positive act required from us by the 
state.  Here both Raz and I have reached the same conclusion that while the person may do so 
(in my case I would say has the power to do so),  the state will exact some form of penalty.  
We both seem to take the view that that is just. 
2) The case where law B is broken because we object perhaps on strong moral grounds, to 
Law A.  Here again we tend both to agree in the end result, that there is no right to civil 
disobedience (in Raz's case where the society is „liberal‟ - in my case irrespective of whether 
the society does or does not guarantee political participation), but we get there by entirely 
different reasoning.  Plus 
3) The terminal case where it is necessary because the society is so oppressive, to fight for 
one's beliefs.  This, I believe is a different case and not analogous.  The individual has the 
„power‟ to decide to take up arms.  Raz may regard this as a „moral right‟, followed by a 
decision to do so - so the action is „justified‟.  I consider the individual has the power to do 
so, based upon a moral decision which „justifies‟ the action in the eyes of that individual.  If 
sufficient numbers agree then his action will be deemed generally „justifiable‟.   
    However the idea that a law may be invalid because it is deemed by some to 
be immoral and they therefore in some way have a right to take action by way of breaking 96 
 
that law or others as a means of showing their opposition is  the great Law Myth of our time.  
It has really only blossomed since the permissive 60's and if not stamped out will lead to 
eventual chaos. 
 
POSITIVE DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW. 
    I have referred to this on several occasions.  I maintain that this is present by 
virtue of the fact that:- 
1) Power is prior to rights and Duties. 
2) Rights and duties are created by the law. 
3) The state has the multital power required to establish unpolarized rights and duties by 
establishing the law.   
4) Traditionally all states stand in a Dominant position with respect to their citizens. 
5) The state establishes jural relations in an unpolarized form between itself, as Dominus, and 
the citizen (Servus).  It also establishes in the laws, unpolarized jural relations which may 
occur between the citizens. 
6) These jural relations become polarized to form legal relations by virtue of the operating 
facts which themselves are initiated by an act of power.  (We each have the power to initiate 
an act creating a legal relation). 
7) Insofar as the state establishes codes of conduct for the citizens and requires compliance 
therewith, the state of Dominus and Servus and a jural relation exists. 
    The state has the right, long established by precedent in all states / recognized 
by the authorities (per Hart) / inherent in the establishment of any state (Lundstedt) to 
demand obedience from its citizens and the citizens have the Duty to obey. 
    These rights and duties are prima facie valid.  Invalidity may occur, for 
example due to a law establishing a duty being ultra vires i.e.  beyond the power of the state 
to effect.  - e.g.  a minister makes regulations which he does not have the power to do. 
    The validity of the law is not subject to question by virtue of its morality.  
Nevertheless a state may enter into an international agreement to, say, preserve a specific 
right (e.g.  free speech) A law subsequently passed restricting that right may be invalid, but 
not because it is morally offensive, but contradicts another law which (say) could not be over-
ruled without a 2/3 majority in parliament, or whatever other restrictions might have been 
agreed to. 
    Only in the case of overwhelming injustice is it possible to over rule the prima 
facie duty to obey.  This is virtually an equivalent to self defence. 97 
 
    So far we have removed the question of morality relating to validity.  This is 
necessary because morality changes and without some criteria for establishing when a 
question of morality becomes “the law" we can not have it change the law.  Otherwise the 
whole system would be subject to springing and shifting changes, and uncertainties that 
would create more harm than good.  The idea that morality can govern the validity of a law is 
the great Law Myth. 
  So have we eliminated morality altogether?  To this the answer is definitely no.  
Morals and ethical principals have a large part to play in concepts of justice.  However justice 
as such does not automatically over rule the law.  The court decides upon the law and 
enforces it.  There is a certain latitude with the judges to temper harsh cases and in their 
obiter dicta the judges may well reflect the necessity for changes but they rarely over rule the 
law.  Where they do manage to effect changes it is usually on the grounds that the law does 
not cover the precise situation.  Whereupon they import a concept of justice to reach a 
solution.  This relates to the problem raised by Professor Dworkin as to what happens when 
the law does not cover the actual situation (i.e.  his hard cases).  This as I hope to show will 
lead us towards a rapprochement with some Natural law theories, and the substantiation of 
the right to a claim for justice in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5.  RULES OF LAW - PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE. 
For the non specialist: Here we are going to discuss, amongst other 
things, the conflict between Positivism and the Natural Law theory.  
As a quick synopsis you will recall - 
Legal Positivism is the antithesis of the Natural Law Theory.  The 
Natural  Law  Theory  is  based  on  Natural  (or  reasonable)  moral 
standards providing the foundations of valid laws. 
Legal Positivism is based on the concept of law as an authoritarian 
statement (Austin maintained it stemmed from the Sovereign's will) 
and is therefore definable as valid without being based on a moral 
evaluation. 
    At this point we are about to examine one of the most fundamental roles that 
the concept of Justice has to play.  It is in the area between the positive law and the Morality 
and Ethics of a Society.  Justice is uniquely placed to serve us here because while it is behind 
the law it is not of the law. 
    In any society the law can only provide the guidelines and even though it may 
appear to be fairly specific, it is in reality still only a generalization.  It does not, and can not 
allow for each and every circumstance.  That is why there is, as we saw earlier, a need for a 
law applying body - the courts where the judges apply the generality of the law to the specific 
facts. 
    It is here that Professor Dworkin's „hard cases‟ arise.  These are cases where a 
direct reference to the enacted laws appears to leave a gap.  One of the best examples is one 
Dworkin  used,  the  case  of  Riggs  v  Palmer,  where  the  court  ruled  against  a  murderer 
inheriting under the will of his victim, even though there was no law to this effect.  One of 
my favourite examples is Rylands v Fletcher
67 As Dworkin says, most lawyers probably 
accept that in such cases the judges use their discretion.  In fact as he points out they do far 
more than merely use their discretion. 
    This also brings him into conflict with Hart, because in deciding these cases 
Dworkin maintains, correctly in my view, that the judges are making new law which does not 
come within Hart's rule of recognition. 
 
    Up to now I have taken a fairly strong positivist view but there are distinct 
loopholes  in  this  approach,  and  the  most  expert  exposer  of  these  loopholes  is  Professor 
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Dworkin.  He shows up the problems with his „hard cases‟.  There is no problem when a case 
fits precisely within the law.  However the law itself is composed of generalizations meant to 
embrace a large number of cases the facts of which are never quite the same.  Hart describes 
the law as open textured.  Dworkin describes it as having furry edges (I think I rather prefer 
Dworkin's „furry edges‟).  In most cases the judge will adjudicate on the case within his 
interpretation of the law (which may or may not be appealed against), and the case is decided 
within the law even if the case sets a new precedent. 
    So far so good, but Dworkin then cites cases in which judges make new law.  
He particularly relies on Riggs v Palmer (where a murderer was not permitted to inherit 
under his victim‟s will) and Henningson v Bloomfield Motors Inc.(where the manufacturers 
were  not  allowed  to  limit  their  warranty  when  a  manufacturing  defect  made  the  car 
dangerous).  These are excellent examples and show up the point he is making very clearly.   
    Dworkin's  explanation  is  that  the  judges  refer  to  Principles  of  Law,  as 
opposed to Rules of Law  in these  instances.   He emphasises the different qualities of a 
‘Rule’, which is fixed - i.e.  if it is overruled it ceases to be a rule.  If it is varied it becomes a 
different rule.  On the other hand Principles are far more flexible.  They are subject to being 
overruled without being defeated and ceasing to exist.  Variations, possibly brought about by 
conflict with other principles in the light of the circumstances, do not fixedly alter the original 
principle.  Therefore he argues that Principles of law, which are a vital part of the law and its 
application, do not fit under Hart's rule of recognition. 
    At this stage Dworkin tries to dismiss Hart's rule of recognition.  There have 
been arguments from his opponents, positivists such as Raz who have argued eloquently and 
eruditely that Dworkin's objections are invalid and that these Principles can be fitted within 
the rule.  I shall not go into the arguments, because despite their undoubted ingenuity I am 
still left with the view that Dworkin has a valid point which refuses to be demolished.  Where 
I want to differ with Dworkin is in what he does next.  I feel he wants to sling the baby out 
with the bath water whereas I am desperately hanging on to the plug trying to salvage what is 
best from the rule of recognition. 
    The reason I feel I can do this is that when I look at Dworkin's Principles I do 
not see Principles of Law because they do not fit within the positivist‟s definition of Law.  
Rather I see every one of them as Principles of Justice.  And what difference can that make? 
- A very great deal.  You will recall from Figure 1. in chapter 2  that I laid considerable 
emphasis on the different philosophies lying behind each category.  We see that, unlike the 
law,  Justice is derived from Principles of Morals and Ethics.  The law, on the other hand, 100 
 
may be based on the grounds of utility, necessity etc.  Therefore it would be quite wrong to 
try to fit these Principles (of Justice) within a rule of recognition for the law.  Moreover I 
have tried on several occasions to emphasize the malleable nature of Justice - its need to 
produce fairness in a way that is acceptable within the mores of the day. 
    Given this, we now have an aspect of the legal amalgam which incorporates a 
basis in morality and ethics which in turn plants a foot squarely in the natural law camp.  
Again if exponents of Natural law theories will go along with me sufficiently to appreciate 
that their „Natural Law‟ (which again does not fit within Hart's Rule of recognition) would in 
reality be better defined as „Natural Justice‟ by my definition, then we can begin to effect a 
serious link up between the two.  The secret however lies in accepting that they are two 
different things with different philosophical backgrounds that co-exist, rather than taking the 
previous view which has always been that one or the other must knock its opponent out of the 
ring. 
    Once having got this far we are still a long way from a solution and we have 
many more hurdles to surmount.  However the first one is that we do not have to throw out 
the rule of recognition - it is quite valid for determining what is or has become the law, or a 
rule of law.  However we are now dealing with Principles of Justice.  I am sure the purists 
will say „but you have failed to produce a single rule to cover everything‟.  To which my 
answer is “How right you are, but who said I had to have such a rule anyway? - so it is no 
good becoming in togam torquendo
68 because you have set up some impossible barrier upon 
which I refuse to impale myself”. 
    But  once  we  accept  that  we  are  dealing  with  principles  of  justice  which 
answer to Dworkin's characteristics of resilience and mutability we are still faced with the 
most major problem of all - How can we relate these two?  In order to do so let us abandon 
our stance as a positivist (already somewhat Dworkinized) and look at it from the point of 
view of Natural Law theory.  Here I presume we must take the view that there is either a 
whole range of natural laws - which if their theory is to hold together, would have to be 
capable of being set out rather like our positivist laws, and these presumably would require us 
to establish some rule of recognition for them.  Moreover these would be the equivalent of 
legal rules and would thus be subject to being over-ruled, defeated, amended etc. as is the 
case with all laws.  This is not what we want at all.  What we need to import are not natural 
laws, but the principles of Justice from which we derive flexibility and the application of 
                                                 
68  “Getting one‟s toga in a twist” 101 
 
morals and ethics to vary and if necessary set the law aside. 
    It occurs to me therefore that if there is to be a natural law there will be only 
one, but it will invoke the Principles of Justice into all other laws.  Therefore we may say 
that the Prime Natural Law (which subsequently I shall call The Prime Inherent Law) is:-
     
“In any  anomic or  mesonomic  relation which  may involve an 
exercise of power or a ligation the Servient party is entitled to 
Justice at the hands of the Dominant party". 
 
    If we unwind this rather fierce looking definition we find that it covers the 
following:- 
    In any situation, whether it is potentially covered by the law (Mesonomic), or 
even  in situations which are  not covered by the  law (Anomic),  if there  is a relationship, 
agreement, obligation, or understanding  between two or more parties, then where  such a 
relationship involves one party being obliged to another, or under a duty to the other to do 
something or perform or desist from any action, then not only shall the senior (Dominant) 
party (i.e. the one who is in a position to benefit from the performance or action or non 
performance of the action) always treat the other (Servient) party fairly,  BUT the party who 
has to perform his or her obligation shall be entitled to and have an enforceable right to be 
treated justly by the dominant party.  Similarly this applies to obligations between the State 
and its citizens.  
    Again where one party has power over the other then, in the exercise of that 
power, the subservient party is nonetheless entitled to be treated justly.  This is particularly 
important when it comes to treatment of its citizens by the State.   This is why it is put 
negatively, i.e. that the subservient or weaker party is entitled (has a right  - a Hohfeldian 
claim-right) to justice at the hands of the other.  We shall see later how this  can be related to 
all acts of power, giving rise to a responsibility to those under our control such as children 
and animals.  All of which shows why, if you squash it into three lines it makes the Prime 
Inherent Law look rather formidable - and, I might add, properly recognized and applied in 
any society it would indeed be formidable! 
    Now the effect of this law is to introduce the Principles of Justice into the 
general law, not only inter partes but most importantly between the State and its Citizens.  
This is because, as you may recall, my views of the relationship of the Citizens and the State 
is one of constructive Contract - a jural relation.  The citizen accepts the protection of the 102 
 
State in return for obedience to the law.  Thus there are duties and ligations involved, and by 
the Prime Inherent Law Justice is invoked between the citizen and the State. 
    How does the Prime Inherent Law exist? What brings it into being? The 
answer is that it is the prime factor inherent in any civilized State.  This is why I tend to 
regard this law as the Prime Inherent Law which describes its manner of coming into being.  
However others might well consider it to be the Prime Natural Law.  I would argue against 
this because the fact that it is inherent (which is what brings it into being) is different to being 
derived from nature.  Any State which ignores this law, either between itself and its citizens 
or in administering the law between citizens can no longer call itself civilized.  It is thus a 
necessary element of any civilized State and must therefore exist.  Alternatively it may be 
said to exist definitionally.  There is no way it can be eliminated without fundamentally 
altering the nature of the State.  It is interesting to note that while I tended to disagree with 
Raz when he introduced the right to political representation as the fundamental distinction of 
a civilized society (because I think it would be possible to have a civilized society without 
political representation), I have, by the introduction of the concept of justice provided a 
foundation from which he could argue towards and arrive at the same conclusions as before.  
This is why although we appear to disagree over some fundamentals - I could never agree to 
his definition of rights and their creation for example - we often seem to reach similar 
conclusions in relation to morally based matters.   
    It is my belief that with my solution we can overcome many hurdles and found 
our conclusions on a firmer footing.  We have produced a law which is necessary to any 
culture which is civilized.  It does not have to be authorized by anyone or brought into 
existence.  It is necessary to, and inherent in, the existence of any civilized culture.  In short it 
is part of the definition of civilization.  We have hereby tied the Natural Law into the 
Positivist's Laws and we can see, through the many examples given, that the two do co-exist 
and indeed how they interact as in the cases cited by Dworkin. 
    What we have now is a society based on positive law, together with principles 
of justice which impart flexibility.  From this our case law proceeds.  We do not need prior 
rights - all we need is justice.  After all, according to my definition, a right involves a jural 
relation and these jural relations are set out under the law.  The concept of what is just in any 
society feeds through as limitations on any restriction of freedom.  Again you will recall that 
Freedom is a state and does not involve a jural relation.  It is only when it is restricted in 
some manner that a question of justice is involved with its concomitant introduction of the 
Prime Inherent Law, thereby establishing a mesonomic jural relationship. 103 
 
    What we must now do is to see whether my concept answers some of 
Dworkin's further points.  While I have been happy to be Dworkinized as far as we have 
gone, he lays claim to rights pre-existing legislation, and at first blush this tends to make me 
feel that either we are talking at cross purposes or he is advocating a whole series of natural 
laws which are unwritten but which can unseat the law of the land.  Those aspects of 
positivism which I have so far not shed instinctively make me bridle at such an idea.  Yet are 
we really so far apart?  I have introduced one law prior to legislation and this is designed to 
bring in „Principles of Justice‟ which I have already noted bear a remarkable resemblance to 
Dworkin's Principles of Law.  Moreover we must remember that Dworkin is referring mainly 
to the type of society that has a constitution which outlines certain basic freedoms and 
political objectives.  These in themselves create potential or unpolarized jural relations.  
These in turn become polarized by virtue of the operating facts (relevant circumstances) and 
may be called upon to be interpreted by the courts.  In so doing the courts rely on Principles 
of Law (Dworkin)- my Principles of Justice, and may create new law, which - according to 
me anyway - would be recognized in future by virtue of the rule of recognition.  Thus may an 
application of the Principles of Justice graduate via case law to become part of the law of the 
land. 
    I believe that I can accomplish all of Dworkin's results by my method, and this 
is a method which will work for a country without a constitution, as well as one with one.  In 
fact it is my argument that once the principle of inherent Justice is recognized one has a more 
flexible system without a constitution. 
  Next we should perhaps deal with Hart's view that no rights or duties of any sort can 
exist except by virtue of a uniform social practice of recognizing those rights and duties.  
Hart has a general theory of the concept of obligation and duty together with a specific 
application of that theory to Judges.  So, if law is a matter of rights and duties and not simply 
the discretion of the officials then the law is subject to this and must be subject to a test of 
uniform social practice.  Dworkin most effectively unseats the concept of social rules as 
playing a basic part in giving rise to uniform social practices
69.  His arguments are, I find, 
most persuasive.  I do not believe in law being based on social rules in this manner.  Law 
defines the social rules, and it is not something we obey only because we agree to the 
contents of the law.  You will remember that I started from a fairly contractarian viewpoint - 
Our duty to obey the law stems from our acceptance of the benefits of citizenship, not our 
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agreement to any specific law.  I have already set out the possible avenues of action if we do 
not like it and no longer wish to accept it. 
    Obviously there is a degree of majority acceptance in that no society would 
work if there were complete rejection by everyone of all the laws, but this is very far from 
implying that social rules have any necessary part in the defining of a law.  Anyone who has 
experienced the raw side of politics and who still believes that the law is made up of a 
consensus of what the citizens actually want is looking through rose coloured spectacles of 
such a deep hue that it is unlikely they could even see the telescope let alone hold it to their 
blind eye!  Politics is primarily about the manner of exercising Power. 
    So while Hart supposes some social rules exist in the community of judges to 
fix the limits of the judges' duty to recognise other rules or principles of law, Dworkin rejects 
this.  I am afraid that again I agree with Dworkin, and in my view, while the judges are bound 
to recognize the rules of law, they are also bound to produce a just judgement.  When they 
find the rules of law (statutory and case law) are not doing this they are entitled to take into 
account the relevant Principles of Justice and if necessary weigh them all in the balance.  The 
ability with which they do so determines whether they are a good judge, a bad judge, or 
sometimes a great judge. 
    We may, however, accept Hart's rule of recognition insofar as it is recognition 
and acceptance by the courts for the purpose of establishing the validity and limits of what is 
the law. 
    We then accept that the courts may go beyond the strictly defined law and 
apply the relevant Principles of Justice when necessary.  Their authority for doing so is the 
Prime Inherent Law which I have cited.  The Prime Inherent Law requires no authority to 
establish it because it is inherent in the definition of a civilized society and we can therefore 
accept Dworkin's rejection of the social rule theory and drop it gently overboard.  If it swims 
along we may find a use for it later, but my feeling, despite the eminent arguments to the 
contrary, is that Dworkin has effectively holed it below the water line. 
    Now if the judges' duty is to consider the Principles of Justice where 
appropriate, it is their judgement as to when and how far these apply.  The Priorities of the 
Principles of Justice may differ from State to State and even from time to time within the 
same state.  This is what permits the flexibility and changes in the law.  One cannot reduce 
law to fixed stringent and immutable rules as if it were a science.  The difference is that while 
science may be said to be logical, the law may be said to be biological.  When it comes to an 
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there can be no discernable rule for saying this is just and that is not, or if there were, it would 
be like Davidson's concept of mind/ brain state relations - anomalous.  On the other hand this 
in no way affects our use of the rule of recognition to determine what the regular body of law 
is. 
Hard cases - Principles of Justice v the Rights thesis. 
    Having ruled out the possibility of a social rule governing the judges in cases 
where the statutes or previously decided case law does not adequately cover the situation, we 
now have to consider whether the application of Principles of Justice does. 
    Again Dworkin is the leading exponent of an alternative approach to these 
cases which he calls „Hard cases‟.  His answer is to introduce a „rights thesis‟ which at first 
glance appears to involve rights which pre-exist the law.  Now as I have been at pains to 
point out, „rights‟ according to my definition cannot precede the law except in the case of the 
Prime Inherent Law.  Furthermore my Prime Inherent law introduces only one right - a right 
to the application of the principles of justice.  This is important in the sense that any so called 
rights brought about by this application will be derived rights, i.e. they will stem back to the 
assessment of the relevant principles having regard to the operating facts of the case.  One 
case does not necessarily establish a so called right as a rule of law unless and until the same 
is incorporated within the statute law or accepted as a rule by virtue of subsequent 
recognition by the courts. 
    The alternative is to try to produce a number of rights which operate by virtue 
of a series of independent natural laws.  For obvious reasons this latter approach does not 
appeal to me because while I can (to my satisfaction anyway) justify the Prime Natural Law 
as inherent in the definition of a civilized country, it would not be possible to justify a whole 
series  of different natural rights in this way - They would according to my definition require 
a source of power enabling their creation.  You will recall my extrapolation that Power is 
prior to rights, these being the only two forms of jural relation.  So I cannot accept Dworkin's 
„political rights‟ as such - where do they get their power from etc.?  If of course they are 
rights derived from what may be regarded as political intent from or by virtue of the 
Constitution then they could come within my definition as any Constitution is itself the 
equivalent of a statute of law, albeit in a somewhat more immutable form. 
    However Dworkin explains that the rights thesis is that judicial decisions 
enforce existing political rights.  Now I appreciate that Professor Dworkin comes from a 
jurisdiction where not only is there a written constitution but judges are actually appointed 
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nature shy away from such an explanation.  As he goes on “Judges like all political officials, 
are subject to the doctrine of political responsibility”.
70   That may be so for U. S.  judges but 
as far as I am concerned the doctrine of political responsibility may well differ in the USSR, 
Iraq, Cuba, Zimbabwe, etc.  No red blooded Englishman, who tends to regard the average 
politician as a life form two below that of a good horse thief and roughly on a par with an 
estate agent, would set to sea in a coracle that leaky. 
    However Dworkin's theory of political responsibility in fact turns out to be 
less problematic than one might originally think.  In the first place this is because his 
examples show that it is directed towards consistency of policy.  In political decisions he 
feels policies are aggregative and for example if a grant is made to one manufacturer it does 
not follow that every such manufacturer must necessarily receive such a grant.  However 
when principles are concerned they must be applied evenly and not in a contradictory 
manner. 
    He feels that judicial decisions are political decisions in the broad sense that 
they attract the doctrine of political responsibility, i.e.  arguments of principle must be 
consistent with earlier decisions which are not overruled.  This is so, and judges usually 
explain their decisions in their judgements in this light - This I would describe as judicial 
consistency, not political responsibility which generally speaking is nowhere near as 
consistent or responsible. 
    Generally it seems to me that Dworkin's arguments are based very much on 
his training and background, i.e.  that there exists a Constitution setting out „grand rights‟ 
which he tends to regard as political rights.  However many countries such as the U. K. do 
not have a written constitution and although we may sign treaties containing references to 
rights in the general sense or even adopt a constitution (Heaven forfend) these are factors 
additional to the basic workings of the system.  If all Dworkin's rights were to stem from 
constitutional rights it would merely be the equivalent of dealing with nominated or specified 
rights.  These are quite simply treated in the same way as if a principle of Justice had been set 
out.  The question is however - Do any of the rights Dworkin refers to, purport to be inherent 
rights?  My suspicion is that they are all deducible from Principles of justice, and if I am 
correct in this then there is no conflict between us.  The guidelines for the principles may well 
be derived from the Constitution (which is just) or having regard to the intention of the 
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legislation (which one also assumes is just), but what happens when neither are there to help?  
That is where the Inherent Law comes in. 
    He is also concerned with precedent, and a third factor, that judges may have 
to make judgements of political morality.  Quite apart from the fact that I am highly dubious 
about the existence of political morality I think he is referring to what I would call communal 
or social factors, which may have nothing to do with political issues.  Our trouble, as always 
in discussing theories, is to be sure that we are talking about the same thing.  Political issues 
to me refers to an issue on which there are different political viewpoints and proposed 
solutions.  I find it hard to regard it as a general term such as I would term a sociological 
issue.  Always we have to beware the limitations of our language and I do not want to reject 
what may be a perfectly valid theory on the grounds of my simple misinterpretation of it. 
    Fortunately Dworkin gives us definitional examples.  To him :- 
Arguments of Principle are arguments intended to establish an individual right.  Of course I 
do not cede that individual rights can  be established this way, but if these arguments are 
based on principles of justice to establish a moral claim to a right to the application of justice 
in a certain way then the courts may in the appropriate hard case find in such a manner that a 
right is thereby granted.  I know it may appear that I am quibbling but it is important.  What I 
am doing is going back one step further to relate each case to principles of justice and thence 
forward again via the application of the Prime Inherent law.  This I do in order to provide a 
logical and consistent link for any decisions in hard cases later to become part of the general 
law (by virtue of their recognition and application).   
Dworkin‟s Arguments of Policy are intended to establish a collective goal.  Now the 
example he gives is that it is natural to say that Freedom of speech is a right.  I am sorry to 
appear picayune but I would say it is a Privilege unless it is transformed into a right by 
legislation or otherwise incorporated into the law.  Furthermore that right would then have to 
be circumscribed by the legislation.  He says it is a right, not a goal because citizens are 
entitled to that right as a matter of political morality.  (His political morality and my Justice 
are beginning to look more and more alike in this instance).  Now I would argue that any 
privilege is based on lack of restraint of a freedom i.e. that unless restrained by the law of our 
society we are in a state of freedom of speech.  If that freedom is restrained then the question 
is - Is that restraint just? And that is a matter of Morality.  Thus although we go about it 
differently I can not see that our end positions will differ.  This is very important because it 
will be my argument that Dworkin has expounded a specific application based on a U. S. 
example of a state with a constitution.  And that such example does not clash with the more 108 
 
basic rules which I am proposing which work equally for a State such as the U.K. without a 
constitution or for one with one. 
    I maintain that Dworkin has actually taken a short cut when he argues that 
rights are based on morality.  Morality cannot grant rights (claim-rights) to a freedom which 
exists as a non jural state, it can only censure any restraint of that freedom.  That censure 
amounts to a moral claim to justice which can be brought into consideration by the courts by 
virtue of the Prime Inherent Law.  So while it may be convenient to talk of a right to a 
freedom of speech it is really a shorthand for the right to prevent an unjust restraint of the 
freedom and therefore it falls under the Prime Inherent Law.  So, although I may be using 
slightly different terms, and starting from a general theory one stage back, it would seem that 
our end position will in each case be similar.  This is most important because having been 
convinced by a number of Dworkin's arguments, I believe that insofar as my theory provides 
an alternative explanation of his theories they are compatible. 
    With regard to his example with respect to goals he cites increased munitions 
production as a goal because it contributes to the collective welfare.  He then, by 
distinguishing rights from goals, begins by attempting to provide a guide for discovering 
which rights a particular political theory supposes men and women to have.  I do not wish to 
follow this course because I believe that in each case he ultimately comes down to saying „it 
is unjust that such and such should be the result of the case‟.  Once the word „just‟ is used to 
describe a situation or result we are on common ground and within the influence of the Prime 
Inherent  Law.  Again what is regarded as just or unjust is a question in Dworkin's terms of 
political morality of that State at that time.  As a result I see no reason why our reasoning 
should lead us to conflicting results.  I just find it much simpler to look at whether a restraint 
is just or not rather than try to build up a series of rights (Privileges) abstracted from a general 
political moral background, and then to try to insert these into a legal system which by its 
very nature incorporates a perfectly adequate means of dealing with it.  The fact that judges 
do not refer directly to the Prime Natural or Inherent Law does not mean that it does not 
exist.  Their very actions are consistent with its existence so that in my view it is far more 
clearly defined than any political morality or political goal.  These latter are the variables that 
affect the definition of „just‟ in any society, They can change without changing the Prime 
Natural Law which is what makes the latter of such great importance. 
    This in no way undermines the importance of the distinctions which Dworkin 
makes between Goals and Policy, Principles and Utility, Principles and economics etc.  But 
in each case he is referring to factors which affect, or do not affect, a decision of what is just 109 
 
in the circumstances.  I also believe that Dworkin tends to slip into the habit of referring to 
Principles as rights, which is easy enough to do.  For example at p.96 of Taking Rights 
Seriously  he refers to "the right to equality between races".  Now the point is that he is 
weighing it against other arguments and, by his own definition, it is only Principles that can 
be weighed against each other without being overruled or changed.  By all means we should 
„take principles seriously‟ but once we promote them to rights we cloak them with a rigidity 
which means that they can only remain absolute or be overruled (again by his own 
definition).  At that stage their character is irreparably changed.  So again I find we can go 
along with Dworkin reading „a moral claim based on Principles of Justice‟ for many of the so 
called rights. 
    The basic point is that each of the so called rights seems to me to be only that 
to which a person would feel entitled in order to feel that they had been justly treated.  
Therefore are these rights any more than a right to justice under the prime law?  I would 
suggest that they are synonymous. 
    Later
71 Dworkin worries that his rights thesis, which he feels is secure in Civil 
Law (i.e.  one party has a right to win), does not apply to criminal Law insofar as the state has 
no right to punish.  My worries are the other way round.  As will be apparent later, I believe 
the State does have a Hohfeldian claim right to punish (but that punishment must also be 
just).  On the other hand I am not so sure that in all civil cases one party necessarily has a 
"right to win" as Dworkin claims.  I am sure there must be cases where the right to win is 
blurred.  All the cases of Novus Actus Interveniens, last clear chance, etc.  seem to raise 
general doubts on this issue.  Mrs Palsgraf
72 certainly set out thinking she had a right to win, 
as did the plaintiffs in In re Polemis.
73  So did Rigg, but the Judge intervened to see that the 
Principles of Justice were taken into account.  I do not see how we can say that one party had 
a right to win except ex post facto.   
    However with my explanation one does not have to go hunting around for 
rights to win, one merely has a right to involve the Principles of Justice.  Dworkin's thesis 
provides that judges decide hard cases by confirming or denying concrete rights.  They must 
be institutional rather than background rights and legal rather than other institutional rights.  
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For  example  he  looks  at  chess  rules.    Even  here  after  examining  the  case  in  detail  he 
concludes
74 that  „the  hard  case  asks  what  it  is  fair  to  suppose the  players  have  done  in 
consenting to the forfeiture rule‟. 
Legal  Rights.    Here  Dworkin  says  the  concepts  include  the  intention  or  purpose  of  a 
particular State.  These provide a bridge between political justification of the general idea that 
statutes create rights, and the hard cases that ask what rights?
75  The second concept included 
is of the principles that include the rules of law.  This provides a bridge between political 
justification of the doctrine that like cases should be judged alike and the hard cases in which 
it is unclear.  These, Dworkin maintains, define legal rights as a function of political rights. 
    He then gives the example of his mythical Judge Hercules who considers first 
the constitution as just and settled, „for reasons of fairness‟.  He then says
76, citizens take the 
benefit of living in a society whose institutions are arranged and governed in accordance with 
that scheme and they must take the burden as well.  So far Hercules could not be doing better 
if I had written his script for him. 
    When  Hercules  considers  Statutory  Interpretation  Dworkin  has  him 
considering which articles of principle and policy might have persuaded the legislature to 
enact just that statute.  Here I confess to being a little lost by the arguments.  However it does 
seem to me that in cases of doubt and in reviewing the various principles involved Hercules 
would have reached the same conclusion by applying principles of Justice.  It is I think fair to 
say  that  our  judges  do  not  pay  ostensible  attention  to  parliamentary  intention  when 
interpreting statutes, preferring to rely on the wording so far as it goes.  However if this 
appears to produce a miscarriage of justice they tend to find their way round this by applying 
common sense (which would probably be their description of the principles of justice if they 
thought about it).  The principles of justice are more likely to involve the political intent 
assuming the legislature has attempted to be fair.   
    It is a very interesting question as to how far legislative intention should be a 
proper matter for consideration by the courts, and while there is a difference between the U.S 
and the U.K.  I do not think that it undermines the application of The Principles of Justice.  It 
would be possible for some countries to consider it proper for inclusion amongst the factors 
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governing  the  application  of  justice  whist  others  excluded  it  or  gave  it  a  much  lower 
persuasive value. 
Precedent 
    Here Hercules has to consider a hard case not covered by statute.  Spartan 
Steel is the cited case - a case where the plaintiff's factory was put out of operation by the 
defendant's negligent act in breaking a power cable.  The case is not covered by statute but 
there are cases awarding other sorts of damages, and what do we find:-  
“That the gravitational force of a precedent may be explained by appealing not to the 
wisdom of the enforcing enactments, but to the fairness of treating like cases alike" 
(Emphasis mine) 
- A nice Aristotelian concept of justice if ever I saw one. 
    All in all I cannot see that Hercules would reach any different conclusions 
working on my thesis than he would with professor Dworkin's.  Nor do I see that he would in 
any way be prevented from constructing his scheme of abstract and concrete principles to 
provide a coherent justification of common law precedents and statutory provisions (which 
include  Constitutions  when  applicable).    True,  I  suspect  Hercules  of  applying  a  greater 
emphasis  on  Statutory  intention  and  economic  policy  than  I  would  expect of  Sir  Hector 
Grindit-Fineleigh  (his  U.K.  counterpart)  but  I  do  not  find  the  discrepancies  fatal.    It  is 
interesting to note Dworkin's contention that Judges no longer tend to make rules as they did 
in Rylands v Fletcher but tend rather to cite reasons in the form of precedents and principles.  
I have the sad feeling that this is true and that the law is poorer for this.  Indeed I feel that 
both Hercules and Sir Hector might find their task easier if it were not so.  But this is an 
aside.  Even so, given the tortuous difficulties facing Hercules I feel that Sir Hector Grindit-
Fineleigh  may  find  it  easier  to  get  to  the  right  decision  following  my  path  (despite  his 
naturally more ponderous disposition).  The main thing is, I suspect, that the decisions would 
not be too far apart - again allowing for Sir Hector's less adventurous nature which would 
cause him to err on the side of a conservative interpretation of all principles. 
    One could go on making a detailed comparison of case law but I hope that by 
now I have illustrated that the theories are not mutually destructive despite the fact that Sir 
Hector would not agree to there being any Hohfeldian rights prior to their acceptance as „law‟ 
by virtue either of Statute or precedent.  Of course Sir Hector would not instantly recognize 
the Prime Natural Law as such, having not previously been interested in the jurisprudence or 
philosophical thinking behind the idea of equity. 
    Not only do we have Dworkin's Hard cases, which I hope I have shown can be 112 
 
similarly  resolved  by  my  explanation  but  we  have  the  important  question  he  raised 
concerning individual rights existing prior to rights created by law.  As he points out both the 
left and the right reject the current positivist approach.  The left on the grounds that economic 
utilitarianism allows poverty to promote efficiency, and the right tend to argue that the State 
should not be entitled to dictate its idea of the good by means of social engineering which 
may well ignore the wishes of the people. 
    Neither,  he  feels,  object  on  the  grounds  of  pre-legal  rights.    Whereas  the 
objections of the  left and the right as expounded by  Dworkin are the proper concern of 
political philosophy they fall outside the ambit of this book.  However Dworkin's proposition 
about pre-existing rights definitely does not.  As by definition „rights‟ involve a jural relation, 
and as I have argued that Power is prior to rights it looks as if I must be in direct conflict with 
Dworkin.  Yet curiously I suspect that this is not entirely so. 
    The first point that lessens the apparent disagreement is that Dworkin appears 
to me to be using the term „rights‟ in these cases to refer to moral claims, not established 
Hohfeldian claim-rights.  These Dworkinian rights only become enforceable after the judge 
has considered them and incorporates them into the judgement.  Similarly they may be based 
on „political morality‟.  These fall within the latter part of my definitions in chapter 3 and are 
not  enforceable  per  se.    I  would  argue  that  they  are  brought  into  consideration  via  the 
Principles of Justice as previously described, so that the apparent conflict as first thought, 
being brought about by a different use of the word rights, dissolves. 
    Secondly  we  must  remember  that  in  the  U.S.A.    they  have  a  written 
Constitution of Political Objectives.  Where this covers any specific matter it gives these 
moral claims a more Hofeldian aspect.
77 
    So,  although  in  the  course  of  expounding  any  point  the  writer's  basic 
assumptions and viewpoint must be taken into account, the advantage of the above system of 
Justice and the Prime Inherent Law is that it is equally applicable to many societies.  It is 
applicable to a goal based society, an equality based society, even a benign dictatorship.  In 
fact it is applicable to any society which purports to be civilized in that any civilized society 
incorporates the concept of justice.  It is, as shown in Figure 1.in chapter 2, independent of 
the form of governance and provided a society is „justice conscious‟ an awful lot of variations 
can be made with respect to other matters. 
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    At one point it almost looked as if Mill were coming close to something akin 
to the first step when he said that Justice involved a personalized right similar to a legal right.  
However he  failed to appreciate the  importance because  he was  founding  his concept of 
justice on the desire to punish based on self defence and sympathy for the person affected by 
the injustice.  He felt justice to be a rule of conduct and a sentiment.  It is more than that; the 
law provides the rule of conduct and  moral  judgement provides the ethical  basis  for our 
consideration of what is just. 
    One point of interest arises though.  Can a series of small injustices give rise to 
a  cumulative  injustice?    It  is  arguable  that  it  might  be.    After  all,  unjust  profiteering, 
particularly with regard to essentials such as food could give rise to a situation where the poor 
and elderly are deprived.  The State then has to pay additional benefits to them or for their 
hospital bills because they are not so fit.  Even so no law has been broken, the offence is 
purely moral.  It is difficult to see here how Aristotle's grasping unjust man can be brought to 
any  legal account.  Perhaps  living off  immoral  earnings should take on a  new  meaning.  
Certainly  there  should  be  a  means  of  condemnation,  but,  in  our  present  material  society 
where the goal of wealth is worshipped above all else the current interpretation of „just‟ is far 
from Aristotelian, which may well account for a number of evils in our society. 
 
  POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 
    The fact that the Prime Inherent Law gives a right to the application of the 
Principles of Justice has an important side effect.  If there is a right, then according to my 
definitions there is a correlative duty.  But more importantly the duty involves a 
responsibility.  So far we have taken this for granted,  i.e. If I owe you £100 you have a right 
to obtain it and I have the duty to pay.  It is also true that the duty fixes who is responsible for 
the payment, namely me.  It is by virtue of the Prime Inherent Law that the Legislature in 
using its power to pass laws has the duty to enact fair legislation and is therefore its 
responsibility to do so. 
    We are beginning to see the connection between Power and responsibility 
because all acts of power resulting in a jural relation are governed by the Prime Inherent Law.  
Thus where there is a failure of justice in an exercise of power the responsibility lies with the 
persons exercising the power.  Moreover it is a short step from there to realise that Power and 
Responsibility are directly connected.  Rephrasing this -  
The responsibility for the justness of any act of Power rests with those 
exercising the Power. 114 
 
    Thus the state is responsible for its multital acts of power, and the individual is 
responsible for their paucital acts of power.  This may be said to be directly derivable from 
the Prime Inherent Law.  It may be stated simply - With Power goes responsibility.  Now 
this may be seen to have very far flung consequences, from acting as the basis of the 
justification of laws against crimes of genocide downwards.  Moreover the denial of this 
responsibility is a denial of justice.  Thus it may be possible to justify claims against those 
exercising power, and in fact it might be argued that the government official misusing his 
power unjustly should be directly responsible to those that are harmed. 
    I shall revert to the question of responsibility for actions later.  If the 
responsibility for the consequences of an act of power can be derived from the Prime Law we 
have to determine the parameters of that responsibility.  It is not as easily ascertainable as a 
right and its correlative duty.  This is because with rights, once the right is established and 
defined then so is the correlative duty.  However as responsibility for acts of power is derived 
from the Prime Inherent Law it is a Principle of Responsibility. 
    Now we will be examining responsibility with respect to acts both criminal 
and civil later, but the responsibility in those cases is legal responsibility.  Here we are 
primarily concerned with the moral responsibility flowing from acts of power.  The test is the 
Justness of the act. 
    Where an act is unjust and damage flows it is those who effect the act who are 
responsible.  The degree of responsibility varies with the power and the harm done.  It is very 
probably subject to all the same equitable principles which we shall be discussing in the next 
chapter, but there is often no quantum of damages assessable as if it were a legal 
responsibility leading to a claim. 
    Responsibility is a concomitant of Power.  They walk hand in hand which is 
why even the highest in the land will agree  “The Buck stops here".  In other words one 
cannot shed one's responsibility for acts of power.  They are not like acts of God.  Even so the 
question as to where responsibility lies is a fascinating philosophical point.  The question of 
responsibility appears to be subject to many of the same rules of foreseeability which we 
shall be discussing, for justice has its part to play.  However it may be questionable as to 
whether the variables associated with intentionality arise, in that acts of power are per se 
intentional. 
    Thus we may well find responsibility subject to the foreseeability test.  With 
regard to intentionality however, if the harm done by the act of power proves to be greater 
than intended there seems to be no reason why the greater responsibility should not attach.  115 
 
And if responsibility attaches, as indeed it does as a matter of justice, then we can find 
another logical chain in our interactive behaviour. 
    Society has dealt with responsibility for prohibited acts by enacting the 
criminal law.  We have also, to a large extent, dealt with responsibility for negligent acts in 
the civil law.  What we have failed to develop fully in our law is the responsibility for acts of 
power, and this is where society is becoming increasingly unmindful.  This is because no 
modern government is there out of duty.  Rather it seeks power and is granted that power by 
the Society.  Even so that does not absolve it from responsibility for the effects of its act of 
power.  Nowadays there is far more power taken upon itself by the average government than 
there used to be.  The only way to curtail this appetite for power, and yet more power and 
control, is to enforce the responsibility for the exercise of that power. 
     By passing a law which treats a citizen unjustly the government does not 
absolve itself from the unjust damage it does to such a citizen.  Here again we come back to 
professor Dworkin's goals.  These are goals of government and one of the things we will have 
to decide is how far government is permitted to pursue its goals to the unjust detriment of the 
individual citizen.  Although this comes more properly under the philosophy of governance it 
is important to note that what gives its citizens any foundation for claims against the 
government is that so long as any government claims to be civilized the Prime Natural Law is 
inherent. 
    So for example it is not sufficient for individual civil servants who reach a 
decision (an exercise of power) which say denies a citizen planning permission to claim that 
there is no responsibility for that decision merely because of a policy.  Some policies are 
quite fatuous and it is the right of the citizen to have compensation if necessary.  This is 
obvious in the case for example where a house is appropriated, because that is a positive act.  
But it is equally true that negative acts denying freedom to a citizen must also be liable.  
Unless officials are made liable for their acts to a degree, there is no chance of restricting the 
mushrooming bureaucracy which will lead to a reduction in the effectiveness of the state as a 
whole, and its ultimate downfall. 
 
ACTS OF POWER - NON JURAL OR ANOMIC RELATIONS. 
    In most of the cases we have been looking at, an act of power creates a jural 
relation.  This occurs either by virtue of an act of the State (multital), or of the individual 
(paucital).  Power you will recall involves the ability to alter legal relations (per Kocourek).  
In fact it is the ability to alter any relationship.  Life in any society does not just involve jural 116 
 
relations.  These are relations ultimately governed by law.  If we follow Kocourek's reasoning 
the jural relations are polarized by operating facts, to become legal relations.  But in many 
respects non jural relations can be of equal importance.  They involve those relations where it 
is either undesirable, or it has not been thought necessary, to legislate to provide the 
background of a jural relationship. 
      The most important example we have come across so far is that of the 
relationship of parent and child.  True, the care of children is a matter which is increasingly 
being brought under the jurisdiction of the State, and this has created an erroneous 
impression.  Many like to talk of the „rights‟ of the child and this has even led to children 
suing their parents.  This is quite wrong and irreparably damages the parent child bond.  The 
whole concept is antipathetic.  It is again directly attributable to the pernicious and totally 
incorrect attitude of thinking of everything in terms of „rights‟.  The correct approach is that 
the failure to care properly for children is a breach of a duty imposed by the State (Not the 
child).  Therefore abuse of children is a state or criminal offence and should be prosecuted in 
all cases by the State and not the child.  (We are currently beginning to see cases where 
children are being persuaded to sue their parents - another tragedy of the rights based 
approach). 
    A fortiori animals do not have „rights‟ against humans - One can just see the 
case Peter Rabbit (by his next friend) v J.  Bloggs for an order of Mandamus to supply 
proper nourishment or for an injunction to stop forcing the inhalation of tobacco smoke.  One 
cannot deal with animals by anthropomorphizing them.  One should not try to force non jural 
anomic situations into a jural framework.  How, therefore, is one to deal with such matters? 
    The answer, both for animals and children, in those circumstances that have 
not been covered by the law, lies in the nature of Power.  Any exercise of Power necessarily 
involves a Dominant and a Servient party even though the latter may not have a legal 
persona.  Thus we can again call on the Prime Inherent Law to invoke the Principles of 
justice into the relationship.  At this point it must again be emphasized that the whole 
question is a moral one, as indeed it must be where there is no legislation involved.  (As soon 
as legislation is involved there is the groundwork of a jural relation, either inter partes or 
between the State and one of the parties). 
    It is very important to appreciate the difference between law which provides 
for jural relations between citizens and law which provides for situations in which the 
relations are non jural.  There may be some difficulty in distinguishing these, and here 
remember a jural relationship is a two way relationship.  Ownership of a car for example is 117 
 
unidirectional.  Both may be covered by legislation, but the relationships involved are 
different.  For example in the case of criminal acts involving non juveniles we have the 
triangular relationships discussed in chapter 7.  In the case of animals however there may 
well be a law protecting an animal, and A (a citizen) has a duty to obey that law.  There is 
however no right in the animal per se.  It has no right to protection as do the members of 
society because it has no duty to obey the laws.  A horse doing 30 in a zone restricted to 20 
mph will not get a ticket! Nor is a stray dog fouling the pavement given a £50 fine.  Nor is an 
animal required not to harm people such as A.  In short it is not part of a jural relationship.  
This is because a jural relationship is one between two legal persona.  To give an example 
which will make it even clearer: The State imposes on me a duty, say, to maintain and 
preserve an old building which I own.  When I knock it down, the State sues me - the 
building has absolutely no rights against me for assault, GBH (Grievous Brickerly Harm?) or 
otherwise for damages.  This is because not only is there no anomic (non-jural)  relationship 
between myself and the building, there is no relationship at all.   
    Now in the case of animals there is also no jural relationship.  The relationship 
of my duty of care is moral or anomic.  However once a law is passed that duty of care 
becomes legal and if I break it I become liable to the state, because my duty is to obey the 
law.  It is true that Public opinion may well represent and ultimately determine what is 
regarded as just in the case of any animal.  These are often said to be the natural rights of the 
animal.  In fact they are actually privileges which  we feel should be protected, because they 
represent what is considered to be just treatment of that animal, in just the same way that we 
feel some of our privileges should be protected. 
    So what is the relationship (if any) and how does it arise.  Let us examine this 
further from basics.  An act of Power invokes the Principles of Justice which apportion 
responsibility.  In short those possessing the power are responsible for its just application.  
Thus there is a direct relationship between power and responsibility.  In the case where power 
involves a non jural relationship the responsibility is moral.  Similarly where the act of power 
transforms a jural relationship to a legal relationship the responsibility becomes legal.  
Moreover the responsibility appears to be directly proportional to the power exercised.  There 
would appear to be the same adjustments to be made with respect to foreseeable 
consequences of the act of power and  parallel possibilities of amelioration and exoneration 
as will be  discussed in chapter 6 (with respect to foreseeability and intentionality).   
    For anyone to evade the consequences of their act of power would amount to a 
denial of responsibility, or an act of injustice.  At this point it should be clear that the greater 118 
 
the potential power which anyone has with respect to anything else, the greater is one's 
responsibility to act justly.  Therefore for example in the case of an animal, say my dog, over 
whom I have literally power of life and death (in the case of having it put down), my 
responsibility is correspondingly great.  This responsibility is a moral duty to treat the animal 
justly.  My argument therefore is that where my power is so great, my moral duty is 
correspondingly great.  Now this is the point that arguments as to the extent of one's duty can 
arise in much the same way as was discussed in chapter 4 with regard to duty to obey the law.  
In those cases the law was clearly set out, but here we are concerned with moral duties. 
    Thus it is with regard to our moral duties with respect to animals that the 
differences of attitude appear.  From this would flow what might be deemed to be just 
treatment of the animal involved.  It is this which will govern those matters which we feel 
should be the subject, if necessary, of legislation importing a fixed duty on the individual to 
do or not to do certain things.  Again failure is dealt with by the State as it is a statutory duty.  
It is never a matter of a right possessed by the animal.  It is with respect to the extent of the 
moral duty that the differences of opinion, which are becoming more and more apparent in 
today's society, occur.  However it is my feeling that there is a far greater chance of reaching 
a more logical solution if approached via the just treatment of animals than there is in trying 
to conjure up so called „rights‟.   
    For example it is possible that there is a difference in the duty of care which 
might be morally regarded as due to domestic animals, farm animals and wild animals.  
Certainly in my view the duty of care due to an animal in one's care is very high indeed and 
in the case of domestic animals approaches that due to children.  There is no possible excuse 
for cruelty and of course that is recognised already by legislation (though I would increase 
the severity of the punishments considerably).  Further along the scale it seems there is the 
moral question as to whether we should breed and kill animals to eat.  It is fairly universally 
accepted that it is morally permissible (with some minority exceptions) provided the animals 
are treated humanely.  This brings up the manner of the killing.  Again it can only be morally 
right that this should be as humane as possible.  If there are religious requirements for 
inhumane forms of killing it is my view that these should be banned.  The grounds for this is 
that unnecessary cruelty is wrong and that any God that still requires acts of cruelty when 
better means are available is either asleep at the wheel or is not one that I would want to have 
any truck with. 
    It is of course the same with the transport and general conditions for farmed 
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insupportable.  Of course there will be arguments (usually utilitarian) against this view, but 
my feeling is that the only valid argument for battery farming (assuming that it is necessarily 
in a cruel form) would be the necessity to supply a specific nutritional requirement that could 
not otherwise be supplied, e.g.  in the case of a starving population. 
    When it comes to wild animals i.e. those other than domestic and farm 
animals, it seems to me that again there will be different categories.  First there are those of 
higher intelligence, Whales, Dolphins, Apes and Baboons etc.  where we should at least 
prevent their slaughter.  It must be remembered however that in nature life is cruel.  Most 
animals kill others to eat, though only a few such as foxes and mink appear to kill for the fun 
of it
78.  It seems that moral arguments must be worked through for each group and that the 
duty of care lessens as we descend through the groups.  Thus if we find it justifiable to keep 
and kill animals to eat then I find it hard to say that we should not kill mink (a vicious little 
killer in its own right) to provide warm clothes.  Again the proviso should be that the keeping 
and the killing should be humane.  Certainly where the culling of some animals is thought to 
be necessary (e.g.  seals to preserve fish stocks) it seems wrong to say that their hides should 
not be used.  It is of course difficult to say this whilst looking at a film of young seal pups, 
and it is a subject where logic can give way to emotion very easily. 
    There are certain Buddhist monks who cover their mouths to prevent 
involuntarily inhaling and killing a mosquito.  However it is generally hard to 
anthropomorphize a mosquito so, by and large, they get a pretty poor press as the saying 
goes.  We are thus heartily trying to rid ourselves of the malaria mosquito by any means 
possible and if the brute lies writhing in extremis not many are going to bat an eyelid!  
Animals that we fear, we will kill without compunction, and if they are small enough and 
annoy us, Swat Them.  Certainly a case of de minimis non curat lex!
79   
    So while animals do not have rights as such we do owe them differing duties 
of care.  As to the extent of those duties and the extent to which the moral duties should be 
legalized, argument still abounds.  Even so the conclusions reached in chapter 4 are most 
apposite and it is not for anyone to break the law to try to enforce their moral view.   
    Thus it is possible to begin deducing moral responsibilities via the power 
                                                 
78   Having seen a host of slaughtered ducks I naturally have a personally more jaundiced view of foxes. 
79  In passing an anomaly should be pointed out.  We usually associate Buddhism with concern for animals, but 
anyone who has witnessed the treatment of dogs in some of these countries such as Burma will be very perplexed.  
This is because the dogs are usually regarded as having the souls of those who have fallen back from a human 
existence due to their bad karma.  So throwing stones at them is accepted - And this explanation came from a 
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responsibility link.  If we link power directly to responsibility we must hold a man, being 
sane, to be responsible for his acts.  We also seem to realise innately that the degree of 
responsibility is directly proportional to the power exercised.  It is probably this background 
thinking that has inadvertently given rise to the concept that absolute power corrupts 
absolutely.  This in fact is not a true statement at all but is based purely on the cases of the 
failures of those in power to accept their responsibility.  Again it must be noted that the 
greater the power the greater is the effect of the corruption in the failure to be responsible for 
it. 
    It is not a necessary fact that great power will corrupt any more than a small 
amount of power.  The abuse of a small power may well pass unnoticed.  The abuse of great 
power certainly does not.  However the degree of corruption is the same.  It is merely their 
effect which differs.  As Glaucon showed, though he did not make the point directly, the 
temptation to use the ring of Gyges really lies in the probability of getting away with it. 
    It is the realization of the relationship of power and responsibility which leads 
people like presidents to say “The buck stops here", and, in the past, for many captains of 
ships to go down with them.  The fact that today we have a society largely bereft of ideas of 
duty and obligation is a political phenomena.  While it is not possible to discuss this here, its 
presence must not be allowed to obscure the philosophically logical link between power and 
obligation.   
  One thing we can do at this stage is to see how the deduced theory might work in the 
case of current disputes.  It might be interesting therefore to consider three cases that give rise 
to considerable antagonism:- Fox hunting, Bull fighting, and the possible extinction of a 
species  
e.  g.  some whales. 
  Hunting: here there is a vociferous lobby determined to ban all hunting (i.e. with 
hounds).  When we considered this in chapter 4 we were concerned merely with the question 
of obedience to the law and not primarily with ways of examining or resolving the dispute.  It 
is now possible to take a further look at the subject in the light of general principles which 
have been deduced.  Quite apart from any social or class antipathy which is as inaccurate as it 
is irrelevant, the anti hunt group want hunting banned.  Treated as I have advocated the reply 
from the hunters would be that such a ban is a restriction of our freedom.  The question then 
to be answered is not whether it infringes some right, but simply - Is such a restriction Just?   
  At this point the anti hunt lobby are required to show that it is just, and their argument 
would be that hunting in this form is a breach of our responsibility (by virtue of our power 121 
 
over them) to the animals involved, to wit foxes.   Now foxes are wild animals who 
themselves hunt.  Moreover they would if left unculled soon become a menace to farmers, 
and, as sources of their food grew shorter, to other animals.  There is no dispute that some 
would have to be killed.  The question therefore resolves itself to a question as to whether the 
manner of their disposal is a breach of responsibility (by being unnecessarily cruel).  The fact 
that the hunt may bring pleasure to the hunters, or even that a certain degree of employment 
may be in jeopardy, is quite irrelevant at this point.  It may be in some cases that economic 
factors would have to be considered as an overriding concern, but that is not the case here, 
and in any event it would be irrelevant to the basic question.  Now it seems that the killing of 
the fox by hounds is certainly as instantaneous as most shooting would be and probably faster 
than gassing or debilitating drugs such as “warfarin”.   So the question is now down to 
whether chasing the fox is cruel.  Foxes have a turn of speed designed for escape (and many 
do) so the chase is part of their instinctive life pattern, and one cannot anthropomorphize 
them by considering their so called “anguish” concomitant with a contemplation of the 
possibility of their demise.  All in all therefore it would appear that the anti hunt case fails. 
  So what about bull fighting.  Again the arguments resolve themselves into a question 
as to whether there is an abuse of our responsibility to the animal.  The fact that the bulls are 
bred specifically to be killed is irrelevant - so are pigs and cows and chickens.  So is the claim 
that one is for sport and the others to eat.  These issues are  external to the main question.  
They may relate to morality;  they certainly do not relate to cruelty.  However in the case of 
the bull fight, the animal is goaded, it is then wounded by picadores to anger it further and it 
is only finally despatched when it has finally got the measure of the Matador and is about to 
get its own back.  There is no doubt that cruelty is inflicted, and death prolonged for 
entertainment.  Accordingly the anti bull fight lobby has a valid case, and accordingly the 
opposite decision to fox hunting is reached. 
  Let us now consider the potential elimination of a species.  A whole set of different 
factors are involved.  The Dodo was eliminated by man apparently because it was pleasant to 
eat and easy to catch.  It does not appear to have permanently damaged our ecology, but on 
the other hand we can no longer say “Shall we have Dodo for Christmas this year instead of 
Turkey?”  Do we have a responsibility to keep species alive  just because they are there?   To 
this I think the basic answer is no, because species develop and some increase and some 
decline naturally, particularly if they are unable to adapt to their environment.  However man 
and his whims do not rate as an environment, and despite early Christian teaching that 
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poor old Church, it keeps having to downgrade its bloodthirsty views - no more burnings at 
the stake and now all this kindness to animals.  It is hardly worth the candle anymore (to say 
nothing of the bell and the book!).  But certain species of whale (and other fish)  may be 
eliminated by over fishing.  There are additional concerns in the case of whales that they are 
highly intelligent and may even according to some have more than a basic realization and 
conception of their surroundings.  In this case although different factors are involved you will 
recall that it was part of my argument that different duties of care apply to different animals.  
Although whales can hardly be rated as domestic animals or pets, their basic intelligence 
places them in a very high category.  The result of this is that we owe a responsibility not to 
act recklessly or heedlessly with respect to such animals until we know sufficient about them.   
It may be, as is the case with seals, that it is necessary to cull them in order to preserve our 
food supplies, but this is required to be in a humane  manner and only to the extent necessary.  
Thus even in cases where there are different factors involved the Power-Responsibility rule 
has a very definite application. 
  Let us take a further example.  The use of fur in clothes.  Where for example it is 
necessary to cull seals there seems to be no point in banning the use of their skins.  Not to do 
so is merely a waste in satisfaction of an emotional ego salve.  And what about Mink farms.  
Now we use beef leather but our excuse is that we eat the cow.  Even so we need a lot of 
leather even if we went off beef.  Is the excuse that beef feeds us and we enjoy its flavour  
any more logical than the excuse that fur keeps us warm and we enjoy its looks.  Provided the 
mink is properly farmed and the veal properly raised it could be argued that both should be 
permitted. 
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CHAPTER 6.  JUSTICE IN RELATION TO FORESEEABILITY AND INTENTION. 
For the non specialist: At this point we are going to have to branch out again into 
new territory as we are now starting to prepare the ground for considering the law and 
justice  as  they  relate  to  punishment.    Before  doing  this  we  are  going  to  have  to 
understand quite a bit about intention.  Not the intention of the law this time, but the 
intention of the Agent at the time of the action resulting in a crime.  Unfortunately 
this is a mental state and we run full tilt into the problem of ascertaining a past mental 
state at a time subsequent to the crime.  In our investigations we shall examine some 
of the works of Hart and also of R.  A.  Duff, and we shall even delve, albeit lightly, 
into the philosophy of Mind.  The study of intention is primarily philosophical but 
most practical examples are to be found in legal cases. 
Reference is also made to Mens Rea.  This is an expression, now rarely used but it has 
formed a part of our criminal law for many years and as such is a useful concept and 
will be referred to in some of the cases we shall examine. 
Mens Rea: Often referred to as a guilty mind, or more explicitly the state of mind 
either expressly or implicitly required in order for the action to qualify as an offence.  
For example the difference between running an enemy down deliberately with a car, 
and losing control of the car and hitting someone.  You see what I mean about latin 
tags being a useful abbreviation - two words for all that! We shall also refer to: 
Malice Aforethought: This is the factor of Mens Rea in murder.  It includes the 
intention to kill even if it was a different person.  The expression is no longer used 
but again it will crop up in the earlier cases.  Both expressions will be dealt with in 
greater detail as they occur. 
    In  looking at Intentionality and  its correlation to Law I have attempted by 
starting from first principles to clarify some of the problems and explain others.  I shall seek 
to show that Intentionality even when used in its legal sense is not some infinitely variable 
state which has to be redefined to fit each situation but that intentionality may be regarded as 
having three forms and that it is the rules of law or evidence which effect the variations, and 
that indeed, looked at in this light many of the anomalies will be seen to be clarified.  The 
rules introduced by the law have, in each case, been attempts to promote Justice. 
           Further if the question of Foreseeability and intended consequence are treated in the 
same fairly straightforward manner a logicality of results may be promoted.  Also, I have 
sought to indicate my reasons for separating and clarifying the distinction between Intention, 
Desire, Belief and Reasons in relation to causal events. 124 
 
           For our present purposes we are not concerned whether the law is a good law or a bad 
law or whether it is designed to effect an objective (e.g.  Tax Laws to redistribute wealth).  
But we should again note that in our law there are also positive guidelines, (e.g.  for making a 
contract, will, or running a business) as well as prohibitions.  Generally the laws of all nations 
fall into two further, but not coincidental, divisions; Civil and Criminal.  It is in the field of 
civil law that the rules tend to be positive in effect, i.e.  how to conduct various activities, 
even though their  format may  be  in part negative.  Breaches of the code of conduct are 
usually adjudged in a manner so as to restore the parties (or compensate them if restoration is 
not possible) to the state they would have been in had everyone obeyed the rules.  That is, it 
may generally be said to be an application of Justice in restoring where possible what should 
have been.  Generally, Civil judgements, at least in our society, are not retributive they are 
compensatory.  (A notable exception being triple damages in U.S.  anti- trust cases but then 
this may be argued as being quasi criminal). 
            One thing which should be noticed about laws in general is that they are only laws if 
they are capable, at least theoretically, of being enforced.  "Think nice thoughts" can never be 
a law properly so called because it just isn't enforceable.  I can sit there smiling seraphically 
whilst in my mind I am sticking pins in a little wax image I keep at home.  This sort of thing 
at best is a moral injunction, at worst a pious hope.  This limitation to the law, when it is 
forgotten, can cause untold problems, for we cannot legislate to control „intentions‟ even 
though our laws are much concerned with them. 
           Philosophically it could be said that law is a coercive force for the application of moral 
standards adopted by a society.  This is not the same as its purpose  - to provide for the 
regulation of the conduct of the citizens of a state.  This is where the influence of moral 
thinking may affect the political input to the formulation of law, i.e.  it is at the stage prior to 
the influence of justice (See fig.  1 in ch.2.).  Its relationship to those moral standards will 
depend on the type of law and the society's view of it i.e.  whether, for example the society is 
religious or secular.  There is inevitably an overlap and this may have an effect on who is to 
be held accountable and under what circumstances. 
           In English law Intention plays a very marked role, both in civil and criminal cases but 
particularly in establishing the nature of a crime, especially where the offence is a serious 
one, and again in considering the punishment.  (While there is an increasing tendency to 
establish a series of absolute or strict liability offenses these are usually of a more minor 
nature). 
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different forms and indeed is sometimes regarded differently by lawyers and philosophers.  
Hart classifies the forms of intention into three
80; as Bare intentions (which I prefer to call 
future intentions); Intending to do something (which I prefer to describe as a Primary 
intention); and doing something with a further intention (which again I prefer to describe as a 
Secondary intention) This is discussed further under „Intention - a philosophical perspective‟.  
However first there is a further complication to consider:- 
DIRECT AND OBLIQUE INTENTIONS. 
           This is well illustrated in the case of  R v Desmond, Barrett et al (1868) 11 Cox CC 
146.  Here Barrett, in trying to help two Irish Fenians to escape, dynamited the prison wall 
outside what he thought would be the exercise area.  As a result of the explosion people were 
killed.  Now the question that can be asked is „Did Barrett intend to kill those people?‟ This 
question raises difficulties because there would appear to be a difference between a death 
which is foreseen as a possible consequence but not desired - often referred to as an oblique 
intention - and a death which was purposive i.e.  a Direct intention. 
           Hart suggests that 
“"whether he sought to achieve this as an end or a means to his end 
or merely foresaw it as an unwelcome consequence of his intention, 
is irrelevant at the stage of conviction where the question of control is 
crucial.  However when it comes to the punishment it may be (though 
I am not at all sure that this is the case) that both on a retributive and 
a utilitarian theory of punishment the distinction between direct and 
oblique intention is relevant"
81. 
           Hart  then  discusses  (p.122-125)  a  system  which  distinguishes  between  direct  and 
oblique intention in a way that english law does not.  This is the 
DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT 
           The example he gives is where according to Catholic doctrine a doctor may save the 
life  of  a  pregnant  woman  having  cancer  of  the  womb  by  removing  the  womb  with  the 
foreseen consequence that the  foetus will die.  On the other hand  he  is  not permitted to 
perform a craniotomy killing an unborn child in order to save a woman in labour who would 
otherwise die.  Hart points out that in both cases it is the removal of the foetus which is 
required to save the mother's life and "in both cases alike the death of the foetus is a „second 
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effect‟,  foreseen, but not used as a means to an end or an end".  Also in both cases the same 
end is the good intention to save the mother's life.  Here while I agree with the general point 
Hart is making surely the technical difference is that in the one case (the craniotomy) there is 
a direct action to kill the foetus even though it is not desired.  Hart goes on that the distinction 
between direct and oblique intention is used to draw the line between what is, and what is 
not, sin in cases where the ultimate purpose is the same, so that the morality is determined by 
prohibiting all intentional killing as opposed to knowingly causing death.  It is a fine point 
and it seems that when one is in a situation where one is faced with the choice between two 
evils any decision, or governing rule, must of necessity be arbitrary.  Duff
82 points out that  
i)  Bentham distinguishes a matter to be directly intentional when it constitutes one of the 
links in the chain of causes by which the person was determined to do the act.  It is oblique if 
the consequence was in contemplation (and likely to ensue) but did not constitute a link in the 
chain; 
ii)  J. W. Meiland distinguishes purposive and non purposive intention (the expected side 
effects) and; 
iii)  R. M. Chisholm refers to the diffusiveness of intention, i.e.  a man acts to bring about p 
and who believes that by bringing about p he will bring about the conjunctive state p and q 
then he does act with the intention of bringing about the conjunctive state of affairs p and q.  
However he also considers the view that such expected side effects are “consented to but not 
intended". 
           This is a very real and unresolved problem philosophically for one can see the merits 
of both arguments, i.e.  that what is contemplated must be within the ambit of intention, and 
the counter argument that there is a sharp distinction between what is intended and what is 
seen as side effects.  As will become apparent later I shall be inclined to the argument, for 
legal purposes at least, that Intention is purposive, that this simplifies the concept of Intention 
and that we can then rely upon the rules of law to bring other actions and their consequences 
within the sphere of deemed or constructive intention.  In taking this approach I am by no 
means attempting to dismiss the strength of the counter argument.   
           Duff raises the question as to whether bringing about the effect was relevant to the 
action.  Was it part of the necessary train of events? For example would Barrett's intention 
have been thwarted if people had not been killed? This is a useful way of distinguishing the 
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relevance of the foreseen consequence to the crime but it does not, in my submission, help us 
in a determination of responsibility.  This is because as we shall see the law is often going to 
hold a person responsible for things which were not relevant to the accomplishment of an 
intention. 
           Also we shall see that while we have so far been considering actually contemplated or 
foreseen risks and consequences there is a very real problem with regard to foreseeability.  
Before proceeding to this we should consider some of the differences in civil and criminal 
law.  We have noted that Civil Law generally comprises positive conduct rules covering such 
things as trade and commerce (Contract) and civil wrongs or Torts.  In these cases breaches 
are dealt with inter partes on a compensatory basis.   
What then distinguishes a crime? 
           Legally it is defined as an act which is prohibited (or the omission to perform an act 
which is commanded) by law, the remedy for which is punishment of the offender at the 
instance  of  the  state
83.   The S horter Oxford includes two further qualifications besides 
prohibition viz.  1) or injurious to the public welfare (usually a grave offence) or  2) an 
injurious act (usually a grave offence). 
           What can one say of this philosophically?  First of course crimes seem to be 
a)  a grave matter  
b) defined by the state  
c)   which are worthy of punishment as opposed to a compensatory approach.  What has been 
omitted is any reference to intention or at least the exclusion of accident.  So let us try for a 
philosophical definition.  Perhaps a start would be:- 
       An act which is designed to alter adversely the status quo of a third party without 
his consent. 
    This  would  cover  all  crimes  against  the  person  and  property.    It  would 
incidentally, I am aware, also cover breach of contract (though it may be argued that such an 
act is usually designed to benefit the perpetrator and only incidentally harms the other party).  
However leaving that aside for a moment the thing to note is that already we have had to 
introduce the question of intention in order to exclude accidents, negligence, and the acts of a 
madman.  Now we could alter our definition to try and exclude intention and it would have to 
develop into:- 
       An act (whether of omission or commission) prohibited by the state, saving and 
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excepting those acts which are accidental, negligent or committed by a mad person, 
and which alters adversely the status quo of a third party without their consent.   
    Here we see we haven't really gained anything because we now have to define 
accident, negligence and madness all of which tend to involve the concept of intention, as 
indeed does the concept of consent.  All we have done is to remove the concept of intention 
by one stage and lose precision in the process.   Moreover we have still omitted the case 
where say a burglar, intending only to frighten, takes a gun and in the course of his crime 
kills someone.  At this point it will be appreciated that we are of necessity going to have to 
add  further subclauses and that before  long we are going to end up with a  horrendously 
complicated definition.   
                The alternative is in effect to do what the Common Law has in fact done  - i.e.  
Having regard to 1) the seriousness of the offence, 2) the ambit of foreseeable incidental 
injury and 3) the  intention or presumed  intention,  it has  made rules to cover the various 
situations likely to be encountered.  These rules themselves form part of the law.   
    There are two other points that can be deduced from our review so far: 1) The 
legal approach, so often regarded as purely arbitrary, can be seen to have a certain underlying 
philosophical  basis  and  2)  It  is  beginning  to  look  as  if  the  idea  of  intention  cannot  be 
dismissed (though there are those who would reduce all crime to purely strict liability - See 
Wootton
84.  I shall not be pursuing this particular argument though the reasons for my almost 
implacable  opposition  to  it  should  become  apparent  from  my  views  relating  to  the 
intrinsically integrated relationship of some intentions and actions). 
        If we return to a consideration of the standard definitions of crime we see that in 
the first place the individual society or its government in fact decides what is and is not to be 
regarded as serious.  While most societies agree on some prohibited acts such as murder there 
is by no means agreement on all categories of offence, nor of the seriousness with which they 
are to be regarded.  This is one of the reasons why difficulties increase as groups become 
larger, particularly when they attempt to become multicultural.  It is easier to become multi -
racial, where for example the English of West Indian descent share a language and a religion, 
than  in  becoming  multi -cultural  by  integrating  say  non  English  speaking  Muslims  of 
Pakistani origin.  The difference with which offenses may be regarded is particularly marked 
when we come to the fixed or statutory absolute liability offenses.  It could well be that the 
Germans and Poles might consider the contents of the average British sa usage, were they 
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ever to be truly known, to be a fit subject for criminal prosecution! 
                In the case of crime, as opposed to civil wrongs the state has become involved 
because it defines the conduct and the seriousness of the various actions.  As we have seen 
these fall into two parts, crime against the person, and crime against property.  How then is 
the state to deal with these crimes and indeed why should it?  It could after all allow things to 
be settled in the same way as for civil wrongs, i.e.  inter partes and by way of compensation.  
But  this  would  not  work,  not  least  because  the  crimes  here  include  intimidation  and 
oppression of the weaker by the strong.  The individual is at a disadvantage - How can he 
find out who stole his sheep, car etc.? So the state intervenes of necessity on behalf of the 
individual and prescribes a punishment for the offender. 
PROBLEMS FOR THE COURTS' DETERMINATION. 
    There is a basic problem for the Courts in the determination of the factual 
situation  with  respect  to  intention,  motive  and  the  like.    There  is,  unlike  medicine,  no 
opportunity for surveillance or questioning before an event (as there would be, for example, 
in a medical or psychological experiment).  Moreover after the event the consequences may 
be such that the intention or motives may be seen, even by the participant, in a new and 
contradictory light.  For example A assaults B - the thought „I don't care if it kills B, me or 
anyone else' may even flash through his head.  In the event B dies and A may then become 
remorseful.  Given the bare facts it is going to be difficult to establish A's true intention at the 
time of the event.  Was it:- 
 a) to kill 
 b) to wound 
 c) to frighten  
 d) to punish 
 e) a state of oblivious or foolish carelessness (negligence) 
 f) a state of total recklessness and abandon or    
 g) a blinding red fury in which events are not even recallable. 
            Further, A may later genuinely review his actions in a different light.  Any admissions 
of intention may well be coloured by the prospective punishment  
a) because A wishes to obtain the lightest possible punishment (the usual case) or,  
b) once remorse sets in, A's sense of guilt could become so overpowering that it makes him 
believe that anything but the harshest punishment would be inadequate. 
            An example where the latter appears to have happened was in case, a few years ago, 
of the man in Brighton who set fire to a flat to scare the people remaining at a party.  When 130 
 
the joke misfired and people died he then committed suicide. 
           So the problems involved are difficult and compound and although the example given 
above relates to criminal law and Mens Rea there are useful parallels of the necessity for rule 
making and assumptions in civil law in both contracts and torts.  In contracts the courts are 
often faced with the question as to whether the parties „intended‟ to be bound or not.  Often 
one did and one did not.  Here the courts are looking for a consensus ad idem, for, until the 
parties are deemed to have agreed no contract can exist. 
           In the field of torts there has been a much more prolific series of situations and cases 
whereby circumstantial rules have been established.  Faced with the problem of determining 
intentionality, particularly in cases where a whole series of unpleasant consequences may 
flow and may even have been perceived to flow from the Agent's decision, the courts had 
little option but to develop a series of rules or guidelines.  Sometimes, looked at in isolation, 
one could say that these rules are arbitrary and to an extent this is a justifiable criticism.  
However the rules may be the only way justice can be best approached when the attempt is to 
attribute a cause or an intention retrospectively from an action.  There is little else that can be 
done.  Moreover the law is also constrained in that it is required, within limits, to display a 
degree of 1) certainty and 2) of uniformity.  To this end it has produced its rules to aid the 
resolution of certain questions.  No rule can possibly be perfect or apply in all cases (even 
some of our most cherished scientific laws fail here) but as has been shown above, it is highly 
doubtful, even given all the facts, that one could always determine the parties' state of mind 
beyond  a  peradventure.    Despite  all  these  limiting  parameters  the  rules  must  be 
philosophically and sociologically acceptable if justice is to be seen to be done.  It is this 
above all which requires a constant review of the one in the light of the other. 
           Quite apart  from the  intention  behind an action and the effect that that may  have 
legally, we are faced with the problems brought about by varying results of the action.  These 
may of course be those that were foreseen, foreseeable, and necessarily incidental, as well as 
those not foreseen, contingently incidental, and unforeseeable.  The Law has provided us with 
many fascinating insights as to tackling these problems, particularly amongst some of the 
older cases.  This is because formerly the law was considerably less governed by statute and 
far more dependant on precedent.  As a result the judgements relating to new situations were 
often profound and showed considerable philosophical insight.  Nowhere can this be better 
seen than in the case of some dissenting judgements in the court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords.  It is a fact that many of the dissenting judgements of Lord Denning when he was an 
Appeal Court Judge were subsequently incorporated into our present laws.   131 
 




           One thing the legal approach did was to condense a number of approaches and sort out 
the contributing factors.  It is useful to start with the subject of „Harm resulting from an 
action and its relation to foreseeability': This really can be reduced to three categories which I 
believe are best illustrated with an optical analogy:- 
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Imagine a light source L 
(representing action)throws  
out an unfocussed beam of  
light which covers a certain 
area.See Fig.1.  Imagine that  
this is an action and the  
area of its foreseeable harm. 
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In figure 2 we see the effect                                      
of introducing a convex lens. 
This concentrates the light   
(harm) to a reduced area H1. 
This is the area focused on,  
i.e.  of foreseen Harm.  The  
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actually foreseen harm. 
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Harm H3 (i.e.  all possible  
consequent harm) occurring 
outside this H2 perimeter  
requires something to  
reflect the light out, say 
a small mirror.See Fig.3. 
The Law actually has made  
allowance for this variously  
as a "novus actus 
interveniens"," causa  
causans, causa proxima etc.       H3                               H1                                                        
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           Thus, as I hope we shall see, it is sufficient to divide the harm  resulting from an action 
into only three categories and not the rather more profuse number which were beginning to 
appear when we approached the problem via intention.  While the civil law cases refer to 
foreseeability  with  regard  to  the  harm  done,  exactly  the  same  criteria  apply  to  the 
consequences of an action which is the usual subject of discussion in criminal cases.  Of 
course the responsibility both moral and legal will be affected by the Intention and this brings 
upon us a whole new set of problems which will be dealt with separately. 
           Before examining Intention with respect to its effects on criminal cases (by far the 
most important aspect) it is of interest to examine briefly some of the rules in Civil Law. 
 
INTENTION & CIVIL LAW 
           In the case of Contracts the courts are primarily concerned with establishing a) When 
two parties intended to form a binding contract - the establishment of a  "consensus ad idem" 
and b) When one of the parties intended to breach the contract.  In practice the former is 
much more important because the simultaneous „intention to be bound‟ actually forms the 
basis  of  the  contract.    Admittedly  there  can  be  other  requirements  e.g.    in  England  the 
necessity for a written document with respect to land.  Even then the rule still holds for if 
someone signs under duress or in the mistaken idea that they were signing something else 133 
 
there would be no intention to be bound and therefore no consensus.  In the case of breach, 
the law takes an entirely opposite view.  You may well do something intending to breach the 
contract  but  if  your  action  doesn't  actually  breach  it  your  intention  is  of  no  direct
85 
consequence and you will not be liable.  Th is is because the law here is concerned with the 
harm arising and until harm arises by actual breach there is no case. 
           If we turn to the Law of Torts we find a really interesting line of cases which show 
how the concept of Foreseeability came to   affect the situation.  They also illustrate the 
philosophical thinking behind the cases:- 
           Originally it was thought (wrongly) that for liability in Tort there should be either 
wrongful  intention  or  culpable  negligence.    This  would,  at  first,  ap pear  to  be  both 
philosophically and equitably sound and many examples could be given illustrating this.  The 
great advantage of the law, however, is from a philosopher's point of view that sooner or later 
(and usually sooner), it will throw up a situation which does not fit the theory.  Moreover the 
prime intention of the civil law is to give reparation for damage done rather than to punish the 
offender.  This distinction must always be born in mind when considering civil cases.  
Nevertheless they contain many practical philosophical ideas for dealing with matters whose 
scope has to be determined ex post facto. 
           A typical example of the sort of situation which didn't fit the basic assumption came 
about in  
Rylands v Fletcher (1868) L.R.3 HL.330.  Here the two defendants constructed a reservoir 
on their land (as lessees) to supply water for their mill.  There was in fact the shaft of an old 
mine, which connected with the plaintiff's mine, under the property.  Through the negligence 
of the contractors this was  not discovered.  When the reservoir was  filled water escaped 
causing £943 damage to the plaintiff's mine.  The court ruled that the law was one of strict 
liability (without wrongful intention or culpable negligence).  As stated by Blackburn J. 
       “the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there 
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anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril and if he does not do so is 
prima facie liable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape".   
 
  It is interesting to note that although it is an example of an absolute rule the concept 
of „natural consequence‟ was introduced. 
                However  in  the  cases  which  involved  negligence  an  even  stricter  liability  was 
imposed at one time (in the U.K.  at least).  This was exemplified in the case of: 
In re Polemis [1921] 3 KB 560.   In this case the owners of the ship Thrasyvoulos chartered 
it to Messrs Furness, Withy and Co who loaded it with petrol in tins.  During the voyage they 
leaked and there was a considerable quantity of petrol vapour in the hold.  At Casablanca the 
Arab Stevedores (who were servants of Furness Withy) negligently caused a heavy plank to 
be dislodged.  It fell into the hold, causing a spark which ignited inflammable gases, setting 
fire to the ship which was completely destroyed.  The employers were held liable for all the 
losses flowing from the initial negligence. 
            It was quite clear that this rule could prove far too severe and in fact it had already 
been partially tackled in cases involving contributory negligence - which since 1945 has been 
covered by statute.  Before that time however the law had introduced a number of concepts to 
try to reach an equitable decision.  One was the concept of Novus Actus interveniens which 
gave rise to a secondary cause.  Here the court took regard of the causa proxima and adopted 
the rule of causa proxima et non remota spectator.  This was the doctrine of last clear chance.   
For example in the case of  Davies v Mann (1842) 10 M & W 546.  Here the plaintiff 
had left his donkey in the road with its legs hobbled (negligence).  The defendant came along 
far too fast (negligence) and killed the donkey.  The plaintiff succeeded on the doctrine of last 
clear chance.  In fact we see this followed today to a minor  extent in motor accidents where 
it is most inadvisable to drive into the back of another vehicle because we are supposed to 
make allowance for emergencies but also, one suspects, though it is not set out as such, the 
man at the back has the last clear chance of avoiding the accident. 
           Not all cases were this clear and the courts used at one time to try to resolve, where 
there was more than one cause, which was the Causa causans and which the causa sine qua 
non.  In these cases the causa causans was held to be ultimately responsible.  However they 135 
 
made  an  exception  in  the  case  of  people  who  voluntarily  intervened  to  rescue  and  were 
harmed.  Such people were excluded by the rule of Volenti non fit injuria which precluded 
volunteers from claiming for injuries received.
86 
           The difficulty faced by the courts was that they were trying to administer justice in a 
manner which was philosophically  fair (equitable) and which gave some  indication of 
consistency and impartiality.  In order to do this the concept of equity was introduced into the 
law.  It was the flexibility of our law  which allowed judges to apply the law differently 
according to the facts by distinguishing cases from previous precedents b ecause they were 
not "on all fours" and also to set forth lines of reasoning designed to act as precedents for 
future cases.  This became the great body of law known as the English Common Law.  It was 
the ability of judges to consider cases with this type of philosophical approach that enabled a 
famous American judge to produce a solution of great insight.  This occurred in the case of 
 Palsgraf v The Long Island Railroad Co.  (1928) 284 NY 339.  The facts were an almost  
perfect textbook case for a challenge to the strict liability approach.  Here a man with a parcel 
under  his  arm,  raced  for  a train  that  had  started to  move.    A  railway  employee,  against 
regulations (negligence), attempted to help him and he dropped the parcel.  The parcel, which 
contained fireworks, fell under the wheels of the train.  Mrs Palsgraf was waiting further up 
the platform by some scales and the resultant explosion from the fireworks shook the station 
causing the scales to fall on her thus injuring her.  Accordingly she sued the Railway and, had 
the Polemis approach been applied, she would undoubtedly have won.  However Cardoso J.  
in a brilliant judgement held that the damage was too remote.  It was unreasonable for the 
responsibility to flow beyond what was reasonably foreseeable as the result of an action.  i.e.  
whereas  harm  may  reasonably  have  been  envisaged  to the  passenger    or  his  goods  (the 
parcel), the injury to Mrs Palsgraf was too remote.  This case actually preceded In re Polemis 
but  the  English  courts  subsequently  followed  the  same  line  of  reasoning  (In  Bourhill  v 
Young  and later The Wagon Mound -another ship) in what has become known as the 
„ambit of foreseeable risk‟ approach.  In the Bourhill case the Plaintiff, who was heavily 
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pregnant (being  in the eighth or  more  month), was travelling on a  London tram when a 
motorcyclist negligently tried to pass the tram on the wrong side as it turned.  The resultant 
crash not only stopped the tram but killed the motorcyclist.  The Plaintiff was not affected by 
the stopping of the tram but, „out of a morbid curiosity of her own‟ she decided to have a 
look.  She therefore got off the tram and trundled round the other side whereupon the sight of 
the mangled remains of the motorcyclist gave her such a fright that she promptly miscarried 
(thereby adding considerably no doubt to the state of carnage and confusion).  It was held that 
she could not succeed in her claim against the estate of the deceased motorcyclist.  The facts 
of this case are cited to show just how wide ranging the application of the „ambit of risk 
approach‟  could  be.    It  was  an  extraordinarily  clever  approach  that  ruled  out  the 
unforeseeable (H3) harms (Fig.3) but included all reasonably foreseeable (H2) harms.  The 
only thing left for the court to decide was, not the actual H2/H3 boundary but whether the 
harm fell within the class H2 or H3, i.e.  was it, or was it not, reasonably foreseeable? 
             This was much easier than attempting to establish the precise boundary because for 
example while philosophers might spend a considerable time trying to determine the precise 
boundary  between  the  two,  the  court  would  usually  be  able  to  say  „in  these  particular 
circumstances this should be regarded as foreseeable (H2)‟.  In other circumstances it might 
be able to distinguish the case as not being on all fours and find for H3.  The ambit of risk 
was  that  which  was  reasonably  foreseeable  and  the  test  was  that  of  common  sense,  i.e. 
applying the test of a reasonably well informed and reasonably thoughtful person  - often 
referred to as "the man on the Clapham omnibus". 
           A point should be emphasized at this juncture - 
In the civil cases we have been considering negligence as the factor initiating liability.  This 
is entirely fortuitous and must not be confused with  a consideration of negligence in criminal 
cases.  My sole object is to draw the parallels between the Foreseeability of the harm caused 
by  a  culpable  act  (a  negligent  one  in  the  civil  cases)  and  the  results  or  consequences 
stemming  from  a  criminal  act.      The  parallel  between  these  cases  and  those  involving 
intention can also be seen in that the intention in a criminal case, like the civil negligence, 
may well prove insufficient to carry liability beyond a certain point.  The applications of the 
effects  of  negligence  in  civil  cases  and  intention  in  criminal  cases  both  involve  a 137 
 
consideration of the resultant harm and whether it was foreseeable, foreseen or unforseen.  
However in a civil case of negligence we usually have a set of established facts upon which 
to base our judgement, whereas in the case of intention  it often has to be construed.   
           The consideration of the factors involved in the civil cases is interesting because it 
reveals a relationship and similarity of application of the rules, particularly of foreseeability, 
in the case of negligence and of intention, with respect to harm done or consequence of the 
act.  There is one other interesting point to note and that is that in the civil cases a rule arose 
known  as  the  "egg-shell  skull"  rule
87.  Under this it is the type of harm done which is 
important, and not the quantum of harm.  So if injury (or damage) was foreseen in a civil case 
then the party responsible would bear the full liability even though he may not have foreseen 
the extent of the damage.  (Note the similarity with intending to do grievous bodily harm by 
an act, which in the event kills). 
           In criminal law we shall find we have to separate Foreseeability and Intention, not 
with respect to the actual harm done but with respect to the punishment for the same harm 
done.  This is because in civil cases we are concerned with liability for, and c ompensation 
for, harm done howsoever & whysoever caused, whereas in criminal law the concern is to 
punish for the crime committed.  The severity of the harm (within the parameters of the 
defined crime) may not alter the crime but may have a bearing on the  absence or degree of 
mercy applied in the sentence.  The foreseeability will play a similar role in affecting the 
assessment of the crime via the intention.  The intention may also bring about a variation in 
the category of the crime.  Thus it is in the Cr iminal law where intention plays such a vital 
role.  This statement actually needs further amplification because it is the legally construed 
intention, as opposed to the actual intention, with which the law can concern itself.  Even so 
we will have to look   at actual intentions to establish the theoretical equitability of the 
punishment, and then at the rules for presuming an intention so as to bring the majority of 
cases within the ambit of the penalty imposed for the harm done.  This problem is one of 
great  nicety  and  it  is  often  by  virtue  of  not  constructing  the  relationship  from  a 
philosophically sound point of view that gives rise to discrepancies, confusion or apparent 
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injustices.  (See for example Intention and Recklessness post). 
           An example from the parallel subject of defences is the M'Naughten rule which directs 
its attention to „knowledge of right and wrong'.  Thus a totally macabre serial killer can be 
found to be „sane‟ when perhaps the involuntary reaction of members of the public would be 
to say „He must have been mad to act like that‟.  It must be remembered however that the 
courts are not concerned with the public's definition of madness.  [Nor indeed technically are 
they concerned primarily with the administration of Justice, being more and more concerned 
merely with administering Statute Law].  However it is necessary for the courts constantly to 
see that its ideas and those of the public agree as nearly as possible or they will be regarded 
as being "out of touch" and their authority will decline.  Thus it is the duty of the courts (and 
a fortiori of Parliament) to keep fine tuning the laws, rules and interpretations so that they are, 
as far as possible, philosophically and sociologically acceptable to the society in which they 
are administered.   
    We  have  seen  that  the  law  involves  both  the  concept  of  intention  and 
foreseeability i.e.  that if an act was not intended it may not be a crime in the same way that if 
it was not foreseen it may not be a crime.  We have also seen that the actual harm done may 
be a determining variable.  In fact there are further such variables for we will also have to be 
concerned with the question of recklessness and negligence. 
    We can see from the law and the cases that in most, but not all, crimes the 
question of intention is regarded as the most serious.  e.g.  Intention is required for Murder 
(albeit  not always  for the specific act but at  least intention to do serious  harm)  whereas 
Manslaughter, the  less serious crime requires only recklessness.  Regrettably the Statutes 
have  recently  introduced  the  term  "heedlessly"  and  this  causes  additional  problems  (See 
Intention & Recklessness post).  Negligence, the third category can vary widely from a slight 
neglect which sets off a train of events with serious results (and here foreseeability may be 
brought in to determine the limits of the culpability); to negligence bordering on recklessness. 
    We have now established the interactive factors and it remains to determine if 
there is any philosophically justifiable explanation for the way that they are utilized by the 
courts.  In the circumstances it will be necessary to consider aspects of Intentionality and 
relate these to the type of harm done, its effect on the legal presumptions of intention and 139 
 
(briefly) the relationship with defences.  Before doing so one must first look at some of the 
philosophical aspects of intention. 
 
INTENTION AND THE DUALIST APPROACH. 
For the non specialist: This section is largely philosophical.  It is not essential to the 
understanding of the discussion of Intention but is a useful background.  The terms 
Dualism (basically the concept that we consist of a physical body and a non physical 
mind) and Monism (that the mind and its states are purely physical) occur and are 
further explained in the text. 
 
           One of the problems in considering the decided cases is that the language used by the 
judges often reflects a dualist approach.  When read by a philosopher this may well be over 
emphasized and it must be remembered that in the case of a Judgement a Judge is setting out 
to give reasons for his decision because  
1) He is required to do so,  
2) The case, if not successfully appealed against, may set a precedent for others to follow and 
guide lines are therefore useful and  
3)  In  the  event  of  an  appeal  the  reasons  are  there  to  justify  the  decision  (not  always 
successfully). 
    None of these factors require explanations in strictly philosophical terms. 
           Secondly there is a natural dualism in our manner of expressing our concepts brought 
about by the length of time during which dualism has been the prevailing concept.  It really 
wasn't until Ryle and Wittgenstein's thinking took hold that there was a serious concerted 
attack on the concept and even the convinced Monist finds it easy enough to slip into a figure 
of speech which can have dualist overtones.  One sees this clearly in the cases where a Judge 
may  well  use  expressions  such  as  „the  impossibility  of  seeing  into  the  accused's  mind'.  
However this will often be as a prelude to inferring intention from the accused's actions and 
should not, in my submission, be regarded as a strict philosophical statement of Cartesian 
dualism.  Moreover many of the cases we refer to will have been decided at a time when 
Cartesian dualism was virtually unquestioned.  Certainly many of the judges will have been 140 
 
educated  in  a  largely  dualist  era.    Nevertheless  from  a  philosophical  point  of  view  it  is 
necessary to examine the  categorization of  intention.  In this regard Duff  mounts a very 
persuasive argument
88. 
           His case is that had the courts actually applied a strict dualist approach it would have 
failed them.  Classical dualism is predicated upon the assumption that we consist of a purely 
physical body and a non physical mind which feels   and thinks.  Bodies are public (and  
observable) and minds are essentially private and only knowable to the person concerned.  
Under such a system the defendant's intentions could only ever be truly known to the 
defendant and the court would have to infer them from the purely external physical evidence.  
In reiterating this in the judgements Duff feels that the Judges have taken an epistemological 
dualist approach.  With this he disagrees, drawing a fine distinction and pointing out that in 
fact pure bodily movements do not, and usually cannot, of themselves give any indication of 
a particular mental state.  The example he uses is of an observer in a restaurant watching Pat 
and Ian.  They are having a row and Ian strikes Pat.  Duff points out that the mere  physical 
movement of Ian's hand to Pat's face is explainable in a number of ways.  It is only the fact 
that I have observed the row, the angry gestures etc.  that enables me to report that Ian 
assaulted Pat.  In a way the argument is similar in type to Str awson's argument concerning 
Persons, i.e.  that the concept of person is prior to the Mental and physical predicates
89.  To 
me it is a most logical view.  Moreover Duff points out that the dualist approach founders on 
the argument from analogy in that we ha ve only one certain observation and that relates to 
ourselves.  As, for a dualist, minds are necessarily private I could not even test in principle 
the inferences which I might make as to another's mental state
90. 
           Even more telling is the argument that if inner mental states are to be inferred from 
behaviour we would need to be able to identify our mental state independently of external 
behaviour, i.e.  if A is distinct and must be inferred from B we must be able to identify A 
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apart from B.  Therefore if intention is a cartesian mental state I must be able to identify 
certain  Mental  states  as  intentions.    But  we  can't,  we  really  can  only  identify  intentions 
through actions.  The action and intention are identified together.  Normal descriptions are 
not of pure colourless events and in fact to produce the latter type of description we are 
virtually forced to strip away part of the normal description.  To use a different analogy 
which reverses Duff's approach but which I submit is equally apposite, we do not see people 
as skeletons to which there is flesh and blood appended any more than we see actions as bare 
motions with different substance mental states attached. 
           Thus Duff's view is that we begin with people and their actions.  These actions are not 
reducible to basic constituents of bodies and colourless movements.  To revert to my former 
analogy a body is flesh and blood but in considering it we don't separate the blood out and 
start with that even though we know the blood is there and the function it performs.   
           There are two further problems to be considered, people do not always do what they 
intend (this will be dealt with under the section dealing with bare or as I prefer to call them 
future  intentions)  and  mistakes  can  be  made  in  observing  actions  as  to  the  underlying 
intention.    The  mistakes  occur  according  to  Duff  because  we  infer  from  the  available 
evidence  and  our  inferences  may  be  wrong.    Nevertheless  we  still  infer  from  actions  or 
aspects of actions to the broader patterns of meaning within their context.  As he points out 
the more we know the easier our task is.  When one reads a book one does not just see marks 
on paper but words and sentences.  Despite this there are those who argue that the special 
knowledge we  have of our own  intensions  marks this out as a distinct category.   Duff's 
explanation is ingenious and logical.  It is that in the one case I am an observer and in the 
other I am the actual agent.  As he points out his views do not affect the meaning of intention 
but they bear directly on the proof of intention and the distinction between actus reus and 
mens rea. 
INTENTION - A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE.
91 
           Hart very usefully (p.117 et seq.) divides Intention into three parts one of which he 
describes as „bare‟ intentions.  Although I shall use the term I consider it to be an unfortunate 
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choice.  „Bare‟ intentions, as I would interpret the word, would be those things which some 
philosophers would seek to separate from action i.e.  being „bare‟ they have been stripped 
down to essentials.  They are precisely what Duff has shown cannot exist by themselves.  A 
„bare' intention is rather like a fish dragged from the water, it ceases to function.  In each case 
what Hart and Duff refer to as bare intentions are in fact future intentions.  Future intentions 
are perfectly respectable. 
THEY ARE HOWEVER IN NO WAY SEPARATED FROM THE RELATED ACTION.   
           “I intend to go to Glasgow tomorrow”  is the example given, but the intention is totally 
bound up with the proposed action.  If someone says to you “Tomorrow I Intend."  your first 
reaction would be to ask “Intend what?" and if they said 
“I've told you, I intend!", the conversation would not last long before you either concluded 
that they were slightly peculiar or that they were being deliberately obtuse.  The actual status 
of a non activated future intention is a subject of considerable theoretical interest but slightly 
beyond the scope of the present subject. 
           The categories of intention which are of prime concern to the law are the remaining 
two which Hart describes as   
i) „intentionally doing something‟ and  
                    ii) „doing something with a further intention‟.   
    Again I would prefer to classify these as :- 
a)  „An  Intention  of  Action‟  or  a  „Primary  Intention‟  -  I  buy  a  ticket  to  Glasgow 
(intentionally or intending to do so); and  
b) „An Intention of Purpose or consequence‟ or a „Secondary Intention‟ -  
    For  example  -  I  am  going  to  Glasgow  to  visit  my  aunt  (per  Hart  „doing 
something with a further purpose‟).  Here it should be noted that this may sometimes be 
described as a reason.  Certainly it answers the question „Why are you going to Glasgow?‟ 
and the answer, most certainly in everyday terms, is understood as the reason.  But is that 
enough? It is my belief that Intentional statements are not reasons.  They may very well 
incorporate reasons but that is not the same thing.  Let us take the example further. 
I am going to Glasgow.  - Primary Intention. 
Why are you going to Glasgow? 143 
 
To visit my aunt.  - Secondary Intention. 
Why are you going to visit your aunt? 
Because she has been ill and I wish to cheer her up.- Reason. 
           I believe this distinction is of great importance.  Another reason for going to Glasgow, 
cutting out any secondary intention could be „I am going to Glasgow because I love it there‟.  
The difference is that the reason, when we get down to it, is not action related whereas the 
secondary  intention  is,  as  I  have  been  arguing,  of  necessity  Purposive  or  action  related.  
Reasons are belief and desire related and they are explanations of causes of actions but they 
are  not  of  themselves  purposive.    An  excellent  example  showing  the  relation  between 
Intentions and reasons is given by Davidson in his essay on „Intending‟
92 in which a man 
boards an aeroplane marked „London‟ with the intention of going to London England.  In fact 
the plane is headed for London Ontario.  Davidson continues 
“The  relation  between  reasons  and  intentions  may  be  appreciated  by 
comparing these statements: 
(1) His reason for boarding the plane marked „London‟ was that he wanted to board  
a plane headed for London, England, and he believed the plane marked „London‟  
was headed for London, England. 
(2) His intention in boarding the plane marked „London‟ was to board a plane  
headed for London, England" 
    He points out that if you substitute „boarding the plane headed for London 
Ontario‟ for „boarding the plane marked London‟ it renders (1) above false but not (2). 
    Again in his essay on „Actions, reasons and causes‟
93 he points out that the 
“primary reason" for an agent's action comprises the pro attitude and the belief and that “to 
know  the  intention  is  not  necessarily  to  know  the  primary  reason  in  full  detail."
94  (The 
importance of these distinctions will be referred to in the section on Intention, Desire, Belief 
and Reasons.) 
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           It is the secondary intentions which sometimes play an important and confusing part 
in the criminal law.  In my submission they become easier to understand and interpret if we 
regard them as I have described them as „secondary purposive intentions‟ rather than as Hart 
does as a different class of action viz „doing something with a further intention‟.  This is 
because we can define an action as intentional (or not as the case may be) and as philosophers 
we can proceed to ask were there any secondary intentions?  Now even though the answer 
may appear to be no, the law will impute a secondary intention in certain cases and this is 
where the whole question of foreseeability with its three categories of harm, H1 Foreseen, H2 
Reasonably Foreseeable, and H3 Unforeseeable, come back into play. 
  Usually they are discussed as the Consequences of a course of action rather than the 
harm resulting.  This is because in criminal law we are particularly concerned with the nature 
of the act (including the consequences flowing from it) rather than, as in civil law, the act 
(which  is  usually  merely  negligent)  and  the  harm  flowing  from  it.    Nevertheless  the 
consequences C1 (foreseen or contemplated), C2 (reasonably foreseeable) & C3 (unexpected, 
unforeseen) will be found to parallel H1,2 & 3 via the foreseeability link.  This is not to say 
that  the  foreseen  consequences  are  necessarily  the  same  as  the  intended  consequences 
because as I have sought to emphasize intention contains a purposive and transitive factor.   
INTENTION AND RESPONSIBILITY 
           In allocating responsibility there appear to be three levels of gravity relating to the 
circumstances of the action - i.e.  was it intentional, reckless or negligent? The most serious 
relates  to  those  things  which  were  done  intentionally  or  purposively.    After  all,  on  the 
grounds of natural common sense, it seems obvious that we should be responsible for those 
things which we intended to do.  But already I have introduced a philosophical problem by 
subtly  changing  the  phraseology  from  “things  done  intentionally"  to  “things  which  we 
intended to do" because as we saw in the discussion on oblique and direct intentions, doing 
something we intended to do (e.g.  Barrett's dynamiting the wall) can be argued to be quite 
different intentionally from killing people as a side effect. 
           Duff (p.34) raises the question therefore as to whether we should be concerned with 
intention at all.  He maintains that in the Hyam case  and in Moloney (both of which will be 
discussed  in  detail  later)  the  judges    “approached  their  task  with  firm,  intuitive 145 
 
preconceptions about the guilt or innocence of various actual or possible defendants.." 
    I am sure Duff is correct.  It would be very difficult for a judge not to form a 
conclusion towards which  he then works.  Nevertheless great efforts have  been  made to 
provide a logical (and often philosophical) approach via the concept of intention and Mens 
rea.  The confusion arises that different judges have taken different views of “intention".  
Duff  (p.35)  suggests  that  this  shows  that  the  concept  cannot  provide  a  "justificatory 
foundation for the intuitive judgements which they have wanted to make".  He suggests we 
should  "ask  more  directly  and  honestly  which  defendants  we  should  convict  of  which 
crimes".  Simple though such a solution might sound I doubt that it  would fit well within our 
system of law.  It would, I suggest, soon smack of arbitrariness.  One of the great merits of 
our legal system, whatever other faults it may have, is that judges are required to justify 
themselves.  However Duff seems to back away from the idea in the next paragraph and feels 
“we need not yet abandon the attempt to explicate the concept of intention as a concept which 
is, and should be, central to the determination of criminal liability". 
           It is true that Baroness Wootton's idea was that, having established as a fact who was 
„guilty‟ of the action, their whole case history would be examined with a view to „curing‟ 
them, and the punishment or treatment decided accordingly.  There is a school of thought that 
has  caused  us  to turn  increasingly  to the  absolute  liability  offenses  but  already  they  are 
beginning to offend the public's sense of equity.  Therefore particularly in serious cases such 
as murder the concept of intention together with certain rules of legal assumptions will, I 
submit, remain with us. 
           There  is  very  little  problem  with  responsibility  for  acts  of  Direct  intention.    The 
problem arises over those questions relating to matters the subject of Oblique intention and 
secondary  intention.    The  importance  of  this  springs  from  the  corollary  of  our  previous 
assumption.  i.e,. if I am to be responsible for things I directly intend should I therefore not be 
responsible for those things which I do not intend? Of course the problem is that I might 
allege I never intended whatever results occur. 
           The law's answer (and indeed ours) lies in the application of the foreseeability rules set 
out earlier.  There are several ways in which we can categorize events.  As we saw the most 
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and unforeseeable.  It is sometimes thought that the criminal cases bring in a fourth as in the 
example of the man who places a bomb on an aeroplane.  As various law lords have pointed 
out this  type  of  act  makes  the  death  of  the  passengers  and  crew  an  almost  'inseparable' 
consequence.  It is also a matter of the obviousness of the foreseeability.  The aircraft bomber 
must know that he will almost certainly kill people; Barrett may have foreseen that he would 
kill or injure people (certainly Hyam did).  These are basically in my argument the "foreseen" 
cases.  Next come the more remote "foreseeable" (but possibly not actually foreseen) cases 
and finally the totally unforeseen and possibly unforeseeable consequence. 
CONSTRUCTIVE INTENTION - a personal view 
           Now  in  my  view  these  differentiations  depend  on  the  facts  of  each  case.    It thus 
becomes to an extent a matter of evidence.  Certainly one must have rules but they will be 
rules of construction from the evidence and not a matter of providing an elasticated definition 
or further subdivisions of intention designed to fit the circumstances of each case.  It seems 
quite obvious that the courts are willing to find that where the result is "inseparable" the agent 
will be deemed to have intended the consequences.  Moreover I see no reason why the courts 
should not take the view that, unless there is evidence to the contrary, a person should be 
deemed to be responsible for not only the inseparable but also the reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of his acts.  Again this would be on the ground of “constructive intention” and 
constructive intention would follow the act.  These are perfectly acceptable legal principles.  
Let us take an example: If an act were malum in se such as causing grievous bodily harm then 
the reasonably foreseeable consequence that it might cause death would be accompanied by 
the “constructive intention”.  Not surprisingly this is exactly the end position the law takes 
but it does not justify itself as I have done, though it could easily have done so. 
           Let us apply this to Duff's example of marking the snow:- 
“I should not, however, be said to bring about intentionally every expected side effect 
of my actions, however certain its occurrence.  I intend to cross a snow covered lawn, 
knowing that this will mark the snow.  I do not act with the intention of marking the 
snow;.... 
 On one view it is true that I mark the snow intentionally: what makes it odd to say 
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convention that we should say only what there is some point in saying...” 
    He goes on to ask why one is not held responsible for marking the snow if it is 
a  foreseen  effect  of  his  voluntary  action.    He  says  this  is  because  he  is  properly  held 
responsible for effects which he intends to bring about, and for some, but not all expected 
side effects.  In fact he says that the category of intentional agency is wider than that of 
intended agency but does not cover all the side effects of my actions. 
    In order to clarify this I would suggest a slightly different approach.  Let us 
say the lawn is newly sewn below the snow and crossing it will do serious damage to the new 
grass (slightly improbable I admit but I am trying to use Duff's idea so that I do not fall into 
the trap of choosing examples to fit my own case).  Two cases then arise:  
a) I rush across your lawn to call for help for Pat who has fallen down and broken her leg  
b) I cross your lawn because it is a short cut to the pub.  
     According to my suggestion in case a) the evidence would show that the act 
of  crossing  was  with  good  intent  (to  get  help  for  Pat) therefore  there  is  no  constructive 
intention to harm the lawn.  In the second case there is a deliberate trespass for my own 
benefit and that, being malum in se, the constructive intention to damage the lawn flows.  (I 
appreciate that trespass is not a criminal offence and that therefore other points could be 
made but let us assume that damaging the grass is being treated as an offence under section 
1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971). 
           I  believe  this  is  a  better  way  of  dealing  with  the  concept  of  intention  in  these 
circumstances.  For example had we applied Chisholm's theory that knowing that if p, then p 
and q, means that by intending p I must intend p and q.  Then it works for the bomb in the 
aeroplane (the example given), but not always - e.g. the doctor who knows death may be a 
75% probability of the operation. 
           Duff  claims  that  a  recognition  of  the  distinction  between  intended  and  intentional 
agency can cure the confusion but that it does not answer the question of whether intended or 
intentional agency should be required for criminal liability (p.80).  I believe my theory may 
offer a way forward.  At this point we should return to the manner in which the law has 
actually dealt with the situation:- 
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Mens  Rea.   =  A  guilty  Mind  or  intent.    Moseley  and  Whiteley's  Law  Dictionary.    The 
original Maxim is “Actus non fecit reum nisi mens sit rea” - An act does not make a person 
guilty unless the mind is guilty.  Now this is open to two interpretations:-  
1)  That  the  person  is  not  guilty  unless  they  intended  to  commit  the  prohibited  act  -  an 
interpretation favoured by Hart, with which I totally agree, or  
2) The view held by Professor Jerome Hall, that this refers to moral culpability.
95 
           One of the great difficulties we are faced with in the cases is that when dealing with a 
crime or guilt we are always dealing with the matter post hoc facto.  We never have a chance 
of establishing the Agent's intentions or actual foreseen consequences before, or at the time of 
the event, and naturally afterwards viewpoints change.  This is particularly so if we find a 
situation in which, given one set of „intentions‟  the crime will be murder, and with other 
different intentions it could be reduced to manslaughter.  Here immediately we find ourselves 
faced with the prospect of the agent's possible conscious or unconscious attempt to reduce 
their responsibility in the light of impending retribution. 
           Thus  we  are  faced  in  law,  unlike  other  areas  in  philosophy,  with  attempting  to 
formulate the most reasonable set of methods or rules to establish intent and foreseeability.  
From this it can be seen that the rules themselves could induce a significant difference.  For 
example  one  could  say  that  intention  only  covers  direct  immediate  intention  so  that  for 
example the person putting the bomb on the plane hoping to collect the inflated insurance on 
a packet of diamonds on the flight does not intend the death of the crew and passengers.  
Alternatively one could say that with regard to consequences all those that flow shall be 
deemed to apply.i.e an In re Polemis approach.  While the primary intention or intention of 
action is usually fairly clear the intention of result or consequence, the secondary intention, is 
usually less so and it is particularly this that will have to be inferred from the evidence.  So:- 
“What do you intend to do with that match?” 
“Light this petrol heater”. 
Some time later, “Did you intend to burn down the house?”  
And this reveals our real problem.  If asked at the time  one can ascertain true intention 
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(excluding deliberate deception) but working backwards  from a result  is always going to 
involve a factor of uncertainty.  Was the fact that the house insurance had been doubled 
fortuitous  or  suspicious?  etc.    Thus  when  looking  at  the  cases  we  must  always  bear  an 
additional caveat in mind.  There is a great deal more to a case than the judgements.  The 
evidence can only be seen from a complete trial transcript.  Also in the court of first instance 
the judge sees the evidence being given and listens to the witnesses.  Although today it seems 
that we are all too eager to denigrate our judges (often for something which was Parliament's 
fault) they are usually experienced in assessing people as well as the law.  This is why the 
court of appeal are loath to override findings of fact of the Trial judge.  However, when we 
come  to  review  the  case  we  usually  find  that  we  are  considering  the  House  of  Lords 
judgements and the point under consideration is usually a well defined specified point of law.  
Judges‟ remarks on other matters not directly related to this are obiter dicta and as such not 
binding.  Also one must remember that foreseeability, which goes to the result is in a sense a 
unidirectional qualifier.  The fact that I could not (reasonably) foresee a result can nullify 
intention.  How could I intend what is not foreseeable? The other way round however - the 
fact that I could foresee a possibility, e.g.  of burning down the house, does not mean that this 
was my intention. 
    At this point it is necessary to look at the legal applications as seen from a 
review of some of the cases.   
“Foresight of a high degree of probability is not at all the same thing as intention" .... 
it is not foresight but intention which constitutes the mental element in murder”  per 
Lord Hailsham  Hyam v DPP  [1975] A.C.55 @ 77.    
           However  this should be read with his  definition quoting Asquith LJ in  
Cunliffe v Goodman [1950] 2 KB 237 at 253: 
“An intention..connotes a state of affairs which the party intending does more than 
merely contemplate.  It connotes a state of affairs which, on the contrary, he decides, 
so  far as  in  him  lies,  to  bring  about  and  which,  in  point  of  possibility,  he  has  a 
reasonable prospect of being able to bring about, by his own act of volition.” 
To this Lord Hailsham added the qualification... 
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consequences of the end as well as the means" (Hyam  p.74.) 
    Here then is the distinction between the C2 (foreseeable) and C1 (foreseen, or 
in Hailsham's words inseparable) consequences of my earlier illustration.  Moreover as Lord 
Bridge pointed out in the court of Appeal in Moloney v R.  intention could be deduced from 
the evidence. 
 In R v Moloney [1985] AC 905 the facts are that the Appellant (M) and his stepfather (S) 
drank very heavily at a wedding anniversary.  The rest of the family retired at one a.m.  but M 
and S remained and were heard talking in a friendly manner.  At four a.m.  a shot rang out.  
M telephoned the police saying he had murdered S.  He said they disagreed as to who was 
quicker at loading and firing a shotgun.  M was the first to load and S said „I didn't think 
you'd got the guts, but if you have pull the trigger‟.  M stated he didn't aim the gun, he just 
pulled the trigger.  Lord Bridge did not agree that Foreseeability amounted to intention.  After 
the case of DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290 where the Lords had treated the maxim „A man is 
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts‟, as a rule of evidence 
creating an irrebuttable presumption, he maintained that section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1967  had  put  the  issue  back  in  the  hands  of  the  jury  to  draw  such  inferences  from  the 
evidence as appear proper in the circumstances.  The Appeal was allowed.   
      However  the  guidelines  set  out  by  Lord  Bridge  (which  omitted  any  reference  to 
probability) in Moloney were held to be defective by the House of Lords in  
R v Hancock and Shankland [1986] 1 All ER 641 where Lord Scarman set out:- 
i)   The intent to kill in Murder is a specific intent - the intent to kill or inflict serious bodily 
harm, 
ii)  Foresight of the consequences is no more than evidence of intent..quoting Lord Hailsham 
in Moloney   
“..Foresight and foreseeability are not the same thing  as intention 
although either may give rise to an irresistible inference of such...” 
iii) The probability of the result of an act is an important matter for the jury to consider and 
can be critical in their determining whether the result was intended. 
           Duff sees Lord Bridge's judgement in Moloney as leaving an area of uncertainty but I 
would suggest this is no longer so in the light of Hancock and Shankland.  Furthermore 151 
 
turning to Lord Bridge's example of the man boarding a plane to Manchester this should now 
be read in the light of R v Hancock and Shankland so that the fact that there is a moral 
certainty that a plane is going to Manchester only raises a rebuttable (even though this may be 
very difficult) presumption that an escapee (who may have dived aboard it) actually intends 
to go there.  (cf.Davidson's example of the man boarding a plane for London.  ante).  One 
cannot  resist  the  personal  conclusion  that  R  v  Hancock  and  Shankland  was  ultimately 
wrongly decided.  If the likelihood of causing death is not a probable as well as natural 
consequence of deliberately dropping a large piece of concrete onto a motorway we might as 
well declare a state of total anarchy.  It is, perhaps, an example of how far the modern courts 
will go to reach a desired decision. 
 Hyam v DPP [1975] A.C.  55. 
      Mrs Hyam set fire to Mrs Booth's house by pouring petrol through the letter box and 
setting fire to it by means of a newspaper and a match.  There were four people in the house, 
Mrs Booth and her three children.  Two of the children died as a result of the fumes generated 
by the fire.  The appellant's motive was jealousy of Mrs Booth who she thought was likely to 
marry a Mr Jones of whom she (Hyam) was the discarded or partially discarded mistress.  
Her account of her actions and her defence was that she had only intended to frighten Mrs 
Booth into leaving the neighbourhood and that she did not intend to cause death or grievous 
bodily harm. 
   The trial judge directed the jury: 
“The prosecution must prove that the accused intended to kill or do serious bodily 
harm to Mrs Booth.  If you are satisfied that when the accused set fire to the house 
she knew that it was highly probable that this would cause (death or) serious bodily 
harm then the prosecution will have established the necessary intent.  It matters not if 
her motive was, as she says, to frighten Mrs Booth.” 
    Although  Hailsham  LC  thought  as  quoted  above  (from  Moloney)  that 
knowledge of probable result did not amount to intention he went on to consider the state of 
mind of a defendant who knows that a certain course of conduct will expose a third party to 
the risk of serious bodily harm    
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lawful excuse deliberately pursues that course of conduct regardless.  In that case 
there is not merely actual foresight of the probable consequences, but actual intention 
to expose his victim..."  
    Here with respect Lord Hailsham appears to be in error philosophically (as 
well as contradicting himself).  Had he said there would be “not merely actual foresight....  
but deemed (or constructive) intention” there would have been no confusion.  That this is 
what  he  meant  there  is  little  doubt  for  he  goes  on  to  refer  to  the  Fourth  report  of  the 
Commissioners on Criminal Law (8 March 1839) p.  xx.  where they say 
“Again it appears to us that it ought to make no difference in point of legal distinction 
whether death results from a direct intention to kill, or from wilfully doing an act of 
which death is the probable consequence." 
    Thus we should not conclude that Lord Hailsham was defining a new category 
of Intention.  Viscount Dilhorne  felt that knowledge of high probability of consequences 
should probably be treated as intent.  Lord Cross followed R v Vickers (malice aforethought) 
and Diplock & Kilbrandon LLJ dissented holding that an intention to do serious bodily harm 
was not enough.  This case illustrates part of our difficulty with case law from a philosophical 
point  of  view.    Lord  Hailsham  directed  his  judgement  on  a  consideration  of  intention, 
Viscount Dilhorne's remarks on this subject were obiter dicta (and therefore do not set a firm 
precedent),  Lord  Cross  followed  R  v  Vickers  on  malice  aforethought  and  the  other  two 
dissented. 
    A brief consideration of the Vickers case is included because Lord Goddard 
CJ set out the position with regard to the law prior to, and the effect of, the Act of 1957. 
 
R v Vickers [1957] 2 All ER 741 
  Here the appellant broke into the cellar of a shop owned by a Miss Duckett aged 73, 
intending to steal money.  Miss Duckett surprised him whereupon he struck her with his fists; 
she fell down.  The medical evidence was that she was struck 10-15 times and kicked in the 
face.    The  degree  of  force  required  to  inflict  the  injuries  ranged  from  quite  slight  to 
moderately severe. 
    Now, before the 1957 act the term 'constructive malice' was often used and it 153 
 
meant that if a person caused death during the course of a felony which involved violence, 
that always amounted to murder.  Section 1(1) of the act effectively removed that from the 
law and provided:- 
„the  killing  shall  not  amount  to  murder  unless  done  with  the  same  malice 
aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a killing to amount to murder 
when not done in the course or furtherance of another offence.‟ 
    Lord Goddard stated that „Malice aforethought‟ was a term of art defined as  
“either an express intention to kill or an implied intention to kill as where the prisoner 
inflicted grievous bodily harm, that is to say, harmed the victim by a voluntary act 
intending to harm him and the victim died as a result of that grievous bodily harm.  If 
a person does an act on another which amounts to the infliction of grievous bodily 
harm he cannot say that he did not intend to go so far.  It is put as malum in se in the 
old cases and he must take the consequences." 
   And there we have it in a nutshell - killing as a result of voluntarily harming the victim was 
regarded as Malum in se and Murder.  Lord Hailsham confirmed this in R v Cunningham 
[1981] 2 All ER 863 when he reviewed all the authorities from Coke onwards.  In law there 
was no difference between direct and implied intention. 
INTENTION AND ATTEMPT 
    The question of intention was considered in the circumstances of „attempt‟ in    
R v Mohan [1975] 2 All ER 193 
  Here the appellant was convicted of attempting by wanton driving to cause bodily 
harm to a policeman.  The trial judge had directed the jury that it must be proved that the 
appellant must have realized that he was driving in a way likely to cause bodily harm, or he 
was reckless as to whether such harm was caused.  „It is not necessary to prove an intention 
to cause bodily harm.‟ 
           The court of Appeal found the final direction was bad.  It was necessary to consider 
intention  -  quoting  Lord  Asquith  with  approval  that  „intention‟  denotes  more  than  mere 
contemplation.   
  “If that interpretation of 'intent' is adopted as the meaning of Mens rea in the offence 
of attempt it is not wide enough to justify the direction in the present case”. 
    From this Duff concludes that the concept of intent has a narrower meaning 154 
 
when what is required is „specific intent‟, and a broader meaning in other contexts (Duff p.  
19).  With great respect I do not interpret this case that way.  The Court of Appeal goes on to 
consider „intent‟, not „specific intent‟.  James LJ, giving the judgement of the court, stated 
that, prior to the Criminal Justice Act 1967 s.8 the standard test in English Law of a man's 
state of mind in the commission of an act was the foreseeable or natural consequences of that 
act....„So knowledge of the foreseeable consequence could be said to be a form of „intent‟”. 
   “Thus, upon the question  whether or not the accused had the necessary intent in 
relation to a charge of attempt, evidence tending to establish directly, or by inference, 
that the accused knew or foresaw that the likely consequence, and, even more so, the 
highly probable consequence, of his act-unless interrupted would be the commission 
of the completed offence, is relevant material for the consideration of the jury.  In our 
judgement,   evidence of knowledge of likely consequences, or from what knowledge 
of  likely  consequences  can  be  inferred,  is  evidence  by  which  intent  may  be 
established but  it is not, in relation to the  offence  of attempt, to be  equated  with 
intent.  If the jury find such knowledge established they may, and using common 
sense, they probably will find intent proved, but it is not the case that they must do 
so." (Emphases mine) 
    Now from the above I submit it is clear that it is not as Duff says that this case 
shows that  “The concept of intention is thus, it seems, not univocal in criminal law.." What 
the difference is, is that in cases of attempt the burden of proof subtly shifts.  It is one thing 
for me to say to a driver who missed a policeman by half an inch "You intended to get him 
didn't you?" and quite another when the policeman is lying in the middle of the road.  In the 
first case he can say “No I didn't, I'm a skilful driver and I only wanted him to get out of the 
way" (And prima facie the evidence does not gainsay him).  In the second case the best he 
can say is “I didn't mean to do that" To which the not unnatural retort is "Yes, but you did in 
fact do it."  I know the cases do not express it as a shift in the burden of proof - it would be 
clearer if they did - but it is in fact clear from a closer reading of them that it is the rule as to 
what evidence constitutes intent that changes not the nature of the intent. 
 In R v Cawthorne [1968] J.C.32. 
Cawthorne fired shots into a room where his mistress and three friends were taking refuge.  
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was that he was reckless but had no intention to kill.  Duff points out that Scottish law is that 
an  attempt  to  commit  murder  requires  intention  whereas  the  fait  accompli  only  requires 
intention to injure severely.  Again Duff has put his finger on a very difficult point.  It is clear 
that for an attempt, where there is a failure so that we have no evidence of the actual crime i.e 
a dead body as opposed to a wounded one, we must establish an intent if we are to prosecute.  
Also it would seem that to prosecute for intent of the greater offence we would necessarily 
have to show the greater intent.  This seems to be the only way we can explain the law.  As to 
the question of prosecuting attempts, that I suspect is purely a matter of public policy. 
    Again it is a rule of law which has virtually said „if you are serious enough to 
want to wound seriously and you overstep the mark and actually kill then we shall treat it as 
murder.‟ This does not involve a philosophical tampering with the meaning of intention, it 
merely, as a matter of practice, warns people how certain offenses are going to be regarded. 
    To the extent that the attempt cases may be reviewed in this light they do not 
confuse the issue of intention. 
INTENTION AND RECKLESSNESS (including HEEDLESSNESS) 
    The state of the law and thinking generally is very confused on this subject.  
We are going to find ourselves faced with two leading cases, Cunningham (the narrow view) 
and  Caldwell  (the  broader  view);  a  Code  definition;  an  additional  statutory  definition  of 
'Heedless' which uses language in common with some of the judgements on recklessness; the 
Law commission's comments and a dictionary definition (covering everyday use). 
  Starting with the dictionary definition of recklessness:- 
"1.    Of  persons:  careless  of  the  consequences  of  one's    actions;  heedless  (of 
something); lacking in prudence and caution.   
2.  Of actions, conduct, etc.  Characterized or  distinguished  by (carelessness or) 
heedless rashness.   A good example is given - “a rough and reckless soldier, caring 
for nothing but a fight."         Shorter O.E.D. 
It is interesting to note that „Heedless‟ is defined;- 
"Without heed; paying no attention; careless, regardless."The example given is 
- “There in the ruin, heedless of the dead, The shelter-seeking peasant builds 
his Shed." (Goldsmith).   156 
 
    Now the interesting part, and why I have quoted this, is that Recklessness is 
generally assumed to include heedlessness but not vice versa (which could usefully be used to 
distinguish the broad and narrow concepts).  Secondly, if one looks at the examples, it will be 
seen that the words cannot be interchanged without distorting the sense conveyed.  This at 
least augers well for a possible solution.  But, let us note, while there is talk of careless of the 
consequences - a behavioural attitude - there is no talk of deliberate risk taking or importation 
of intention. 
Now to the cases, in 
 R v Cunningham [1957] 2 All ER 412.   The facts were set out by the trial judge that the 
accused who was living in a house very roughly divided in two (there was a honeycomb wall 
dividing the basements), deliberately, intending to steal money from the gas meter, broke it 
away from the supply pipes in the basement releasing the mains gas supply into the house.  
He must have known perfectly well that gas would percolate all over the house... 
“As I have already told you, it is not necessary to prove that he intended to do it; it is 
quite enough that what he did was done unlawfully and Maliciously". 
    The court of appeal quoted Professor C.S.  Kenny' Outlines of Criminal Law 
(1902) to the effect that: 
“  „malice‟  must  be  taken  not  in  the  old  sense  as  wickedness  in  general,  but  as 
requiring either (i) an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that was in 
fact done, or (ii) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not (i.e.  the 
accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done, and yet has gone 
on to take the risk of it).  It is neither limited to, nor does it indeed require, any ill will 
towards the person injured”. 
In their judgement the Court of Appeal said: 
“..In our view, it should have been left to the jury to decide whether, even if the 
appellant did not intend injury to Mrs Wade, he foresaw that the removal of the gas 
meter might cause injury to someone but nevertheless removed it.   ..." 
    Now in my respectful submission there is some difference between someone 
who, having foreseen the danger of the removal of the gas meter,  
 a) „goes on to take the risk of it‟ (Kenny- implying conscious assumption of risk) or 
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conscious assumption of risk).   
    Nevertheless  the  case  is  cited  as  the  view  that  requires  conscious  (i.e.  
intentional) assumption of the risk. 
  In  R  v  Briggs  [1977]  1  All  ER475;  R  v  Parker  [1977]  2  All  ER  37  and  R  v 
Stephenson [1979] 2 All ER1198 the test for recklessness was judged to be subjective, i.e.  
as to what the person actually foresaw.   
Then came 
 R v Caldwell [1982] A.C.  341. 
 Here the facts as set out by the house of Lords per Diplock LJ were that the respondent had 
been doing work for the proprietor of a residential hotel.  He considered he had a grievance 
against the proprietor.  One night he got very drunk and in the early hours of the morning 
decided to revenge himself on the proprietor by setting fire to the hotel, in which some guests 
were  living at the time.  He broke a window and started a fire on the ground floor; but 
fortunately it was discovered and extinguished before any serious damage was done.  At his 
trial he said that he was so drunk at the time that the thought there might be people in the 
hotel whose lives might be endangered had never crossed his mind. 
 The charge under s.1(2)(b) requires:-  
  i)  intending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of another or  
 ii) being reckless as to whether the life of another would be thereby endangered.(numeral 
divisions mine) 
The House of Lords held 
“(a) if the charge of an offence under s 1(2) of the criminal Damage Act 1971 is 
framed  so  as  to  charge  the  defendant  only  with  intending  by  the  destruction  or 
damage [of the property] to endanger the life of another, evidence of self induced 
intoxication  can  be  relevant  to  his  defence;  (b)  if  the  charge  is,  or  includes,  a 
reference to „his being reckless as to   whether the life of another would thereby be 
endangered‟,  evidence  of  self  induced  intoxication  is  not  relevant".    Appeal 
dismissed.   
(Lords  Keith  of  Kinkel  and  Roskill  concurring,  Lord  Edmund-Davies 
concurring  but holding recklessness to have  been correctly defined  in   the 158 
 
cases of Cunningham and in Stephenson.) 
    The  decision  has  been  attacked  on  the  ground that  recklessness  should  be 
defined as conscious risk taking.  This of course was really part of the problem with the law 
before the act of 1971.  This came under the Malicious Damage Act 1861.  Here, where the 
prosecution did not rely on an actual intention, the jury were required to analyze the thoughts 
that passed through the mind of the accused at or before the act in order to see on which side 
of a narrow dividing line they fell. 
      Again quoting Lord Diplock (referring  to the passage quoted above of professor Kenny) 
“Among the words he used was „recklessness'....  It presupposes that, if thought were 
given to the matter by the doer before the act was done, it would have been apparent 
to him that there was a real risk of its having the relevant harmful consequences; but,   
granted this, recklessness covers a whole range of states of mind from failing to give 
any thought at all to whether or not there is any risk of those harmful consequences, 
to recognizing the existence of the risk and nevertheless deciding to ignore it.".. 
    ".....the restricted meaning  that the Court of Appeal in R v Cunningham had placed 
on the adverb 'maliciously'...  in cases where the prosecution did not rely on an actual 
intention  of  the  accused  to  cause  the  damage  that  was  in  fact  done  called  for  a  
meticulous analysis by the jury of the thoughts that passed through the mind of the 
accused at or before the time he did the act that caused the damage, in order to see on 
which side of a narrow dividing line they fell.  If it had crossed his mind that there 
was the risk that someone's property might be damaged but, because his mind was 
affected  by  rage  or  excitement  or  confused  by  drink,  he  did  not  appreciate  the 
seriousness of the risk or trusted that good luck would prevent it happening, this state 
of mind would amount to malice in the restricted meaning placed on that term by the 
Court of Appeal; whereas if, for any of these reasons he did not even trouble to give 
his mind to the question whether there was any risk of damaging the property, this 
state of mind would not suffice to make him guilty of an offence under the Malicious 
Damage Act 1861."  (Emphases mine) 
    Duff appears to join the critics, asking "Why should the s.1(2) offence not 
require an intention to endanger life?"  With respect the answer is of course that subsection 
1(2)(b) is in two parts separated by “or” and the first part does import intention and the 159 
 
second part does not.  The point is that if Intention is, as I have tried to show, purposive, then 
how do we define a purposive recklessness?  Are we  meant to apply the recklessness to the 
primary intention? Presumably not, for he didn't deny setting fire to the premises.  Then it 
must be to the secondary intention i.e.  the intention to harm people.  Now is this to be taken 
to mean that when he first thought of the idea he thought of the harm and desisted (because if 
he had not desisted it would have clearly been intentional) until in his drunkenness he forgot 
about the harm.  Or are we to take it that the whole scheme was devised in a drunken state in 
which he was too reckless to bother about the consequences.  This is far more likely but is the 
court not entitled, as it has done with serious injury and murder, to take the line that if a man 
wantonly gets himself into a state where he cares not a jot or tittle about the consequences of 
his act then he shall be deemed responsible for that act.  This seems to me entirely logical on 
two grounds  
a) That I am at a loss as to how to impute intentionality into recklessness and  
b) The Courts had already found themselves faced with this problem and whereas others may 
be able to afford to discuss how many angels may sit on the head of a pin, the law is, as I 
pointed out in the introductory paragraphs, constrained to practicalities.  One may well argue 
that Caldwell is wrong and that there should be no difference between the village idiot setting 
fire to your house, and me doing so in a drunken rage (but not having thought about it) 
because you do not agree with the point I have just made.  I happen to think Caldwell was 
right. 
           Now it seems to me that the clearest way to separate the concepts would be to regard   
i) „Recklessness‟ as the doing of an act which objectively would appear to involve certain 
obvious risks either without having thought or proceeding without regard to those risks; and  
ii) „Heedlessness‟ as the doing of an act which objectively might appear to involve certain 
reasonably foreseeable risks but which subjectively were not considered .  So the village idiot 
heedlessly sets fire to your house, but I in a drunken rage recklessly do so.  In neither case is 
the factor of Intentionality required.  Once that is imported you move beyond recklessness to 
the most serious category.  I am afraid that I respectfully disagree with Duff where at p 141 
he tries to separate one account as emphasizing 'choice' (in practice the cases don't) and the 
other as relating to attitude so as to introduce 'willingness' and then juggling with those two 160 
 
intentional states.  In any event, if one is too drunk to think about something how does one 
intentionally decide to take risks? Intentionality in my submission is ruled out by definition 
and to introduce it merely muddies the waters.  
 As to how it may be possible to proceed without a „Mental state‟ being involved  see the next 
section - a hypothesis developed on Davidson. 
    Unfortunately the above are merely my hypothetical views because Parliament 
in its wisdom has managed to confuse the issue still further.  In the 1985 Code quoted by 
Duff at p 146 heedlessness is referred to in terms of the “obviousness” of the risk to any 
reasonable person.  This of course collides ominously with Lord Diplock's use of “obvious” 
in the definition of recklessness in Caldwell. 
           Finally  in  the  Draft  Criminal  Code  (1989  Law  Com.    No.177  vol.    1)  the  Law 
Commissioners considered a definition:-  
"18...  a person acts:....(c) recklessly with respect to: 
(i)  a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist; 
(ii) a result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur; and it is, in the circumstances 
known to him, unreasonable to take the risk;" 
    The Law Commission commented on the definition of recklessness [in clause 
8.18] that Caldwell had given  a wider meaning to „reckless‟ than that proposed by  clause 
(c).  Their fear was that the Caldwell interpretation would be given to all cases.  Indeed it had 
been applied to reckless driving in R v Lawrence and they felt it would be applied to all 
cases unless specifically otherwise stated in the offence.  (admittedly the contrary view had 
been taken by the Court of Appeal in the statutory definition of rape.  They did not cite the 
case,  though  I  suspect  it  is  DPP  v  Morgan  (1975)  61  Cr  App  R  136.,  where  positive 
intention was required). 
           They then give an explanation of the narrower meaning:- 
8.19  "If the Caldwell concept of giving no thought to the possibility of there being a 
risk, where the risk is in fact obvious, is to be a basis of liability  for some offenses 
governed by the Code, the Code ought to have a term to express it.  But the question 
that must first be faced is whether „reckless‟ should be used in the code to express 
this  concept  as  well  as  that  of  the  actor's  recognizing  „that  there  [is]  some  risk 
involved and ..nevertheless [going] on to do the act which creates the risk‟.  We are 161 
 
sure that it should not and we adhere to the narrower meaning...  which seemed to 
have become the judicially accepted meaning before Caldwell.  Our reasons are as 
follows. 
(i)    The code needs a term, for use as necessary in the specification of offenses, 
which refers only to the unreasonable taking of a risk of which the actor is aware.  
Such conscious risk taking is the preferred minimum fault element for most serious 
modern offenses.......... 
(ii)   Before Caldwell, „reckless‟ had become the conventional term by which to refer 
to this narrower type of fault.  We do not know of an acceptable alternative. 
(iii)  We understand that trial courts have  experienced considerable difficulties  in 
using  the  complex  Caldwell  definition  of  recklessness.    That  definition  in  effect 
describes kinds of fault.  Even if both kinds were to be needed for some offenses, 
they need not be conveyed by a single Code expression.  We believe, indeed, that it 
may be of advantage to prosecutors and to sentencing courts to be able to distinguish, 
by means of a discriminating language, between different modes of committing the 
same offence." 
    One is forced to comment that a reading of Caldwell, and the section, shows 
quite  clearly  that  there  are  two  parts  to  section  18c  one  of  which  specifically  refers  to 
intention and one which does not (see earlier).  Regrettably the Commissioners seem to be 
taking us back to face all the same problems about deciding precisely what was in the agent's 
mind  at  a  precise  moment  (cf.    Diplock  LJ.)  and,  in  my  opinion  they  were  far  short of 
clarifying the terminology.   
    If recklessness is to require intentional risk taking then where does it differ 
from an intentional act?  It opens a minefield of possible excuses.  'Yes M'lud I consciously 
took the risk but I was too drunk / stupid / careful to admit / that I foresaw that a loaded gun 
with a hair trigger might blow his head off!' 
           The two words reckless and heedless could have been used to separate the perceived 
from the unconsidered but the opportunity appears to have been missed. 
INTENTION AS A MENTAL STATE - DAVIDSON. 
For the non specialist: You will recall that referring to Dualism and Monism earlierI 
referred to the fact that Dualists believe that we consist of a physical body and a non 162 
 
physical  mind.    The  Monists  believe  that  there  is  only  one  aspect  -  the  purely 
physical.  This means that for the Monist mental states (often referred to as ψ or psi 
states)  must  be  reducible  to  actual  physical  brain  states  and  that  these  should  be 
determinable.  The basic argument behind the Monist view is that if the ψ state is not 
physical, then how can it affect our actions? i.e.  How can a non physical thing act 
upon  a  physical  thing?  Therefore  they  argue  the  non  physical  does  not  exist.  
Davidson's theory is that - Yes the ψ state may well be reducible to a brain state, but 
not always necessarily to the same brain state.  However the laws governing such 
reductions are so complicated as to be unfathomable  - Hence his theory is called 
“Anomalous Monism".  And in reducing this enormously complex subject to so few 
lines I can only plead E & O E and apologise to the experts (who shouldn't be reading 
this bit anyway!) 
    There  is  one  point  which  is  of  concern  and  that  is  the  assumption  which 
appears in Moloney (certainly in Lord Bridge's obiter dicta) that all actions require an intent.  
i.e.  the manwho boards the plane for Manchester even though it is the last place he wants to 
go clearly intends to travel to Manchester.  I realize that the point I am seeking to make is a 
borderline  case  but  I  would  dispute  the  assumption.    Again  we  need  more  details  of 
surrounding circumstances.  For example - A man who is seeking to escape boards a train for 
Manchester.  Does he really have an intention to go to Manchester - a city which he doesn't 
know and where he has no contacts? His primary intention is to escape and, even if he had 
bought a ticket for the full journey, he could be planning to get off after two stops.  He may 
well have got on the first train that was about to leave.  He may not even have known where 
it was going.  It seems to me that Lord Bridge implies that as soon as he knew where the train 
was going this implied an intention to go there.  This cannot be right. 
    There is the allied problem of instinctive or thoughtless reaction - an old lady 
drops her parcel and you bend to pick it up; or you withdraw your hand from a hot radiator.  
Do these actions really require the formation of Mental states of Intentionality? I submit they 
do not, and while it is just a hypothesis I would explain it as follows:- Davidson has posited 




illustrate in Fig 4.:- 
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But I do not see why this should not also provide for certain circumstances as follows:- 
 
                 Input                         ψ State                                            Mental State 
                                                  Beliefs                                               (uninvolved) 
                                                  Training 






                                                                      Brain State                                              Physical State (Reaction) 
                                                                                           Fig.5. 
     
    This would explain a whole range of actions which do not require a specific 
intentional state; for example how else do we explain the sudden swerve we make when an 
obstruction is seen out of the corner of our eye? The reaction does not involve an intention to 
swerve one just does it.  In fact there can be times when realizes it might have been better not 
to swerve had one had the time to consider.  A bat flies low and we duck only to realize later 
that this was no bat but an optical illusion caused by a trick of the light. 
    It  would  seem  that  there  may  be  a  range  of  functions  which  might  occur 
without a mental state.  Certainly all our bodily functions, heartbeat, breathing etc require no 
Mental state, they do not even require consciousness.  If one looks at figure 5.  it seems that 
certain actions must occur in this manner.  I put it as a hypothesis that certain emotional states 
such as fear could blanket or cut out (short circuit) the mental state required for an intention 
and activate the brain state direct.  If this is true it could have an effect on the way we should 
regard some states of Duress (at least those occurring while there is immediate fear or terror). 164 
 
INTENTION AND DURESS 
  It is perhaps convenient to consider cases such as Lynch at this point.  In  
 DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] 1 All ER 913 The appellant was summoned by 
Meehan, a well known and ruthless gunman to drive Meehan and his accomplices to a place 
where they intended to kill, and did kill a policeman.  The appellant remained in the car and 
drove them away afterwards.  There was evidence that it was perilous to disobey Meehan 
who indicated that he would tolerate no disobedience.  The House of Lords held by a three to 
two majority that the defence of Duress was available but Lord Wilberforce indicated that the 
difficulty in raising it would correspond with the heinous nature of the offence.   
In Abbott v R [1976] 1 All ER 140 the Privy Council held that Duress was not available to a 
principle in the first degree (Lords Wilberforce and Edmond-Davies dissenting) largely on 
the ground that this would open up a terrorists' charter. 
In R v Howe [1987] 1 All ER 771 the House of Lords again  held that Duress was  not 
available for a first degree principle and that it should not have been in Lynch's case. 
    Duress is clearly a case where the law feels it has had to take a certain course 
for practical reasons.  Philosophically there  is a case which  might be  made out that fear 
(certainly of immediate danger) could in some cases prevent the formation of a Mental state 
of intention i.e.  of intending the consequences of ones actions.  The person would just co-
operate.  However murder is an area where the law has already overruled the need for direct 
intention, allowing intention to do serious bodily harm to suffice.  It seems that it is forced 
again to impute intention for if it were to find, as could be the case, that there was no actual 
intention it would need to be able to punish based on grounds other than intention and what 
could those be? Again it would seem that the explanation would be that the act was Malum in 
se and that this actually makes a better ground than importing intention.  This is because if 
three criminals set out knowing one is carrying a gun (and liable to use it) and he uses it 
killing someone the secondary intention seems far stronger than that of Lynch. 
INTENTION & DESIRE 
    During  the  course  of  his  judgement  in  Hyam  Hailsham  LJ  distinguishes 
Intention from desire.  This distinction seems philosophically logical for I can desire that 
lovely car without ever intending to possess it.  Here he referred to Cunliffe v Goodman 165 
 
which was a  civil  case where a  Landlord wanted to demolish  a  building or at  least  had 
applied for planning permission to demolish and replace.  The question was did she intend to 
demolish the building or was she merely hoping to.  The case decided that intention could not 
be implied where the matter was beyond the control of the person.  Here what was possible 
depended on the grant of the licences and she could not intend demolition in advance of 
obtaining the licences.  It also seems to me that this case can be distinguished on the ground 
that  the  Landlord's  intention  to  demolish  was  a  future  (or  bare)  intention  and  that  such 
intentions  are  always  open  to  variation  until  such  time  as  they  are  fixed  by  a  primary 
intention  or  an  intention  of  action  (see  above).    The  action  of  applying  for  the  licences 
showed no more intention than an intention to obtain the licences.  Here again with regard to 
intention we have to have regard to all the circumstances and the obtaining of the licences 
would not reveal a fixed intent to demolish.  It could just have been a means of enhancing the 
potential, and therefore value, of the property. 
    In considering desire I believe that we may have to consider four interacting 
considerations in order to get them into perspective:- 
INTENTION, DESIRE, BELIEF AND REASONS. 
    Duff in dealing with Intention and reasons for action (p.47) states: 'Intended 
actions are those which are done for reasons.  They answer the question Why did you do 
that?' and he gives as an example in Mrs Hyam's case one can ask "Why did Mrs Hyam set 
fire to the house? In order to frighten Mrs Booth into leaving town".  From this he goes on to 
state "An Agent's intentions in action are her reasons for action." At first this sounds most 
reasonable until we start to analyse the situation a bit further.  For example we could ask the 
question „What were her desires?' and we get the same answer 'To get Mrs Booth to leave 
town'.  Now we know that Lord Hailsham very properly distinguished intention from desires 
and similarly desires are not reasons, they are states of mind.  To solve the problem we have 
to bring in the fourth element, beliefs. 
    At this point we can analyse the situation more effectively when I suggest that 
what we find is that:- 
An intention is to have a pro attitude to a course of action in the belief that it will effect 
a result.  i.e.  Mrs Hyam's intention was to set fire to the house (primary intention) for the 166 
 
reason that she believed it would scare Mrs Booth into leaving town, which is the result that 
she desired (secondary intention).  After all she would not have set fire to the house if she 
were convinced it wouldn't have any effect. 
    Let us test this on a primary intention.  George hits Joe.  George is angry.  His 
desire is to hurt Joe.  His belief is that by hitting Joe he will accomplish his desire.  He would 
not have hit Joe if, knowing Joe to be a masochist, Joe would have thoroughly enjoyed it.  Let 
us try this situation with Duff's explanation.  George's intentions in action (hitting Joe- well 
hitting is the only action, so it must be this) are his reasons for action.  It doesn't work.  And I 
submit that the reason is that Duff has inadvertently very briefly slipped into the error that he 
actually so skilfully pointed out to us in the first place namely that the observable action 
contains more than bare movements.  He actually goes back to the more detailed explanation 
when  he  refers  to  Anscombe  Intention  s.37  (on  p  49)  that  reasons  justify  an  action  by 
specifying its desirability characteristics - the features which make it worth doing. 
    Therefore  I  submit  that  reasons  are  not  intentions,  they  are  merely  a 
justification of the pro-attitude (of that individual) for the action.  It is a pro-attitude which is 
required and this is that which combined with the causal event
96 precipitates the.  “primary 
intention”.  
    This reasoning is again based on Davidson's views (which I find exceptionally 
persuasive) on Causal interaction.  His views with regard to psychological and mental states 
and their relationship to brain states is in fact supported by the arguments relating to the 
heterogenous nature of psychological states.  He starts with the assumption that both the 
causal dependence and the anomalousness of Mental Events are undeniable facts
97.  He then 
pursues three principles of which we are here primarily concerned with the first. 
  This -The Principle of Causal Interaction- is “that at least some mental events interact 
causally with physical events." This is based on his argument that any action has a primary 
reason as its cause and that primary reasons are comprised of a “pro attitude” or “the related 
belief”  or  both.    Here  we  should  remember  that the  beliefs  will  differ  with  the  culture, 
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training and instincts of the agent.  Moreover given the belief and pro attitude of a primary 
reason for an action we can show that it has a desirability characteristic.  Thus actions have a 
causal foundation.  He distinguishes this from the “reasons" for an action, claiming that there 
must be a pro attitude assumed in order to make the reasons for acting intelligible.   
    Davidson  points  out
98  that there is an argument that as a primary reason 
comprises attitudes and beliefs which are states or dispositions and not events, therefore they 
cannot be causal.  His reply to this is that the onset of a state or disposition is an event.  The 
example he gives is the case of the driver who raises his arm to signal a turn.  The required 
mental event Davidson points out is the one usually omitted from the discussion about the 
reasons for the driver wanting to turn etc.  The preceding event is that the driver notices his 
turning coming up.  Davidson concedes that we are not always able to trace or determine the 
exact causal event, but posits very reasonably that there will be one. 
SUMMARY 
    The best way of looking at Intention and its application to the Law is to take 
the matter in logical analytical steps.  The first is to define one's concept of Intentions.  To me 
they fall into three distinct categories:- 
1) Primary Intention                                          -   the intention of immediate action 
                                                                                     or  Intention Actus Proximus 
 
2) Secondary Intention                                     -   the intention of result or consequence 
                                                                                     or  Intention Actus Remotus 
3) Future Intentions                              Not yet acted upon therefore subject to change. 
                                                                                      or  Intention Actus Incertus 
It will be noted that in each case the definition is action related. 
           The law involves only the first two but it contains offenses which can involve the 
different intentions in three ways as follows:- 
1) Offenses involving Primary Intention. 
    Assault entails an actus proximus  
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    “Did you mean to hit him?"   
    “Yes"...Assault.   
or 
     “No”...it was an accident - I had no Intention. 
 
2) Offenses involving a primary and a secondary Intention. 
    Theft involves the primary intention of taking (the Actus Proximus) plus the secondary 
intention of depriving the owner permanently (the Actus remotus). 
  I had been working towards the principal that primary and secondary intentions are 
coexistent on the grounds that:-  
I gave her poison intending to kill her.  After all I could hardly give her poison and then 
decide to kill her.  However there are a number of ways of looking at this; I intend to kill her 
(bare or future intention), I put poison in the tea (primary intention) the reason being that I 
believe that this will kill her.  Moreover in the case of theft I could take something, initially 
intending to borrow it, and later decide to keep it.  As I have pointed out I believe that with 
compound intentionality we have to be very careful to analyse the state of affairs in detail and 
we should not omit the state which may involve beliefs, fears, instincts and trained reactions.  
Therefore it seems that the primary and secondary intentions are not necessarily coexistent. 
 
3) Finally by virtue of various rules of law or definitions of the crime the law may impute 
an intention. 
    e.g.  Malice aforethought where a killing, even though only bodily harm only was intended 
in the Actus proximus, will suffice to impute the intention for murder. 
    However these latter cases are not some different form of intention as some 
writers might imply but merely a rule for the application of the law.  I am of the opinion that 
if we were to regard these as we formerly did in the old days, as acts which are regarded as 
Malum  in  se  there  should  be  no  confusion.    We  are  then  free  to  impute  a  constructive 
intention. 
    Similarly if we treat reasons as what they are, the pro attitude supporting the 
action, and not as a form of intention which they are not, the confusion and complexities may 169 
 
be eliminated. 
    In the case of recklessness the whole point is that the person is not thinking of 
the consequences therefore they can have no intention.  However the circumstances are such 
that had they taken control of themselves they would surely have foreseen the consequences 
or probable consequences.  Therefore the harm would come within the ambit of foreseeable 
risks and where the action is wicked enough it will be treated by the law as Malum in se and a 
secondary intention will be imputed.  In this manner one can se how the three categories of 
severity arise:- 
  1) Direct Intention   
  2) Recklessness - Implied Intention  
  3) Negligence - Intention not involved 
    The reason why there may appear to be confusion is that whenever a matter 
arises it is in relation to a different set of facts and is often considered by a different judge in 
a different set of sociological surroundings.  In these circumstances the really remarkable 
thing  that  can  be  seen  is  the  consistent  pattern  of  the  philosophical  thought  behind  the 
judgements of the common law.  The increasing influence of Statutory law and in particular 
the idea of Statutory liability without the philosophical background formerly imported by our 
judiciary is perhaps a contributory factor tending to undermine the effectiveness of our legal 
system.   
    I believe that there is an urgent case for a continued philosophical review of 
the  background  to  our  laws.    In  fact  I  would  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  unless  a  proper 
philosophical background is maintained, our laws, and in particular our criminal law, could 
fall into further disrepute.       
19169. 28-11-02.cor09-05-06 
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CHAPTER 7. PUNISHMENT. 
 
    In a civilized society not only must the laws be just and their administration 
just, but the means of enforcing them should also be just.  That does not mean, as some might 
suppose, that punishments must be mild and friendly. Far from it. Justice demands that the 
punishment be adequate. 
Definition. 
    One of the best sources for a definition lies with Hart.  His central case of 
punishment contained five elements:- 
           “(1) It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant. 
(2) It must be for an offence against legal rules. 
  (3) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence. 
  (4) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender. 
(5) It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system 
against which the offence is committed".
99 
    This definition covers the basic legal aspects of punishment without 
presupposing any of the philosophical arguments.  The only comment I would make is that, 
in my submission, the reference to pain is not as important as the feature of unpleasantness.  
Fear or dread could be as important as pain.  One notes that Hart refers to „normally 
considered unpleasant‟ and this raises a very important point.  Normally considered 
unpleasant, by whom?  It is one of my contentions that one of our society's great mistakes is 
that it attempts to provide punishments in which the answer to the above question is that the 
punishments are considered unpleasant by society in general, or to be more specific by „the 
man on the Clapham omnibus‟ - i.e. a generally law abiding citizen.  
    The mistake in this lies in the fact that the punishment, if it is to be effective in 
any of the ways that we shall be considering later, must be considered to be unpleasant by the 
recipient.  As we shall see the recipient‟s views may differ considerably from that of the law 
abiding citizen.  Unfortunately the effect of concern for the prisoner's well being,  and their 
„rights‟, have resulted in regimes in prison which were described by one young car thief as " 
a holiday camp".
100   The point I seek to make has nothing to do with the severity or non-
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severity of the regime in question, but rather the fact that the man on the Clapham omnibus 
would, no doubt, have considered being in prison, even if it were like a holiday camp, a 
totally mortifying experience, and certainly not one that would ever have been admitted in 
public.  The disgrace in which he would be held, i.e. the critical reaction of his peers would 
be an added deterrent, So  it is  arguable that much more attention has to be paid to  the 
„critical reaction‟ of the public.  
Purpose 
    One should perhaps raise a point here which is that the object of punishment 
(one of its purposes) is to ensure conformity with the rules in the most efficient way possible.  
It is the efficiency of punishment in effecting this objective that is a factor often introduced 
into discussions.  However that object can be affected by many issues such as the likelihood 
of being caught; and if caught, of being prosecuted; and if prosecuted, of being convicted; 
and if convicted, of the unpleasantness of the punishment;  and finally of the reaction, if not 
of society then certainly of ones peers to the fact of conviction. These matters relate to the 
practical issues with respect to punishment. For this reason I have distinguished them, quite 
arbitrarily, under the term „object‟ of punishment as opposed to the „purposes‟ of punishment. 
    With respect to the purposes of punishment there are further aspects which are 
usually cited under the general headings of:- 
I)   Retribution 
ii)  Deterrence & 
iii) Reform or Cure. 
    There is a great deal of confusion over these because they are not mutually 
exclusive and indeed I) and ii) are to an extent (though the quantum of that extent is 
arguable) inter-related.  The principal arguments occur as to which should be the primary 
purpose of the punishment and which is the most effective in accomplishing the primary 
objective of compliance with the law.  However I shall be arguing that these three headings 
actually involve some a number of different aspects of punishment. 
  To start with it is interesting to take a look at what happens in  Civil Law.  Matters are 
comparatively simple here.   Where damage occurs, usually as a result of a breach of 
contract, or negligence in the case of a tort, the preferred manner of dealing with the matter is 
to assess the damage and award compensation.  Obviously there are cases where a writ of 
Mandamus leads to orders for specific performance, where that is a) possible and b) 
considered desirable (the object being as far as possible to put the parties in the position they 
should have been in had the breech not occurred, or, where this is not possible, to compensate 172 
 
the loser).  Thus where loss (damage) has occurred, compensation will usually follow.  
    However the concept of restitution or compensation by the criminal strangely 
does not play a large part in western law criminal law (though there are moves in this 
direction).  Theoretically it should be as possible to determine the compensation for damage 
caused by a criminal act as it is in the case caused by negligence.  Unfortunately  in a high 
proportion of cases it is unlikely that the criminal could compensate the victim. There are 
moreover, two essential differences in the case of criminal law.  The first is that society as a 
whole can be offended by the infraction of criminal law.  This is because the rules concerned 
are of general applicability.  In the case of a breach of a specific contract, or of a tort, it is 
usually only the parties involved who are concerned as to the outcome.  The breach of the 
contract does not (usually) involve the odium of the general public, whereas a burglary does.  
Is it just that the rest of us could not, without our active participation, have been a party to the 
contract, whereas a burglary could have involved us?   Is it a matter of fear?; or moral 
outrage? These are interesting questions that would need to be pursued in a comprehensive 
theory of punishment.  The second difference relates to the factor of intentionality (actual or 
construed) which was discussed in chapter 6.  This factor can affect the seriousness with 
which any offence might be regarded.  For example there may be a death caused by accident, 
negligence, or intentionally, and in the latter case that case may be further divided into actual 
or construed intention.  
 
PUNISHMENT IN CRIMINAL MATTERS 
  I). Retribution. 
    In most societies the idea of vengeance for a wrong suffered does not lurk very 
far below the surface.  The Vendetta concept is prevalent where there is no other adequate 
means of law enforcement.  The lex talionis, is often used as an example of the crudest form 
of retaliation, an eye for an eye, by those wishing to attack the concept of retribution.
101  In 
fact it is not as crude as is generally supposed for in its true interpretation it is negative, and 
designed to place a limit on the retaliation sought. ie. If the injury is the loss of an eye, then 
one shall not exact more than an eye in retaliation - it is not permitted to seek death for an 
eye.  This actually is a limiting principle of justice and relates to the quantum of retaliation 
rather than the vendetta approach.  However it has been misrepresented for so long that it will 
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no doubt continue to be used to illustrate a rather cruder concept. 
    A good starting point in considering retribution is with the definition by 
Hart
102 where he explains the strict or strong theory of retribution as containing three 
conditions:- 
1).  That a person may be punished only if he has  
a)  Voluntarily done something that is  
b)  Morally wrong. 
2).  His punishment should in some way match or be related to the wickedness of his offence 
and 
3).  That the justification for punishing under such conditions is that the inflicting of suffering 
in return for an act falling within 1) is in itself just and desirable. 
Kant goes so far as to add that the punishment of the offence is not merely desirable but 
obligatory. 
  The retributive theory need not necessarily be in the strong form but the essential 
ingredients will remain.  Mens rea normally plays a part in it, though as can be seen with the 
introduction of modern strict liability crimes, e.g. speeding, intent may be eliminated.  It is an 
interesting point, as to whether such strict liability crimes do not in fact aid in bringing the 
law into disrepute - such is the innate response, at least in modern western societies, to the 
concept of intentionality.  
    While strict equivalence of punishment is no longer advocated, the idea that 
there should be some degree of relative proportionality between the severity of the crime 
and the severity of the punishment, is retained.  This is emphasized in Hart's second point.  
Indeed it would be possible to argue that proportionality is an intuitive concept of justice.  
This idea seems to be common to both retributive and deterrence theories, including 
utilitarian ones.  There is however a practical problem because the criterion used is often that 
of the amount of damage done, rather than the subjective wickedness of the agent.  
  ii). Deterrence. 
    Most forms of retributive theory also imply that punishment is justified as a 
means of preventing crime.  The fact that suffering will be imposed as a punishment is 
estimated to cause a degree of fear of the consequences of committing a "criminal" act. 
    This concept of fear as a deterrent may be justified on two grounds:- 
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1).  Where the crime is one which is morally condemned the punishment may be justified as 
an expression of the moral condemnation of that society.  Without wishing to appear too 
cynical, despite the often substantial justification pleaded for punishment on these moral 
grounds, it does seem that there may equally be said to be a strong whiff of vengeance 
attached to them - perhaps another rose by a different name. 
2). Where the crimes are not necessarily morally condemned, e.g. speeding, then the 
punishment is exacted on the utilitarian grounds of its value as a deterrent. 
    There are many and continuing arguments as to the relative effectiveness of 
different punishments as a deterrent, but generally it is accepted, for example, that the driver 
with 9 points for speeding already on his licence will tend to think more about his speed for 
fear of the next step, i.e. losing his licence altogether.  However the whole question of 
deterrence is open to the problem that the punishments are set according to the society's 
general view of the relative severity of the offence rather than with respect to their subjective 
effect on the prospective offender.  The young joy-rider, addicted to the thrill of speed, may 
have no licence, and is quite oblivious to either the morality of the danger he may cause, or 
the punishment.  Against this it is argued strongly that the degree of certainty of being caught, 
and if caught convicted, will have a major effect on the deterrent - i.e. where the chances of 
either not being caught, or walking away with a caution, are high, the deterrent effect of the 
punishment will be largely nullified. 
A Failed Experiment 
    An interesting experiment occurred some years ago.  It was decided in the case 
of some statutory offenses which were punishable by fine, that the fine should be varied in 
accordance with the wealth of the guilty party.  Now this is quite different from the idea of 
suiting the type of punishment to the type of criminal (an idea discussed later).  Here the fine 
was varied according to the defendant's ability to pay, theoretically on the grounds that a 
wealthy person would not be sufficiently discouraged by a small fine.  The whole experiment 
was a disaster of monumental proportions.  It was disliked by the courts as being difficult to 
apply and by the public as being grossly unfair.  This is because equal crimes were not being 
treated equally defying the Aristotolean concept of equality.  The experiment was very soon 
discontinued. 
    My suggestion that punishments should be more appropriate for the type of 
criminal involved (which will be discussed later) is quite different as it relates to the type of 
punishment appropriate to the crime and type of criminal practising that crime (e.g. fraud, or 
armed robbery) as opposed to the quantum.  Thus if a particular speeding offence gathers 3 175 
 
points on one's licence, it would be grossly unfair to give someone 6 points just because they 
could afford a chauffeur if they lost their licence.  On the other hand there would be nothing 
to prevent a court increasing the severity of the punishment because the defendant was an 
habitual offender. 
Proportionality 
    It is often argued that proportionality is justified in a retributive theory by 
equating the punishment with the moral condemnation of the action.  In fact Raz takes the 
approach that the sanction may in part replace the critical reaction of the public.
103  While this 
may be true by inference, it seems to me that proportionality is explainable as a matter of 
justice and that this is something which has both a moral and an ethical or social input.
104  
    Thus while it is true that defined crimes will be regarded more seriously when 
they are regarded as morally wrong, the public will also assess crimes which have little or no 
moral ramifications.  These are usually offenses which arise from a necessity to organize the 
society along the best lines of the current political thinking.  Though most of these offenses 
are usually regarded as less serious than offenses with a moral connotation they are none the 
less assessable and are treated accordingly.  The very fact that they are rated less seriously is 
evidence that they are comparable - at least so far as any two crimes can be compared - a 
comparison that by its very nature can be emotional and subjective. 
    There is however a public or composite sense of justice which can be detected 
in our comparatively free society by expressions of outrage at unfair sentences passed by the 
courts, or of unfair acts of Parliament.  At this particular time the social sense of justice 
would seem to favour harsher sentences for certain crimes, and at the same time that the 
courts should be given discretion over the current mandatory destruction of allegedly 
dangerous dogs.  This composite sense of justice no doubt exists just as strongly (if not more 
so) in a rigidly dictatorial society; it is just that they would not be expressed so openly.  It is 
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the freedom of expression in our society which permits us to verify the existence of this 
„sense of justice‟. 
    However I do not wish to suggest that what is deemed just or fair could not be 
influenced by the state.  For example in wartime Japan it was considered morally correct that 
one should obey the edicts of the God Emperor.  These would not even be questioned, unlike 
our current society where it has become almost fashionable to oppose everything in the name 
of independence.  At the same time moral values can also change independently of the state, 
so that, for example, adultery, which is still held by Islam to be an offence punishable by 
stoning, is often widely regarded in other societies as being of little significance.  It is not 
even a crime in western cultures.  However it is not so long ago that a suit might lie for 
alienation of affections. 
    In any event, as we have seen, the concept of proportionality applies equally to 
both retributive and deterrent theories.  Therefore, later I shall be treating it as a separate part 
of punishment, and not purely as a part of retribution. 
  iii).  Reform or Cure. 
    The third concept of Reform or Cure can be argued by some (for example the 
Laing/Wooton approach) as an alternative to the retributive or deterrent theories, or as a 
system to run in parallel. Basically the concept is that „punishment' should be devoted to 
curing the offender and that in this regard the treatment should be personalised with respect 
to the offender rather than a generalized set punishment or imposition of suffering. 
    Unfortunately our knowledge of motivations and psychology do not appear, at 
this stage, to give any real hope that this approach has any greater likelihood of preventing 
recidivism; certainly if applied along the Wooton line of making all „crimes‟ absolute and 
only considering intentionality etc. when considering the „cure‟.  Nevertheless, one cannot be 
instantly dismissive of the concept because, if nothing else, it highlights the possible need for 
a flexibility of punishment for an offence, so that the deterrent effect could be tailored more 
closely to the type of offender.  
Justification 
      Finally there is the difficult question of the justification of punishment.  
Assuming that we accept that punishment is necessary to ensure the efficacy of the legal 
system; And further if we accept that its purpose is one or more of those suggested above, 
and that if it is to be a just punishment it must have regard to proportionality, we are still 
faced with the question of the justification of punishment in general. 
    One can of course say that the argument as to its necessity overrides 177 
 
everything, and that without punishment we would have no means of enforcing the laws, but 
even this would not answer the secondary question of justifying individual punishments.  The 
answer would seem, as is the case with all questions relating to punishment, to be extremely 
complex.  In one sense it is political - the State places a value on the importance of the 
offence by the punishment it imposes. But a free State usually, and particularly nowadays, is 
pragmatic.  Unless there is a reason, e.g. external security, there is no point in placing a 
penalty on some activity to which the society as a whole sees no objection.  Thus there is a 
moral input to justification.  This is why both laws and punishments change.  The punishment 
is considered just when it meets the moral criteria of the society.  As I have pointed out, I 
consider the concept of Justice to reflect the moral and ethical perceptions of the state and 
people of the particular time. 
    "The ultimate justification of punishment is not that it is a deterrent but that it 
is the emphatic denunciation by a community of a crime." 
105  It could be argued that this 
statement by Lord Denning accords more with the moral critical reaction, but it does not 
allow for the other factors, e.g. the compensating balance theory which would maintain that a 
crime disturbs the equilibrium of society.  Punishment is then that which the state considers 
sufficient to restore the equilibrium.  This is the justification which I would add to that of 
necessity.  We shall see evidence of this later.  As to whether the people consider the 
punishment „just‟ depends on their accord or disagreement with the view of the state.  
The psychological necessity of a retributive factor. 
    While there are a few people who, in the face of appalling tragedies, have 
forgiven those who caused the tragedy, by and large general reaction is just the opposite.  In 
fact in most cases it is the catching and punishment of the criminal which has a cathartic 
effect on the victim.  One most interesting case is that of Myra Hindley, the convicted 
multiple child murderess, a woman who all agreed at the time should never be let out of 
prison.  In fact a majority of people would have had her hanged had capital punishment still 
been available.  Some time later, Lord Longford started a campaign for her release. The effect 
of this has been so bad on the mother of one of the victims that it has almost ruined her life.  
She now devotes most of her time to seeing that Myra Hindley is not let out.  Here we have a 
classic case of a victim being further destroyed by people who, no doubt with good 
intentions, concentrate and devote their sympathy to the criminals.  Had the criminal been 
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executed the victims could have started to rebuild their lives more easily.  Here, it would 
seem that justice calls out for a change of emphasis to more sympathy for the victims. 
    Another case of interest is the case of the Scottish schoolchildren murdered by 
a deranged gunman.  Here (unfortunately in some ways) the gunman took his own life.  This 
prevented society from  passing sentence and left the victims‟ relatives nothing left to take 
revenge against.  The result was that, led by fervent orchestration they worked themselves up 
to a pitch of fury against hand guns and finally with the aid of media publicity and a 
government anxious to placate, they got them banned.  The actual total illogicality can be 
seen by considering that if hand guns had already been banned the killer could just as easily 
armed himself with milk bottles full of petrol, some rag and matches and hurled them 
amongst his victims.  So what would have been banned then? - milk bottles, petrol, rags or 
matches?  One ventures to suppose that had the killer been caught and sentenced to be 
hanged, people would still be able to own hand guns.  After all in Switzerland every 
household has a gun and the Swiss have an exemplary record.  So we must conclude that 
guns cannot per se be evil and wicked and arouse the instinct to wanton killing. Indeed were 
we to follow the example set by the above case, then the case against the motor car which 
kills far more people (around 8,000 a year) would be irrefutable. One could then argue that 
they should therefore be banned forthwith, yet not one of the anti-gun lobby has forsworn 
their car! 
    My point is not so much that the reaction was illogical, but that the strength of 
feeling was such, and the need for retribution was such, that, deprived of the correct object, it 
was vented on something else.  One can only conclude that it is a very strong need, even in 
the most civilized society.  It would seem that we must recognize this need and channel it.  
We must not seek, as some try to do, to dismiss it as unworthy, because there is amongst 
most people a compulsive need for there to be some form of active retribution.  The fact that 
the Scottish killer took his own life was virtually treated as an escape, which meant that there 
was no one against whom retribution could be exacted. 
    Now this feeling, which appears to be largely inherent, can be explained in 
ways other than a desire for revenge.  I touched on this in chapter 1 when discussing justice 
where it includes a restoration of the equilibrium - Aristotle's rectification.  A criminal is 
required to pay, not only for his crime but to compensate for the power or advantage he has 
exercised illegally over his victim.  That is to say the crime may be regarded in two parts:- 
1. The Theft / Assault / etc. and 
2. The unjust exercise of Power over the Victim. 179 
 
    This latter explains why a victim of say a perfectly ordinary burglary (no harm 
being done to the property) will often express feelings of having been violated - their domain 
has been invaded, their home feels different, unsafe - „violated‟ is probably the best 
description. 
    It is to restore the balance here that something extra is required - not just the 
return of the property (assuming it was recovered perfectly unharmed). 
    Thus what is sometimes regarded as pure retribution may be argued to have a 
purposive base.  This is in fact the compensatory restoration of the equilibrium or status quo. 
(NB. It is not and can never be a de facto restoration, that would require turning the clock 
back - this is a compensatory restoration, or rectification).  This is why Punishment can help 
the victim come to terms with the crime.  A parallel can be seen in cases of forensic medicine 
where a person who has been injured will find their injuries remain more severe until the 
claim is settled, after which they tend to ameliorate.  One may well be sceptical and call this 
psychosomatic - a desire to maximise the claim etc. - but the physical effect has nonetheless 
been observed too often to dismiss. It is my feeling that the need to see the criminal properly 
punished is very similar. 
    There is it seems in society a collective feeling as to when a punishment is too 
severe or too lenient.  This, its „critical reaction‟, is related to its perception of Justice, not 
the law. Society, in accordance with the mores of the day, judges the justice of the 
punishment.  It is offended by breaches of Justice:- e.g. People benefiting by selling their 
stories and profiting from their crime (This distorts the restoration of the equilibrium); 
Persons recklessly killing someone with their car and getting away with community service 
(Insufficient to restore the equilibrium). I view these as cases where the public perceives that 
one of the Principles of Justice have been broken. 
    The whole field of Punishment is highly complex.  It can not be reduced 
simply to concepts of Retribution, Restoration or Deterrence.  As we have seen mere 
restoration of say the goods taken would not be enough.  In some cases such as the loss of a 
limb or death, there can be no adequate restoration.  We have noted that there is an element of 
Retribution in most punishments but that is not the sum total either.  There is an element of 
equalization of the equilibrium of the balance of society which lies partly within the 
retributive field, and, of course, there is an element of deterrence. 
    The balance between these factors depends on the crime and the seriousness 
with which it is viewed.  This latter brings in a moral aspect and the „critical reaction‟ as it is 
sometimes termed should be reflected in the punishment - again within the retributive factor, 180 
 
but as a matter of proportionality.  Thus so far we see that in retribution alone there are three 
elements:- 
1.  The first element indicates Proportionality - the distaste with which the crime is 
rated.  This itself breaks into two parts:-  
  a) The way the State sees it, and  
  b) The way the current public morality views it (Critical reaction). 
2.  The second element includes a Compensatory quantum.(As far as the victim is 
concerned). 
3.  The third element includes a Restorative quantum relating to the unwarranted 
assertion of power over the victim. (Aristotle's rectification which is sometimes referred to as 
the Atonement factor). 
    These three elements together give form part of the overall retributive factor.  
One cannot easily quantify them, yet each should be present.  Moreover each in itself should 
be just thus giving rise to a just Retributive factor.  Additions to the amounts deemed to be 
just will fall either under revenge or possibly Deterrence.  It may seem odd to associate 
Revenge and Deterrence but revenge in the sense I am using it here is extended beyond just 
retribution. Similarly overkill in a punishment might also provide a deterrent. 
Deterrence 
    Deterrence is also complex in that it is affected by things other than the 
punishment such as, for example, the likelihood of being caught, and the likelihood of being 
punished if caught (the system of warnings only to young offenders has in some cases 
rendered the police practically impotent), and most important and often overlooked, the 
public reaction amongst the criminal's peers. This is not to be confused with the public 
reaction in general. 
    Thus the deterrence factor should affect the type of punishment.  Its object is 
to discourage a) imitation by others, and b) recidivism.  It can be seen that this alone almost 
amounts to the perpetrator being required to get worse than he gave.  The old punishment of 
hanging, drawing and quartering is a good example.  Of course modern sociological theorists 
regard it as wicked, and have now worked their way round to banning all forms of physical 
punishment
106.  The great mistake here is to confuse „just‟ physical punishment with wanton 
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abuse.  A further mistake our society makes is that we judge what might be considered as a 
deterrent largely by middle class law abiding standards.  What may discourage the average 
reader from a crime (e.g. just the thought of being put in prison) may well make the average 
participating agent in such crime laugh. (e.g. the young car thief who described prison as a 
holiday camp). 
    We have seen that Retribution is largely governed by considerations of Justice 
which should determine whether the punishment should be of greater, lesser or comparable 
ferocity.  Deterrence is governed by questions of efficacy.  Both are subject to considerations 
of Proportionality.  In this regard it is interesting to look at the categories of crime.  For the 
purposes of discussion I have broken these down into categories relating to the type of crime 
as follows:- 
A. Crimes against the realm  
1. Treason - committed by a person of British Nationality. 
2. Espionage - committed by a person of another nationality. 
B. Crimes involving death 
1. Terrorism 
2. Premeditated Murder 
3. Murder in the course of a crime (e.g. armed robbery). 
4. Conspiracy to murder (This could include pushing certain drugs). 
5. Causing death in anger (defence of provocation and „crime passionel‟). 
6. Causing death by negligence. 
C. Crimes against the person 
1. Causing Grievous Bodily Harm or lesser injury. 
2. Causing Mental Stress (Blackmail; Kidnapping) 
3. Causing injury in anger (provoked). 
4. Threatening injury. 
5. Causing injury by negligence. 
D. Crimes against property 
1. Arson or damage to property. 
2. Breaking and entering. 
3. Theft (including Fraud). 
4. Squatting. 
5. Vandalism. 
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1. Rioting. 
2. Intimidation by numbers (e.g. aggressive picketing). 
3. Hooliganism. 
4. Public Disorder. 
5. Civil Disobedience. 
    Most of the above crimes are capable of variation in their degree.  Even GBH 
can vary from, say, breaking a leg to severe and permanent mutilation.  Notwithstanding such 
variations there are clearly some 23 categories of crime not counting breaches of regulations, 
eg speeding, weights and measures etc. 
    Now a most interesting question is - What punishments are there to equate 
with the 23 categories of crime?  If we total all the punishments, past present and those used 
by other countries we still find comparatively few:- 
1.  Death. 
2.  Mutilation (Islamic). 
3.  Infliction of pain (physical) - Islamic, discontinued in Europe. 
4.  Infliction of pain (Mental). 
5.  Exile or Banishment. 
6.  Branding. 
7.  Incarceration (Gaol - an example of how emotive words can be)   
8.  Forfeiture of Property. 
9.  Forced Labour 
10. Fines. 
11. Ridicule. 
12. Forfeiture of rights. 
13, Medical Treatment. 
    It is interesting to note that for 23 types of crime we currently use principally 2 
punishments - Incarceration and fines, together with a little light labour (public/community 
service). 
    Given so few remedies it is a wonder we do not make use of more of them.  
We shall return to this aspect later, but at present we are concerned with proportionality.  
Justice demands that like be treated equally and unlike not equally, and this has many 
aspects.  Certainly it adds a requirement for proportionality in the establishment of 
punishments.  This is why all societies from the days of the Weregild (and possibly before) 
set out their „punishment distribution‟, whether they be purely financial or physical or a 183 
 
combination of both. 
    There is of course another reason set out by Hart and that is that it is necessary 
for the public to know what the consequences of their actions will be.  It minimizes 
uncertainty and is part of the deterrent. 
Exemptions, excusable actions, and amelioration. 
    Exemption occurs where punishment may be inappropriate, e.g. certain cases 
of killing in self defence.  Amelioration may occur where say because of provocation the 
charge may be reduced from murder to manslaughter.  It may also occur where there was no 
intention to do the act or where through mental deficiency the Agent did not know what they 
were doing or that it was wrong.  Again we see the subject of Mens Rea occurring.  It will be 
recalled that I mentioned before that the concept of Mens Rea was interpretable in two ways; 
either as being of a „guilty mind‟ i.e. being morally culpable, or merely that of intending to do 
the act.  It is in my submission (following Hart) that it is only necessary for the Agent to have 
intended to do an act which was prohibited by law.  The morality involved is irrelevant.
107  
The trouble as we have seen in chapter 6 is that intention often has to be established 
retrospectively.  This has been overcome in two ways:- 
1. By rules leading to presumptions of intention (see chapter 6), and 
2. The introduction of strict liability offenses.  
    These latter are regarded with great distaste by most as they can lead to 
inadvertent breaches which may cause no harm, but are nonetheless punishable.  Their 
justification is purely utilitarian.  It is therefore a great mistake for governments to introduce 
too many of these, for although they may be convenient and easy their very presence lessens 
the esteem in which the law is held, because they are perceived as being prima facie unjust. 
Variations in the concept of Law. 
      As different societies developed not all the forming social groups 
would have had the same laws, for these originally were entirely dependent on the character, 
nature, and to a large extent the security of the individual leaders.  Moreover as time passed 
and the societies developed, their circumstances, and hence their requirements, changed.  I 
referred in chapter 1. to Pound where in his Introduction to the Philosophy of Law he pointed 
out that there are at least twelve conceptions of what law is and that in practice each of these 
is in reality an explanation of the law of its time.  It is interesting to look at these in slightly 
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greater detail. 
      Pound's categorization covers the following:- 
  1.  Divinely ordained Rule.  This covers such laws as the Mosaic code, Hammurapi's 
Code, and the laws set out in the Koran.  There are also those who wish to derive laws from 
interpretation of the Bible or other religious works but these are of a different order, being 
mainly laws of morality. 
  2.  A tradition of the old customs which have proved acceptable to the Gods.  These 
were probably initially adopted patterns of behaviour which had been found to be beneficial.  
However there was usually a priesthood into whose hands the establishment and 
interpretation of the customs fell. 
  3.  The recorded wisdom of the wise old men who had learned the safe course of 
conduct - A traditional custom reduced to writing.  This is how Demosthenes described the 
law of Athens. 
  4.  A philosophically discovered system of principles which express the „nature of 
things‟ to which man ought therefore to conform.  This was the Law of the Roman juriconsul 
being an amalgam of 2 and 3 based on a political theory. 
  5.  In the hands of philosophers (and/or priests) 4 can (and has) been developed into a 
body of declaration of an eternal and immutable moral code. 
  6.  The law as a body of agreements of men in a politically organised society, as to 
their relations with each other.  This is a democratic version of the identification of law with 
the rules of law and hence with the decrees of the city state. - Plato's Minos. 
  7.  A reflection of the Divine Reason governing the universe.  A reflection of "ought" 
according to reason and morals. - St. Thomas Aquinas's view. 
  8.  A body of commands from the sovereign body of a state as to how the people 
therein should act.  Based on the sovereign Roman jurists of the Republic and the classical 
period.  The positivist law -  The will of the Emperor has the force of law (France 16th & 
17th century).  Also English theory of the divine right of Kings.  Subsequently the people 
through Parliament succeeded the Sovereign. 
  9.  A system of precepts allowing maximum freedom consistent with the freedom of 
others. This idea is said to allow law to unfold with the Society.  It is the law of the particular 
time for those people. 
  10.  A system of principles philosophically developed by juristic writing and 
decisions whereby man's life is measured by reason and harmonized with that of his fellows. 
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  11.  A body or system of rules imposed on men by the dominant class for the 
furtherance of its own interests - usually an economic basis. 
  12.  Law as the dictates of economic or social laws with respect to the conduct of men 
in society, discovered by observation and expressed as what works. 
      The common features which Pound deduced were that all these 
systems gave a fixed standard; an absolute mode of procedure; a system of ordering conduct 
and, he claimed it exists to satisfy a paramount social need for general security.  With all of 
this I would agree and yet there is one additional factor that is vital to the survival of any 
system of jurisprudence which is usually omitted and to consider it we require:- 
A slight political digression. 
    It is my contention that the system of jurisprudence, whatever it is, must order 
the society in such a manner that it becomes the "fittest" ( or most „robust‟) society from the 
point of view of survival.  This is an immutable external factor to which all societies are 
subject, yet because of our tendency always to divide subjects into specialized fragments it 
tends to be ignored.  Until recently it would have been difficult to give a clear example 
without going back to the fall of an empire such as Rome and the time perspective in that 
case makes the arguments tendentious. However recently we have seen the system of the 
USSR, a system of one of the great superpowers able to threaten the world, suddenly collapse 
from within.  This is actually a remarkable example - most societies are overthrown by rising 
stronger powers - but it was in essence because the system was not capable of adaption for 
survival.  It had become corrupt and immensely over bureaucratic. 
      Now it is arguable, in rather a chicken and egg fashion, as to whether it 
is the system of jurisprudence (which after all is the very foundation for running the society) 
or the political theory, which governs some of the fundamentals of the jurisprudence, which 
is the causa causans of the collapse. Either way, it is arguable that flaws in the jurisprudence 
will be the first visible signs of a political instability which will follow if such flaws are not 
rectified. Therefore it is vital to the survival of the unit or society that its jurisprudential 
system is working i.e. that it is not only effective but efficient. At the present time there is 
every indication that our system is neither.  
    Punishment is the means of effecting obedience to the system and, as has been 
shown earlier, it needs not only to be effective but efficient and just. Justice is inherent in a 
viable scheme of punishments. Therefore the efficiency and justness of the system of 




Efficiency of the system. 
    The efficacy of a system is governed by having a regime of punishments 
which relate to the currently perceived and accepted crimes in a logical and proportionate 
manner.  For example, to apply a fine for murder, and capital punishment for adultery, is just 
not effective in a society unless it be one that accepts that adultery is a more serious offence 
than murder.  Similarly a punishment has to be of a type that is efficient in discouraging 
others.  Thus for example it is quite futile in a society which gives financial support to the 
less well off to impose fines on them as a punishment.  There is an immediate dichotomy of 
objectives and a resultant collapse of efficiency.  
    Finally there are the difficulties, again pointed out by Pound, by virtue of the 
changing politico-social aims of any society.  The example that he gave
108 relates to the 
U.S.A. in the 1920s where the idea of security had come to mean, in a society where there 
were boundless opportunities, that men only needed the freedom to realize those 
opportunities to be assured of their reasonable expectations.  Therefore their security 
amounted to a regime of ordered competition of free wills in which acquisitive competition 
and self assertion is made to operate with the least friction and waste.  But with the increased 
wants and expectations, equality no longer means equality of opportunity.  They now want 
equality of satisfaction of expectations and liberty does not afford this.  Hence the shift to the 
humanitarian approach. 
    I have particularly referred to this example because it shows Pound's 
remarkable perception of the problem arising between the 20s and the early 30s when he was 
writing.  In due course it will be necessary to consider the shifts which have taken place since 
then and the likely effects they will have on our jurisprudence and hence the necessary 
punishments.  I have already pointed out the conflicts in both fining and state supporting the 
poor. 
    Very early in our history we started with a law designed to keep the peace.  It 
was a basic law with Tariffs of compositions for every injury.  Such laws were in vogue in 
Saxon times where the Weregild reduced everything to monetary value: Slaves weren't worth 
anything but killing a sheep was a shilling, an agricultural worker 40 sh., a farmer 100, a 
nobleman 300 and a prince 1500.  Under King Alfred fines were still mostly the order of the 
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day but if one couldn't pay the fine, first one's property and ultimately one's life was forfeit.  
In short the fine had teeth and the efficiency of the fine as a punishment had not been 
completely emasculated by a system of social security. 
    Heraclitus originally proposed the transition to the law as preservation of the 
status quo.  This was the basis of Greek and Roman law and was maintained through the 
middle ages.  In this period it is most interesting to note the concept of Feudal Reciprocity i.e. 
while the subjects owed allegiance to the lord the lord was responsible for their protection.  
This seems to me to be the mere recognition of the fundamental quasi contract which is 
inherent to any system in which there is basic freedom. 
    Next came the era of opportunities and men wanted freedom to exploit them.  
So the law adapted to permit the maximum opportunity for self exploitation.
109  
    The Spanish jurists developed the idea of man's natural rights and this is 
another concept which has been distorted by ignoring the inevitably required compensating 
balance.  This was a philosophy acceptable to the time but as the world became crowded it 
has led to inevitable complications. 
    It is only by bearing in mind the problems set out above that we are going to 
be able to make an effective assessment of the current position.  Moreover, views with regard 
to punishment have followed a similar course of variations from the Weregild system of fines 
to the 17th century deportations for sheep steeling to our present ultra concern for the 
criminal, his rights (?), and care not to humiliate him, etc., etc. 
    It is important therefore to look at Punishment in perspective with the concept 
of a free society.  We know the following:- 
  1.  The Inexorable drive is towards survival of the fittest. 
2.  Amongst societies that means the „physically and technologically fittest‟ - i.e. 
the most robust"  society. 
  3.  A free society can best be held together by virtue of a quasi-contract between 
the state and the people.  The state provides an ambience in which those people forming it are 
prepared to live. 
  4.  The trouble is that greed, lethargy, ignorance and inertia may cause people to 
accept a society that is not "robust" enough for ultimate survival. 
  5.  The only way in which a society can operate is to have rules governing the 
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inter-relations of its peoples and defining their duties and responsibilities. 
6.  These concepts of the required law for a society may vary with time and the 
particular society. 
  7.  The only effective way of enforcing those rules is by virtue of sanctions for 
non-performance, i.e. punishment. 
  8.  Sanctions are provided and enforced by the state to prevent citizens taking the 
law into  their own hands and thus reducing the system to anarchy and a vendetta society. 
  9.  The efficacy of the punishments will help stabilize the law abiding qualities of 
the society. 
  10.  Where the society falters the first sign may well be that of a faulty 
jurisprudence. Once the  people start to hold the system in contempt that society is well on 
the way towards disintegration.  For a system to be held in contempt is far worse for the fate 
of that society than a system which is feared. 
  11.  Once the system of jurisprudence falls into contempt one is faced with a major 
problem as to whether it is the system or the politico-social policy producing the system 
which is at fault.  One must conclude that it is almost invariably the latter and that patching 
the jurisprudence will not of itself return the system to the robustness required for ultimate 
survival. 
  At this point we can proceed to examine:- 
The incidence of jural relations
110 between the State and the citizen, the State and the 
law breaker, and the criminal and victim. 
  I have already argued that the citizen has a duty to obey the laws, and that the state 
has a concomitant duty to safeguard the citizen.  This is inter alia part of the contract of the 
individual with the state.  Thus there is a Jural relation between the state and the citizen. 
  In one case the state owes the citizen the benefits of citizenship, including the duty to 
protect (within limits - at least by penalizing transgressors), and the citizen has a right to 
expect protection (again within limits) - i.e. against criminal acts. 
In the other case the state has a right to obedience, and the citizen a duty to obey. 
  There is also a jural relation between the State and the law breaker.  This is set out in 
the criminal Law Statutes.  These set out the consequences of failure to carry out the duty of 
obedience to the law. 
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  What of the relationship of the criminal and the victim?  It may be extrapolated that if 
A is under an unpolarized duty not to harm others (by hitting them over the head for their 
money) then this is a multital or unpolarized duty (as in the example used earlier to keep off 
X's land).  When that duty is breached it becomes polarized and A has breached a paucital 
duty, e.g. not to assault  B. 
  At this stage it can be seen that there must in fact be a jural relation between the 
criminal A and his victim B.  However the status of the legal relationship has been largely 
undefined in criminal matters. 
  We know the legal relationship that exists between A and the State.  This is defined 
by the law, but the legal relationship between the criminal and his victim has been largely 
ignored.  This has been because society has been in the habit of regarding criminals as 
coming from the poorer social groups (and therefore unable to make proper recompense).  
But this is not necessarily so. Some criminals today are very wealthy indeed. 
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When A hits B A has actually breached two separate duties, and the situation is as follows:- 
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  This may be detailed as:- 
  1).  A has breached his duty to obey the State. 
  2).  A has breached his duty not to harm B. 
  3).  The State has breached its duty to protect B. 
  4).  B has not breached any duty. 
    Now, A's breach of duty to obey the state is covered by the criminal Law. 
    The State's breach of duty to protect B, has been recognized, at last, by 
Victim's compensation. But note this is NOT compensation by A. 
    A's breach of duty not to harm B has been neglected. It used not to be. 
    Therefore there should be an additional Punishment upon A to provide 
Compensation to B. 
    "Ah but A has no money and cannot compensate B" the bleeding hearts will 
say . The reply should be -"Tough, so up the punishment in lieu!". This was the basic 
principal adopted in King Arthur's day.  If you couldn't pay the fine, your property was 
forfeit, and eventually your life.  Our soft hearted approach has often led to criminals being 
well in pocket even after the penalty is paid.  
    To illustrate the point more clearly.  If A, while driving his car negligently, 
hits B, then B will be compensated for his pain and suffering.  If A's driving offence were 
sufficiently serious he might well be gaoled, but B will still recover compensation for his 
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    What then in the name of logic is the difference if A causes the damage 
without a car by deliberately hitting B?  Nothing except the practical aspect of insurance.  
Therefore B should be entitled to claim for his pain and suffering FROM A just as if this 
were a civil case and such compensation should feature in the criminal case.  The difference 
being that the court would set an additional penalty in the event of non payment by A. 
    To those who are not convinced:-  Look again at the situation where A 
carelessly runs B down in his car.  He causes B an assessable amount of pain and suffering 
e.g £15,000. Suddenly we find A is not insured. What usually happens is the court slaps A's 
wrist and imposes an extra penalty for driving while uninsured.  But this does not take 
account of what A has actually done.  What he has done is to cause B £15,000 worth of 
damage while driving.  Because he cannot pay he effectively deprives B of this amount, And 
as this flows from his criminal offence (driving while uninsured)  he should be treated as if he 
had stolen £15,000 from B.  If the courts were to treat cases this way  they would be taking 
full account of the result of A‟s criminal act (and there might even be a sharp decrease in 
uninsured drivers).  At the present time A gets away with a small additional fine. 
    So now we have an additional claim, not punishment (retribution) but pure 
compensation.  Moreover this must be included in the punishment in order that the 
punishment  be Just. 
    If this factor were included the state would then punish with a sentence made 
up partly of:- 
1. Proportionality Factor (representing the Seriousness of the Crime)  
2. Retribution factor for the wrong done.  
3. Rectification factor for the power A has wrongly assumed 
4. Compensation Factor to the Victim for the loss and pain and suffering. 
    What the state currently pays B is not on behalf of A, but as a penance for its 
failure to protect B.  Treated in this manner punishment begins to assume its just proportions.  
    However so far it would seem that Punishment is one of the most complex 
issues we have had to deal with.  We can be satisfied as to its necessity and we are reassured 
in this because all societies require its use. 
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the law in the most efficient way possible.  This qualifier adds to our difficulties, yet we can 
hardly omit it  The trouble is that it is difficult to quantify how efficient a punishment is, 
because the efficiency or effectiveness of law enforcement depends on many other factors - 
the police presence; the crime solution rate; the arrest rate; conviction rate; and the deterrent 
effect of the punishment. 
    To begin with it is important to examine those factors in punishment other 
than deterrence.  In a sense deterrence is separable and not really a part of punishment per se, 
because once punishment becomes necessary it is obvious that whatever deterrent there was 
in that particular case at least, it has fallen flat on its face.  The punishment handed out in this 
case may deter the next prospective criminal but the deterrent factor is always in futuro. 
    The true components of punishment, which we have examined so far 
comprise:- 
1.  The Proportionality factor. Here we have seen that this involves 2 aspects - the way the 
State evaluates the crime, and the way society does.  This latter involves the public critical 
reaction which is part of the deterrent factor, and it may differ from the State‟s view. 
2  The Retribution factor.  Governed in quantum by proportionality it is necessary to apply a 
punishment to produce a cathartic effect on the victim. 
3.  A Restorative or Rectification factor to restore the equilibrium of society - this is in 
effect equivalent to the minimum punishment where full restoration was made (e.g.  Stolen 
goods returned etc. when there will still be a punishment for the robbery).  This factor will be 
swallowed up in punishments for more serious cases, but even so it is important not to lose 
sight of it. 
4. The Compensation factor for the victim for the loss, pain and suffering etc.- The Victim 
Compensation factor - due from the criminal to the victim. 
All the above are usually lumped together in a confused way under retribution.  If they are 
properly accounted for it will be seen that there is a case for arguing that the present system is 
far too lenient. 
In addition there is a factor which is actually invoked by the courts, but rarely and to such a 
minor degree that we almost invariably overlook it:- 
5. The Restitution factor - The State Compensation factor. 193 
 
  Occasionally costs are awarded usually in the magistrate's court and for relatively 
minor offenses. But the fact is that the cost of catching and bringing to trial a criminal plus 
the cost of his subsequent imprisonment is horrendous.  This is quite apart from the cost of 
maintaining a police force, which is a cost the society has to bear.  However the extra costs 
involved are directly due to the criminal activity involved.  They are part of the crime against 
the rest of the Society.  Therefore they should be compensated for in the punishment.  In 
practice this is not done yet the expense is actually a crime against the rest of the society who 
may choose to spend the money on, say, health.  Looked at in this way a case could be argued 
that the extra expense directly caused by the criminal is in itself an offence.  Why should 
society constantly have to pay out vast sums of money in this way?  The cost of the catching 
and trial of the criminal should be chargeable against the criminal as part of his punishment.  
At least as a first step the cost of each trial and of carrying out the punishment should be 
made known in each case so that libertarian reformers can put it in the scales to weigh against 
their humanitarian ego-trips. 
    Apart from the above we have to consider:- 
Deterrence. 
    As I have pointed out deterrence is not a necessary component of punishment, 
but one which is usually regarded as part of the punishment in the form of -  
6. The Deterrent factor.  i.e. such amount or means, whether coincident or extra, as may be 
thought to be necessary to deter. 
    All these tend to blur into one another, they do not fall into neat assessable 
little packages (with the exception of 5 which we tend to ignore).  It is to be hoped though 
that one day someone may find a means of arranging them comparatively with respect to 
various crimes.  This would be an interesting if difficult project which can not be attempted 
here. 
    Finally, when all are added together the punishment must be JUST - and we 
have seen that justice introduces its own set of variables which play their part in the final 
evaluation of any punishment. 
    However it is possible to make some headway.  First we can abstract the 
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is usually done by setting the maximum sentence.  The reason minimum sentences and 
mandatory sentences should not be used is that juries, if they felt the minimum too high 
might tend to acquit thus allowing the criminal to escape altogether. 
    In this regard though it is not strictly appropriate to our present analysis, a 
word should be said about juries.  The reason for this is that it is interesting to see how the 
concept of Justice is inherent in the original concept.  Juries are thought to be one of the great 
bulwarks of English Law.  The basic idea was that a man should be judged by his peers.  This 
meant that in the case of the common man he would not be judged by superiors who in earlier 
ages might have considered his life worthless and therefore handed down peremptory and 
harsh findings.  The jury prevented the peasant from being automatically found guilty in just 
the same way that years ago whites in the U.S. were inclined to find anyone black as being 
automatically guilty.  Of course as originally the juries were white the jury system didn't help 
much there!  The trouble was that the original idea was that a man was entitled to be judged 
by his peers which was just (certainly in an Aristotelian sense), but this had been forgotten.  
So, in the U.S. it was not until coloured people came to be on juries that some order was 
restored.  
    Talk has progressed from being tried by one's peers to the concept of 12 good 
men and true.  But unless one is judged by one's peers one could argue that the whole content 
of justice in the jury system is debased.  However in today's climate of bias and prejudice it 
could equally be argued that one's peers  might regard the accused as „one of us' on trial by 
„them' and let him off. In fact the only hope left is to try to find a balance, and even then the 
job is difficult.  For myself I would argue that the average judge, trained as he is to listen to 
both sides of the case, is in many instances the fairest person in court.  So unless we are to 
abandon juries a great deal more care to suit their make up to obviate bias.  The point I am 
making is that it is necessary for us constantly to be vigilant that our whole system is Just. 
    Also a word should be said about our adversarial system.  It is not the purpose 
of this book to review the workings of our legal system but it is interesting to note that our 
whole society seems to have sprung from an adversarial one. - From our confrontational 
Parliament, solemnly placed just over two sword lengths apart and facing each other - to our 
legal system.  No doubt the latter stemmed from the idea of trial by battle when the strongest 195 
 
champion won.  But just as other societies have abandoned the facing opposition of 
parliament in favour of circular or semi-circular seating, so have more sensible minds 
appreciated that in the quest for justice, particularly in criminal cases, the prime object is to 
discover the truth.  This is not aided by our manner of prosecution and defence.  The French 
method of enquiry to ascertain all the facts which are then available to both parties is far 
superior.  Unfortunately the French often leave the course of these enquiries in the hands of 
very junior magistrates, when they should be in the hands of the most experienced.  Even this 
however was far superior to our quite recent practices of ambushing one's opponents (now no 
longer practised). 
    The reason we have had so many alleged miscarriages of justice cases is 
because of the lack of a proper legal manner of ascertaining the truth.  Such things as the U.S. 
5th amendment (whereby answers may be withheld on the grounds that they may incriminate 
the speaker) are blatantly unjust.  If the truth incriminates one so be it. However it would be 
necessary to put a relevancy limitation on questions, i.e. That they are relevant to the case, in 
order to prevent generalized fishing expeditions. 
    So far we have established that punishment, which will be ordered by the 
state, is categorized as to Proportionality by the state in setting out its scale of maximum 
punishments for the various crimes.  The courts will then assess the relative seriousness of the 
particular crime within its scale by reference to the facts, including circumstances of 
exemption and amelioration, mental state, intentionality etc.  To help with intention the law 
will invoke certain rules which I referred to earlier. 
    The courts should also attempt to answer the problem of Uniformity (required 
by Justice) so that sentences do not vary wildly where the crimes are commensurate.  Of 
course it is now possible for either side to appeal the terms of the sentence.  Formerly this 
was available only to the convicted.  It would one feels, be wise to have a single court 
devoted to sentencing, though with our present information technology the judge of first 
instance should soon be able to have ready access to all comparable sentences. 
    The judges will not be concerned with apportioning quantum to retributive 
justice, but its restorative aspect will be featured in their opinion as to the seriousness of the 
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callousness involved etc. etc. 
    The quantum of rectification punishment has never been defined.  However it 
is present as can be shown when a sentence is passed even though there is no remaining harm 
done. That is so because even though recompense was made, the property returned etc. the 
criminal is not just let off, there still remains the fact that the law was broken and therefore 
punishment is required. 
    It is my submission that more attention should be paid to rectification 
punishment (derived from rectification justice).  In effect Rectification punishment is the 
bottom line or minimum punishment likely to be handed out.  However this will vary with the 
crime. The minimum Rectification punishment for stealing from a shop (the goods later being 
paid for when the criminal is caught) will be different from the minimum punishment for 
crimes like murder (even taking into account provocation and all amelioration factors.  Even 
so the other factors such as the cost to society of catching the criminal and the necessary 
deterrent factor must also be taken into account in determining minimum sentences. This is 
why the subject of punishment is so difficult - all the factors inter relate. 
    The law has already incorporated the justice of equality of equals (and the 
inequality of unequals) in relation to crimes.  Indeed, as an example, the considerations of 
intentionality and its presence or absence do affect considerations of punishment. 
    Now, although we have covered most of the factors in punishment there 
remains a little more to be said on the vexed question of Deterrence.  As I mentioned before 
Deterrence is affected by several factors such as police presence, crime solution, arrest rates 
and conviction rates, but there can be an element of deterrence in the punishment itself. 
    This element of deterrence is in itself in two parts, or even possibly three. The 
first is simple.  It is the deterrent effect of the punishment on the normally law abiding 
citizen.  It is quite straight forward and the normally law abiding are deterred simply by the 
fact that there is a punishment prescribed for a particular action.  But it goes a lot further. The 
quantum of the punishment is relevant.  It is not sufficient to say "oh the law abiding will 
obey anyway.  To take a simple example - speeding (There seems to be a lot of speeding in 
this book, and for that I apologize but it is something to which most of us can relate).  The 
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through carelessness he picks up 3 relatively minor speeding tickets within three years he will 
find himself with 9 points on his licence and another ticket could result in losing that licence.  
At that point (or probably at the 6 point stage) he will become much more cautious and 
conscious of his speed. 
    The second case involves the non law abiding but thinking criminal.  He may 
well assess the possible consequences of an action and rate them as too high.  This was 
particularly so when the law was that anyone participating in a crime in which a gun was 
used and death occurred would be convicted of murder.  Many criminals would insist on a 
„no guns' policy before joining an „enterprise'.  There are definitely some, usually 
professional criminals, who will assess the job and reckon whether it is worth the candle. 
    Now it is no good exaggerating this second group.  There are many cases 
where the possible punishment has no effect - Amongst them thrill seekers; those who are 
„sure' they won't be caught; those who just don't think; those on drugs etc.  These latter are 
often cited as an argument against there being a deterrent factor in punishment.  But it is 
pointless to cite one group against the other as one is just not comparing like with like.  
Moreover the fact that something does not work against everyone is no excuse to discard it. 
As I said earlier, the fact that a spanner does not fit every nut on the outboard motor is no 
excuse for slinging it overboard. 
    The possible third group are those who whilst falling into the exception to 
group 2 are those who may be dissuaded from recidivism by experiencing the punishment.  
This is definitely a part of deterrence and/or cure (depending on the approach).  Here we are 
concerned with the deterrent aspect. This may well depend on the type of punishment as 
well as the quantum. 
    And so our punishments must allow for all these factors and they have to be 







CHAPTER 8.  TYPES OF PUNISHMENT.  - A review of Options. 
In order to be just it is arguable that punishments should be relevant 
to the criminal as well as appropriate to the crime.  In this chapter we 
are therefore going to review some alternative punishments.  In order 
to do this there is no point in being selective before we start.  There is 
in industry a problem solving technique known as „brainstorming‟.  
In the course of this a group of people trying to solve a problem sit 
around  and  call  out  ideas  which  are  then  written  down  and 
subsequently explored.  In calling out ideas it does not matter how 
bizarre they appear.  The reason for this is that it has been found that 
a  bizarre  idea  may  spark  off  a  sensible  solution.    In  exploring 
alternative punishments some bizarre ideas have been included not 
because they were seriously contemplated as being useable but rather 
because  as  will  be  seen  on  the  odd  occasion  they  have  produced 
something further.   
 
     Let us first look at some of the conclusions which we can usefully abstract 
from what has gone before:- 
    Punishment is that sanction applied by a Society for breaking its codes of 
interrelation conduct. 
As such it is Logically necessary.  One cannot do nothing or the law ceases to exist. 
    The  Object  of  Punishment  is  to  Maximize  obedience  to  the  law.  
Maximization of obedience can be effected by encouragement to obey, or deterrence against 
breach,  or  an  admixture  of  both.    Encouragement  to  obey  is  incentive;  Deterrence  is 
disincentive. 
"I will give you a sweet if you take that book over to Mummy".-  “I will give 
you a cuff in the ear if you don't”. 
    As it would be very difficult to devise incentives, let alone give rewards, to the 
vast majority who obey or conform to our rules of conduct, punishment must necessarily be 
based on disincentive. 
    Remedial Therapy is not part of punishment.  It is an attempt to prevent 
recidivism amongst offenders and to encourage future compliance.  As such  it  may well 
include incentives.  If this distinction were born in mind a great deal of useless and cross 
purpose  argument  could  be  avoided.    It  is  quite  possible  for  there  to  be  Punishment  & 
Remedial  Therapy.  To  substitute  Remedial  Therapy  for  Punishment  involves  us  in 199 
 
dispensing with something that we have already shown to be logically necessary! 
    Laws are usually in the form of generalizations, as indeed are punishments, 
setting, as they do, maximum sentences and not detailed minutiae. 
    Judges are retained in order to apply these generalizations to each specific 
instance.    (This  in  itself  is  a  good  argument  for  drawing  judges  only  from  the  most 
experienced and well trained lawyers, and not allowing political appointments).  Where the 
application is clear, i.e. the facts come readily within the generalization, there is no problem.  
Where there is not an all fours fit judges use their experience to interpret the generalizations.  
This is, so far, still a pure application of law (I am not following Hart here). 
    At this point, particularly when the case is not clear cut the judges may apply 
Equitable Principles - not the law.  In the case of punishment the judges apply Discretion 
by which various allowances can be made. 
    EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES are based on PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE.  They 
are not generalized or over riding rules of  law  even though unfortunately they  are often 
referred to as „Rules‟ For example take the rule in Riggs v Palmer referred to by Dworkin 
that a man should not be allowed to profit from his wrongdoing.  If this were indeed an 
overriding rule of law it would be applicable to the way in which various criminals make a 
considerable profit by selling their „story‟ (“The Inside Story”) to the press.  A generalized 
rule of law would be invariable and failure to apply it a miscarriage of justice.  Indeed many 
of the public do so regard this particular principle, and the feedback from the public has 
resulted recently in the press adopting a much more cautious attitude.  Also, and I believe for 
the first time, an order was made by a judge for a criminal to refund £15,000,000 within a 
year or suffer a further 4 years imprisonment.  While this is a step in the right direction one 
must ask „Why only 4 years for £15,000,000?‟ - not even the best paid Chairmen of Industry 
have been earning at this rate.  With a sentence like that it pays the criminal to stay inside - he 
couldn't do better if he worked his fingers to the bone.   
    On the other hand a rule such as the Rule in Rylands and Fletcher (see ch. 6.) 
has become a rule of Law. 
PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE. 
    Justice is governed by Morals, Ethics and Survival
111.  Of these three, Survival 
is an external factor which is the instinctua l factor promoting man's continued existence (or 
that of the group).  Survival can completely overrule the law without reversing it.  The most 
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dramatic example of this is the overruling of the sanction against killing in wartime.  It not 
only becomes lawful but priests on both sides often invoke the same deity for success! 
    Morals and ethics are, as we  have  seen,  mutable.  Currently they seem to 
mutate  spontaneously  amongst  the  young.    A  pop  star takes  drugs.    His  followers  don't 
question they just accept.  Morals and ethics applied by the courts are usually conservative 
and  this  is  justified  on  the  grounds  that  change  should  be  slow  and  certain  rather  than 
instantly swinging back and forth and incorporating every dead cat bounce. 
    However  there  are  problems  when  different  jurisdictions  have  different 
concepts of justice.  At present the EU has rather different concepts from those of the UK, 
and this is why so many appeals are being made to the European court.  Many will say this is 
good, but that is only good so long as you feel that the EU concepts are better than our own.  
Were we to take the lead in any matter (and we have in the past) we could find ourselves 
being held back by overriding out of date EU decisions.  Where the public concept of justice 
of one country is overruled by that of another there is a potential source of real conflict. 
LEGAL PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE v PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE. 
    The latter will be more influenced by the morals of the day.  For example 
Aristotle would not have regarded a greedy man as a „just‟ man but present day standards 
tend to honour the man who grabs what he can (e.g. the BBC were planning to celebrate with 
Ronnie Biggs the train robber).  Conversely there are instances where the public seem to feel 
that the law has become more trendy than they (e.g. Capital Punishment, certain pleasant 
remedial holidays etc.). 
     It is wise that the public perception of Justice and that of the State should not 
vary too widely, although it is equally necessary that alterations are accepted by the State (if 
they are accepted - and the State is after all the arbiter  in theses  matters) in a slow and 
responsible manner.  One of the great requirements of law is that it provides relative stability, 
and it should not therefore fluctuate with every new fashion.  There is a particular need with 
regard to Justice in Punishment, especially where the public demands are for more severe 
penalties or for stricter enforcement of penalties for a crime.  The reason behind this is that if 
the punishment is derisory, or at least if the public feels it is so, it is usually because they will 
not feel protected against that crime and they will lose faith in that government and its laws 
simply because they feel that the government is not keeping their end of the bargain.  This 




THE REQUIREMENTS OF PUNISHMENT 
    These are that:- 
  I.    Punishment  should  be  proportionate.    This  is  part  of  the  sense  of  justice  in 
punishment.  Hence we must, as indeed we do, establish our list of crimes and their potential 
punishments - The Penal Fee Sheet. 
  II.  The Punishment must be appropriate with respect to the criminal.  For example 
the car thief and joy rider cited earlier who did not mind gaol because to him it was "like a 
holiday camp" might just as well not have been punished.  Now this is going to mean that 
there  may  have  to  be  a  radical  rethink  with  respect  to  punishment,  and  an  element  of 
flexibility of punishment for the same crime may have to be incorporated.  This is a feature 
which is not present in our legal system. 
  III.    The  punishment  should  if  possible  be  such  as  is  likely  to  deter  as  many  as 
possible  from  the  same  crime.    Again  this  may  actually  prove  to  relate  to  the  type  of 
punishment rather than its physical or temporal severity. 
  IV.    The  punishment  must  be  just  -  it  must  make  the  necessary  allowances  with 
respect to the individual and the circumstances. 
    The above are the mainstays of an effective punishment and we shall examine 
each in greater detail.  However there is one type of punishment that we have at present 
which does not fit the above pattern.  In fact it offends some of the precepts.  It is of course 
the punishment for the Strict Liability offence.  The arguments for and against these will have 
to be very carefully weighed and this form of crime and its punishment will be considered 
separately. 
WHAT MATTERS SHOULD BE PUNISHABLE? What are the defining parameters of an 
act that make it punishable? -  
    Here the basic answer in a practical sense is to take the Legal Positivists view, 
i.e.  that punishable crimes are those which are specified by the State.  The manner in which 
these are varied where the State's view differs with popular morality is primarily a matter of 
governance.  As seen in Fig.1.  in Chapter 1 in our type of society there is a feedback of 
public opinion, but the State legislators reserve the right to rule against the wishes of their 
electors.  Variations of method belong properly in the field of political philosophy.  For our 
purposes we can accept the definitions under the criminal law. 
    A more generalized approach would be to say that:- 
 any act may be deemed to be a crime in which one party adversely affects 
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consent.   
This at least places a limit as to what may not constitute a crime.  The State, however, will 
define which acts are, and which are not to come within the scope of the criminal law. 
THE FORMS OF PUNISHMENT  - A review of the 13 categories. 
    When we consider punishment we cannot confine ourselves to simply that 
which is currently in use.  As we saw in ch. 7.  there are at least 13 types of punishment 
which have been used.  It will be necessary to examine these in detail even though some have 
been discarded and to examine the grounds for their use or non use as the case may be.  We 
should  also  consider  whether  there  may  be  additional  punishment  means  that  might  be 
available. 
    At present we use principally two punishments only, namely Incarceration and 
Fines.  To these may be added a little light labour in the form of community service.  It is 
little wonder therefore that the punishments are hopelessly inappropriate in so many cases 
and that the prisons are full and that crime flourishes in precisely the manner one ought to 
expect . 
    We have in fact painted ourselves into a corner by allowing our lawmakers to 
adopt  ruthlessly  libertarian  attitudes  in  order  to  satisfy  an  egotistical  desire  to  appear 
"civilized".  The truth is that the outcry for a rethinking of our punishments often heard from 
the public is not an outcry of bloodlust on the part of an unsophisticated public, but the 
instinctive realization that the imbalance is causing the situation to get out of hand.  Until the 
scale of punishments is revised to make the penalties more appropriate to the crimes and the 
criminals, we are unlikely to make much progress. 
    What  follows  therefore  is  a  dispassionate  look  at  the  various  types  of 
punishment that have been used in the past.  I have totally ignored all treaties and statutes 
protecting criminal's so called rights and our present libertarian views, some of which appear 
to  be  regarded  by  the  man  in  the  street  as  bordering  on  the  imbecilic.    We  know  that 
imprisonment and fines are not working.  We know that imprisonment particularly can be 
counter productive and additionally that it can be enormously expensive.  If what we have is 
not working, we are going to have to do something else and it is therefore futile to say that 
any alternative is unacceptable. 
    In  the  following  look  at  the  punishments  used  at  different  times  and  by 
different countries, some  may  immediately appear to be unacceptable.  Nevertheless  it  is 
important to re-examine them for they may  just contain a scintilla of a solution to some 
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thing that is certain is that we cannot go on refusing to consider anything but what we have. 
    Thus, turning first to the most drastic punishment the first question we must 
ask is where, if at all, does the death penalty fit in the appropriate scale of punishments.  Only 
then should one consider whether it is to be used or not. 
    Although there are very strong moral strictures against causing the death of 
another this has always been capable of being overridden - whether it be in time of war or as 
an exception e.g death caused by self defence. 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.   
  Crimes  against  the  State:  Capital  Punishment  was  retained  for  the  offence  of 
Treason.  Treason was and may well still be considered to be the most heinous offence.  The 
reason is that it represents the betrayal of the whole community by one of their own, and it 
imperils the safety of every member of the state.  Spying on the other hand does not represent 
betrayal  by one's own.  It represents the efforts of a  foreign  national to benefit  his own 
country, i.e as far as his country is concerned he is acting in their best interests.  Thus there is 
a  marked  distinction  between  the  two  which  would  warrant  a  possible  higher  maximum 
penalty in the case of treason than in the case of spying; e.g.  Life imprisonment for spying 
and Death for treason.   
    This,  for  example,  would  have  justified  the  Death  penalty  for  those  who 
betrayed atomic secrets at the time of the cold war, but not the death of Lord Haw-Haw who 
broadcast against the nation during the war.  Haw-Haw was in fact hanged as an act of pure 
revenge.    He  did  not  spy  and,  although  originally  British,  he  had  openly  renounced  his 
allegiance to the U.K.  and departed abroad.  True he was a man who had changed sides but 
he did so before he started to do any damage. 
    What  has  blurred  the  issue  has  been  a  lack  of  clear  understanding  of  the 
difference between the two crimes plus a tendency to demote the seriousness of the crimes in 
peacetime which is when all of the recent cases have occurred.  If however we admit that life 
imprisonment is justifiable for the most serious cases of spying then death would appear to be 
logical (though not necessarily acceptable) for the most serious cases of Treason. 
    We have to be careful here not to confuse a justification for a higher penalty 
with a justification of the death penalty.  For example one could always argue that 30 years 
maximum would be acceptable for the most serious cases of spying, whereas 50 years would 
be acceptable  for the  most serious cases of treason.  Thus the  fact that Treason  is  more 
serious than spying, if we accept that as a fact, is still no justification for the death penalty, 
and such an argument should logically fail. 204 
 
 
    In passing one should note that the primary reason the death penalty is not 
invoked or sought for spying is that all nations indulge in it and if one killed off all the spies 
one  caught  there  would  be  no  chance  of  getting  one's  own  caught  spies  back!  -  Most 
governments, except the ultra crusading, are basically extremely pragmatic. 
Crimes involving Death: Here we need consider only the most serious, which is normally 
premeditated murder.  However if the penalty for this is life, and if this were to mean life, 
there is nothing to prevent the murderer from killing say a warder that he dislikes or another 
inmate, or, if he escapes, from killing repeatedly to maintain his freedom.  At that point the 
state is actually in breach of its bargain to protect the public  by allowing the subsequent 
killings to be punishment free. 
    So we must argue that if any crime attracts the punishment of life meaning 
life, there must be a further punishment, presumably the death penalty, for anyone under 
sentence for life who commits a further act punishable by life.  This seems to me to be the 
one logical case in which one could argue the absolute necessity of having the ultimate 
penalty available in our armoury.  This is not an argument for the acceptance of the death 
penalty, for one's attitude to this is essentially a moral or emotional one.  It is not even an 
argument for its necessity per se, for we have not considered all the alternatives but it is an 
argument that in a certain scale of punishments there is a logical place for it. 
    In addition there is the valid argument that if you eliminate the possibility of 
the death penalty under any circumstances you devalue the crime.  The effect of this is a 
domino effect on all the lesser crimes until those at the bottom come to be regarded as 
acceptable, and this is precisely what has happened in our society today. 
    Assuming that the death penalty has a place in the scale of punishments does it 
have to suffer all the disadvantages levelled against it by its opponents?  Here the answer is 
of course that it does not.  In the first place its presence in the scale does not mean that it has 
to be mandatory as it was in the past.  In fact we have already been into the reasons why 
punishments should not be mandatory particularly because of the potential failure of juries to 
convict.  Thus it would be possible to introduce the death penalty in such a way as to restore 
its effect as a last resort whilst providing safeguards against its alleged disadvantages. 
MUTILATION: 
    At this point most people think of the Islamic punishment of removal of a 
hand for theft, and throw up their hands (whilst still keeping them attached to their arms) in 
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it is rarely used and then only as a last resort after other methods have failed.  Yet there are 
many here who, whilst condemning the Sharia law, cheerfully advocate castration for the 
child molester.  Perhaps the best way to examine this whole question would be to look at the 
possible effectiveness of such a punishment.   
    It would seem to me that the effectiveness of any such form of punishment and 
thus the necessity for it, is very much in doubt.  It would be difficult to attribute the greater 
freedom from crimes of theft in Islamic countries to the ultimate sanction of mutilation.  
Generally, before one reaches this stage, their laws are more severe.  Moreover the moral 
influence of the Koran in this respect seems to be much greater and the general public 
condemnation is far more severe
112.   
    There is only one case I know of where the argument about effectiveness 
seems to break down.  In a recent discussion it was suggested that mugging and crimes of 
violence by men could be almost certainly eliminated if the punishment were removal of the 
left testicle for the first offence and right for the second.  Although made in jest, there are 
serious arguments which could be made for such a punishment in that the original first 
punishment does not cripple the criminal but it makes the prospect of a repeat punishment 
dire.  Moreover it is not the sort of punishment that is going to make the criminal an object of 
admiration amongst his peers, as they might for example look up to one who had manfully 
suffered the cat o' nine tails.   
      What we can draw from this rather bizarre example is something 
useful about the nature of punishment, i.e. 
1) It need not (and indeed should not) cripple the criminal. 
2) The prospect of a repeat should be a real deterrent, and 
3) It must be something that does not promote the criminal in the eyes of his peer group. 
    The question of image and the public reaction to the criminal is important.  
The punishment must not inadvertently help create the image which the criminal may aspire 
to.  For example some Japanese gangsters are prepared and proud to have the top of their 
little finger severed.  It shows their courage and discipline.  Therefore this sort of mutilation 
                                                 
          112  I was making this point recently when a friend who is a magistrate in London asked me why if what I said 
were so, did he have so many cases of Arabs, often quite wealthy ones, stealing from shops? I must confess myself at a 
loss to answer this particular point, unless theft from infidels doesn't count, rather like our exploitation of foreign labour 
in the past. 206 
 
would serve no purpose.  The removal of a testicle on the other hand is not something anyone 
is going to want to imitate. 
    The point I am making is that even with a punishment as severe as mutilation 
it is not the fact that you cut something off that counts, it is what you cut off that counts!  It is 
important that the psychological point is emphasized as being present even in a horrendous 
punishment because the same psychological point is present in all punishments.  Under these 
circumstances I hope it is apparent just how stupid it is to limit ourselves virtually to only two 
punishments, one of which is already showing signs of receiving less and less social sanction. 
    Before leaving the subject of mutilation we should return to the question of the 
repeat offender.  The ideal example here is that of the child molester, some of whom appear 
not to be cured by imprisonment.  There was one case recently where the offender begged to 
be castrated because he argued that he knew he would repeat his crime when released, i.e. he 
couldn't help it.  This brings up several questions, the first and most important of which is - 
Will the proposed operation (mutilation) cure the problem.  Only if the answer is yes should 
the operation proceed.  If it was known not to have any real effect it would amount to an 
unjust punishment.  If it provided reasonable prospects it might just be justified if the 
circumstances of the case warranted it.  We shall have to come back to the question of the 
repeat offender and those who cannot control themselves because here we are beginning to 
border on sickness rather than wilful crime. 
INFLICTION OF PAIN - PHYSICAL. 
    Here we come to the vexed question of corporal punishment, much supported 
by its advocates and dismissed by its opponents.  Again arguments often rage around the 
deterrent effect or lack of it.  I must repeat that these arguments are just not relevant to the 
assessment of the punitive aspects of any sanction, particularly as most punishments will 
have differing deterrent effects on different people or groups.  A far more interesting 
argument is the one that claims that the infliction of physical pain a) degrades and b) 
brutalizes the recipient.   
    As to a) one of the prime purposes of punishment is to reduce the standing of 
the person being punished within the community.  If the status is unchanged, or worse still 
improved, amongst the person's peers then the purpose of the punishment is defeated.  This is 
why it is imperative that no one, particularly a state funded TV station, should be permitted to 
treat people such as the train robbers as if they were folk heroes.  In fact this in itself should 
be a crime - ‘encouragement of the perpetrators of criminal activities’ It is not until 
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a product of modern entertainment which, failing in natural ability, has tried to substitute by 
shocking or advocating the bizarre.  Unfortunately as it is an easy substitute for real talent it 
has gained increasing usage, with the perpetrators claiming a „right‟ to do so under artistic 
licence.  This however leads us into the arguments relating to the extent of freedom and 
censorship, which unfortunately we cannot pursue here. 
    As to b) the brutalization of the recipient, the argument is that it makes the 
vicious more vicious.  This tends to be based on the grounds that those brutalized by their 
parents often turn out to be violent themselves.  Without case histories this does rather tend to 
beg the question as to whether the parent(s) were brutal to the child because it had a naturally 
vicious disposition and they were at a loss as to what else to do; or whether the brutal 
characteristic was hereditary; or whether the beatings turned a right little charmer into a 
monster.  In short the claim cannot stand until the alternative explanations are eliminated. 
    What I do believe however is that the child hit for no reason by a parent soon 
senses that its treatment is unfair.  I would not go so far as to say that an infant has an 
inherent sense of what is just (indeed this would appear to be a learned sense) but as soon as a 
child gains any experience of inter action with other people the sense of what is „fair‟ 
develops very quickly.  It learns to dislike what is unfair (having its lollipop snatched by a 
bigger child) and this is the rudimentary awakening of a sense of justice.  This perception is 
acquired quickly on the receiving end as most things which are unfair have an unenjoyable 
association.  Unfortunately this does not develop a sense of either justice or sympathy when 
the shoe is on the other foot.  But a just punishment will not be regarded in the same light as 
an unjust one - it lacks the quality of blatant unfairness and for this reason I suspect that that 
particular argument of the anti corporal punishment advocates fails insofar as a just 
punishment, even a corporal punishment, does not brutalize. 
    Of course it will be argued against me that I have not defined what is a just 
corporal punishment.  Certainly my view of what is just in these circumstances would 
probably be far less than previous views of corporal punishment.  In the first place I would 
probably argue that it should not be the punishment of first instance.  This would emphasize 
the seriousness with which any such punishment would be associated.  Again I would 
advocate it primarily for cases of repeated violence or intimidation, but I do believe it may be 
argued that there is a limited place for it in the armoury of punishments. 
    There is also a point which is never considered by those opposed to corporal 
punishment, and that is that they seem quite prepared to torture a person suffering from 
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get the punishment over quickly by means of corporal punishment.  This is an approach 
which has always seemed more emotional than lucid to me.  The fact that corporal 
punishment enables a faster return of the criminal to society may also be argued to be of 
benefit generally. 
    Picking up a point which we have yet to discuss in detail - immediacy of 
punishment - there is an argument which can be made for reasonable corporal punishment of 
children.  Imagine the scene: a small child reaches up to grasp the handle of a saucepan of 
boiling water on the stove.  A quick slap on the wrist and a firm "No" is far more effective 
than trying to explain the effects of a dowsing of boiling water to a child that has no 
conception of what a burn is.  But it is no good putting off the punishment.  Its effectiveness 
is in its immediacy.  However this is a special case but I think one worth mentioning. 
    Again if we are not too proud to look at other animals we can see that in 
training their young they do indeed instill discipline.  All young animals tend to get over 
excited and out of control, but in the case of a lion cub a snarl and bearing of teeth by the 
parent is enough to frighten the cub into obedience.  Of course the cub does not know that the 
threatening behaviour won't be carried through - it can't produce a statute saying "You are not 
allowed to bite me or I'LL SUE" which effectively destroys the threat.  This is more 
important than one might think, and in effect might mean that while we should train parents 
not to hit children, we cannot give the children a right not to be smacked.  In fact the remedy 
for wrongful management of children should be a State remedy NOT a right of the child.  
The reason for this is that the establishment of jural relations directly between parent and 
child is antipathetic to the basic parent child relationship. 
    Similarly we have seen that a mother dolphin, obviously fed up to the fins 
with its child's behaviour, will force it to the sea bed and hold it there whilst emitting a 
threatening note.  Afterwards when it is released and swimming obediently there is usually a 
quick reassuring touch of the fin from mother indicating that all is forgiven. 
INFLICTION OF PAIN - MENTAL. 
    As we have seen scaring children into obedience is one form of control, but 
should this be a subject for punishment.  Certainly the idea of constantly threatening the child 
with future retribution is bad, primarily because the lack of immediacy tends to separate the 
act and the punishment.  Mental pain or anxiety is a subject about which comparatively little 
is known.  Brain washing, and sensory deprivation are subjects usually associated with 
torture and thus dismissed as beneath discussion.  Yet two of the most serious crimes, 
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distress.  Why therefore should there be no parity of punishment?  Moreover, looked at 
dispassionately, any deterrent has a mental aspect.  i.e.  the deterred person is scared of the 
consequences of doing the act, and therefore desists.  This is true of any threat of dire 
consequences. 
    Therefore for example where a person is say sentenced to 6 months, might 
there not be a case for putting him in a very distressing (but not dangerous) situation for a 
short period e.g.  one month, and then releasing him, with the balance of the sentence 
suspended for two years dependent on his good behaviour.  I do not mean some form of „boot 
camp‟, I mean somewhere where the living conditions are very unpleasant, cold, stark, and 
minimal, with no entertainment and no outside communication.  The only relief would be 
educational classes in the daytime.  The effect of this would be to make the education seem 
the most appealing part of the sentence.  It would also cut the length of time inside and 
provide a deterrent foretaste of what is to come if one fails to behave on release.  In short, a 
milder derivation of the left testicle punishment.  Finally by cutting down on the length of 
time actually in gaol it would save a great deal of expense. 
    Immediately there are those who will point out that this would be no good for 
a drug addict and of course that is true.  It will be seen that the whole force of the arguments 
of this section are leading us toward the concept of fitting the punishment to the criminal.  It 
is the severity of the punishment which is related to the crime, and the type of punishment 
which should be related to the criminal.  This will require a radical rethink, and possibly even 
the establishment of alternative punishments.   
    Again it may be true that the sort of punishment described above may only 
prove to be a deterrent when it is experienced, but again I would argue that it is almost 
impossible to produce the omni-deterrent.  There is some proof that future prospects can lead 
to increased deterrent effect as in the case of the build up of points on one's licence.  Where it 
fails is with criminals who do not find imprisonment intolerable and who, although they will 
obviously try to avoid being caught, are not really deterred by the thought of imprisonment.  
Similarly the joy rider, with no licence anyway, is hardly going to be deterred by a points 
deterrent.  However say there were also a points system applicable to criminals, so that any 
conviction would take with it a points value (e.g. purely as an example a previous conviction 
1 point, a prison sentence of 6 months up to 3 points; etc., etc.).   Then anyone being 
convicted of an offence would be sentenced and then any points he had acquired in the last 
three years would be revealed and his sentence would automatically be increased on a sliding 210 
 
scale e.g. 5% for each point.  Here there is an incentive to keep out of trouble without being 
as inflexible as the U.  S.  ‛three strike' rule. 
    While, as we discussed above it, may be possible to frighten children into 
obedience it is not the preferred method.  Punishments of mature adults by means of, say, 
sensory deprivation and other forms of quasi mental punishment is very much an unknown 
field.  Nevertheless further progress in understanding the workings of the mind may provide 
insights for derivation of milder solutions.   
    Another aspect is the use of aversion therapy.  To the best of my knowledge 
this is not usually successful and there do not seem to be any areas of crime to which this 
might be the solution.  However there are a range of options apart from the drastic 
deprivation of the senses (where a person is deprived of all sight, sound and sense of smell 
and touch) which may be of some effect.  Again it might be possible simply to find a means 
of frightening the criminal into compliance with the law.  These fields are largely unknown 
and applications would in most cases have to be very subject- dependant so that their use in 
punishment seems to be of minimum significance at present. 
    Certainly medical and psychiatric research in this field should be encouraged 
as indeed it should be as to the effects of current overcrowding and being forced to live in 
close quarters as many prisoners are today.  It is quite probable that this is currently having a 
counter productive effect.  This is not just because of the opportunity for the criminal to learn 
more criminal techniques from other inmates but rather because we know that overcrowding 
produces antisocial reactions (in rats anyway).  It is important that we should have reliable 
information on these aspects.  Generally the mental effects of all forms of punishment should 
be more thoroughly investigated and all prisoners should be subject to detailed examination.   
EXILE or BANISHMENT 
    Here we have an extremely effective punishment which has fallen into disuse 
but which might well merit revival in some form.  Much depends on the desirability of living 
in one's country but assuming that this is what most people desire, exile could be very 
effective.  Immediately there will be cited the difficulty of enforcement but this is easily 
solved by reintroducing Outlawry, so that the banished person has a price on his head if 
caught within the exiled territory.  In the U.S.A., although it is not generally known, there are 
still professional bounty hunters operating today. 
    Moreover Exile does not have to be a blunt instrument - it can be for varying 
periods; it can be related to the return of funds; it can even be internal as well as external.  
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to which people can be exiled.  In its worst form it could be unregulated so that a person, 
having rejected the laws of society would be sent to an area where they did not apply.  They 
would simply be provided with a survival kit, there being no buildings or other facilities and 
collected at the end of their term.  The advantage of this would be that the area merely needs 
to be guarded but not administered. 
    Normal exile whether internal or external would have to be accompanied by 
the provision of a worse punishment if the person returned and a price placed on their head to 
encourage the reporting of any illegal return.  Also Banishment would be, where appropriate, 
accompanied by Forfeiture of property, and such forfeiture would be followed through to 
beneficiaries.   
    This sort of punishment is not for minor criminals but rather major criminals 
of the Maxwell type.  One really cannot assume that the wife, husband, partner, or children of 
a major criminal have not benefited.  Criminals engage in their activities, unless extremely 
politically motivated, for the benefits they bring.  Therefore unless a related party can show 
where and how they acquired their property, everything should be forfeit in the manner of a 
bankruptcy. 
BRANDING 
    Unless it is possible to come up with a bio-degradeable form of branding it 
suggests that the person is irreversibly condemned.  This seems to be against the whole 
purpose of the concept of punishment, which, if it is to be just, should allow, where possible,  
for the reinstatement of the criminal in society.  There are presumably those who would deny 
this but there seems to my mind no beneficial purpose in creating a body of either 
permanently branded or visibly mutilated people in a society.  There are those who, equally 
unreasonably in my opinion, would brand say child molesters on the excuse that they would 
be easier to keep track of.  Quite apart from the fact that other ways of tagging people are 
being developed it is arguable that our present forms of punishment are inappropriate for 
criminals who are driven by a compulsion. 
    Even if a biodegradable means of branding were established it would probably 
be easily overcome and I would expect its benefits to be minimal.  In short I can see no way 
of even deriving any other form of punishment from this approach.  This is one old form of 
punishment that appears to warrant no argument for resurrection. 
INCARCERATION - GAOL. 
    This subject has, because of its general use, been the subject of innumerable 
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criminals.  Additionally it is extremely expensive.  The object therefore must be to find 
alternatives which might achieve a similar objective. 
    It would be generally desirable if alternative punishments could be found for 
less serious offenses, punishments which would obviate the necessity for keeping people in 
gaol and thus reserving gaol for those offenses which cannot be otherwise dealt with or those 
which are so serious that it is necessary to safeguard the public from the criminal.  There is 
one group where a start could be made, and that is amongst those remanded in custody 
awaiting trial.  There are three basic categories/problems here:- 
 1) is that the accused is basically assumed to be innocent until proven guilty and so the 
presumption is that they should be free pending trial.  This is accomplished by release on bail.  
2) Where the crime is sufficiently serious or the accused considered to be dangerous, the 
accused may be detained, and there seems no real answer to this.   
3) The third category is of those who while they might be released on bail either don't have 
sufficient security or even if they did they would probably disappear before trial.     For 
this last group what is really needed is not so much locking up but a means of ensuring that 
they won't „disappear‟.  The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the time waiting for the 
case to come to trial is currently far too long.  Tagging when it is perfected may be of 
considerable help particularly if the tag can be contrived which sets off a radio alarm if it is 
interfered with.  Where it is really needed to slow the person down the ankle tag could be 
connect via a 30" steel hawser to a cylinder of steel with a handle at the top.  A 4" diameter 
bar of steel 10" long weighs quite enough to slow most people down.  It can be carried and is 
an inconvenience (but not half as much as being in a cell), clothes can be removed and the 
wearer could take a bath, albeit somewhat awkwardly.  As it costs hundreds of pounds a week 
to imprison someone, who is thereby also prevented from engaging in any normal activities, 
it may not be as bizarre a suggestion as might be thought.  To those who would say how 
demeaning to have to carry this object about, the answer must surely be - perhaps so, but a lot 
less demeaning than being locked up and unable to go anywhere.   
    Prison may therefore be awarded its place in the scale best when we have 
determined what alternatives we might adopt for both the more serious and the less serious 
offenses.  Its place will also be determined by the sort of institution it is.  i.e.  soft and 
comfortable with television, sports facilities and easy access to drugs, or spartan and harsh.  
Again it must be emphasized that the estimation of the harshness of a prison is really 
subjective.  Being forced to watch the banalities of television might by some be considered a 
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Aristotle as the only means of filling their spare time might be similarly appalled, even 
though the latter would at least be constructive.  Perhaps a step forward could be taken by 
providing only educative reading material in prisons. 
    There is no doubt that the place imprisonment has in the system may be 
adjusted quite considerably.  It may well pay to have  both a harsh, and also a less severe but 
educative form, occupying two different positions on the scale. 
FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY. 
    This is a very old form of punishment and one that should be employed far 
more than it is.  There is nothing that annoys the law abiding citizen more, or which reduces 
his respect and trust in the State more, than a failure by the State to punish wrongdoers 
properly.  This is simply because it devalues the status of being law abiding.  Failure to 
punish properly and even more so, allowing the crook to put one over on the State is 
especially reviled.  Thus the idea that the criminal, even if sentenced, walks out of prison to 
enjoy the benefits of the crime is anathema. 
    As mentioned above this is not the sort of punishment that is effective against 
the small time criminal who is probably living a fairly hand to mouth existence, but to a 
degree it is bound to be effective wherever an overall profit has occurred.  The better the 
lifestyle of the criminal the more effective this punishment will be.  To reduce the criminally 
avaricious to penury will be far more effective than a gaol sentence spent, often in an open 
prison, contemplating the benefits accruing on release.  This could be a very effective 
punishment particularly if combined with Banishment or imprisonment of a very 
uncomfortable nature, the duration of which is linked to the return of the money. 
    Again as mentioned before the funds must be followed through to the extent of 
complete bankruptcy, and punishment in the case of non repayment should be 
correspondingly much harsher. 
FORCED LABOUR 
    It seems perfectly reasonable that anyone imprisoned should be required to 
work.  Moreover it would seem sensible that they should be paid the regulation wage for their 
work and that at least a contribution towards their upkeep, equivalent to board and lodging 
should be deducted.  Any surplus would be banked and made available to them on release.  
As a principle this would appear just.  Unfortunately I know of many practical objections that 
could be raised, e.g many prisoners are unskilled or worse still incapable of work, the 
facilities are not available etc., etc.  There is also the problem that other workers may feel that 
their jobs are being taken by prisoners. 214 
 
    Nevertheless the principle is a sound one and where it can be invoked it 
should.  At the very least the cost of the trial and the cost of carrying out the sentence should 
be made known in every case, and wherever possible recovered. 
FINES 
    Fines are one of the oldest forms of punishment, and, when one comes to think 
of it, the preferred form whenever they can properly be used.  This is because  
  1.  They adversely affect the wrongdoer without physically harming him. 
  2.  They can usually be applied with greater speed and the effect is instant. 
  3.  The State benefits from the money received. 
    This last point is of great significance.  As societies become more complex the 
cost of administering their laws escalates.  Any punishment which reduces that cost, instead 
of increasing it, as does prison, must be favoured.  Where fines can run into trouble is when 
the offender has little or no money.  Even this may not be as frequent as it seems, for a 
magistrate of great experience and capable of judging character rather well, would when met 
with a plea of poverty after imposing a fine, reply „You realize, of course that I have the 
authority to have you searched‟.  Almost invariably, he said, this produced a sudden recall 
that they did actually have some money on them, which of course „they owed to a friend‟.  
Equally invariably the sum proved to be far in excess of the fine, which was promptly 
recovered.  “You see" my friend pointed out “that type usually do all their transactions in 
cash, and being of an untrusting disposition they feel that the safest place is to carry it on 
their person". 
    Obviously not all problems are that easily resolved and, as was pointed out 
earlier, there is no point in forcing money from someone who is then going to recoup it from 
the state in the form of assistance.  However if a day in the stocks were assessed as being 
equivalent to, say, £100, we have a viable alternative.  The stocks are used as an example 
because they are cheap to maintain, and no doubt once experienced they would be quite a 
deterrent.  It is absolutely uneconomic putting a relatively small defaulter in prison even for a 
week.  Therefore some cheap alternative has to be found, whether it be labour, the stocks, 
corporal punishment or whatever. 
OPEN LABOUR. 
    The only thing one must emphasize is that even a little light labour has to be 
supervised, is not sufficiently unpleasant, and will almost invariably result in a loss of money 
to the state.  Finally it has virtually no deterrent effect.  There are not enough cesspits left to 
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top of that the unions will complain that their jobs are being taken.  It does seem that the idea 
of labouring as a punishment is slightly flawed.  Most people labour in one way or another 
and therefore one has to devise something that is unpleasant, capable of being done by the 
majority of the offenders convicted, and which is profitable.   
    For certain minor offenses where the person involved is not a hardened 
criminal, the idea of weekend labour camps has been used in some countries.  However what 
form of labour is suitable for intermittent application? How much will it cost to oversee etc.? 
    There does however seem to be one area where work might prove beneficial 
and profitable and that is for the young.  I am particularly thinking of a punishment for 
Vandalism, where clearing up the mess, constructing something useful such as a bus shelter, 
and running errands for or helping the elderly could be beneficial, educational and help to re-
motivate someone who has not yet become a hardened criminal. 
    Much depends on what caused the offence in the first place, but it seems that a 
great deal of trouble is in fact incited by the very nature of modern society.  A youngster with 
apparently no future, under educated, and with nothing to do will almost certainly get into 
trouble.  They may well be dissatisfied with their lot, and object to authority but still not be 
basically bad.  Part of the fault lies with a society where they are constantly brainwashed to 
buy things they don't need but must possess, at prices they can't afford. 
    Here there is an opportunity, for example, to send mature youngsters as part 
of, or to join, an aid team to a very poor country where we are providing aid.  The 
opportunity of being in a remote area where they can see real poverty, not the poverty of not 
being able to afford the latest trainers or other pop icon, but the poverty of not getting enough 
to eat, plus the opportunity of helping relieve suffering is a very powerful force.  No one 
returns from the remoter areas of a backward country the same as they were before.  Even the 
helper's limited education may be greater than that of those they are helping and the act of 
helping may restore their self esteem in a manner which is vital to the making of a good 
citizen.  This may appear contradictory but criminals are not all the same and with some, 
particularly those not fully matured, it may be necessary to raise their self esteem.  With 
others, such as the thug, it may be necessary to do the opposite. 
    The above is not so much a form of punishment but rather a serious 
opportunity for re-education.  It must not be confused with the form of supervised jolly in 
which some youngsters were taken on foreign holidays as a „cure‟.  (Fortunately this appears 
to have created such an uproar when the public found out, that it has been dropped).  The 
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possibly slightly better than those being aided.  Moreover supervision from escape would not 
be needed, there being nowhere to go.  The cost would be absorbed as part of the aid we were 
providing, they would provide really worthwhile help and their wages, less a deduction for 
living expenses, could be given to them on their return, so that they would not face society 
and immediately have to resume life as a supplicant for aid themselves. 
FORFEITURE OF RIGHTS 
    Now this would appear to present many opportunities for further investigation.  
Nowadays we receive so many benefits of membership of our society, and they cost us all so 
much, that it does not seem unreasonable to ask why a person who refuses to obey the rules 
of a society should continue to be able to take advantages of the benefits.  At the most drastic 
end, Citizenship could be revoked and the person deported.  Alternatively they could, as 
discussed above, suffer banishment (Internal or External) for a period.  At a lesser level other 
privileges could be forfeited.  Again much depends on the status and lifestyle of the offender.   
    We already withhold passports and withdraw driving licences so there is no 
reason why these cannot be extended.  A prosperous swindler with a nice lifestyle, but not a 
criminal of the major rank warranting the expense of prison, could well be punished by 
having his driving licence revoked and having to walk about with a large ball and chain 
attached! Bizarre!, but perhaps it might be very effective in getting the money back, 
particularly if accompanied by a warrant of forfeiture of property.  One has to look at the 
psychology of the criminal.  The swindler has done what he has to support his lifestyle and a 
false position in society.  In prison he merely costs us more money.  With a ball and chain he 
doesn't, and his standing, which is what he sought, is destroyed.  Moreover depending on the 
necessity he could be tagged for a number of years. 
    Criminals who pray on the weak and elderly or defraud people of their savings 
are particularly objectionable but though the effect may be the same, their method of 
operation may be quite different.  The crime of intimidation is particularly pernicious because 
the victim is often too frightened to speak out.  Perhaps here is a case where corporal 
punishment may be justified, whereas the confidence man may be more easily dealt with by 
humiliation. 
Again the point which needs to be made is that it is not the form of punishment but the 
appropriateness with respect to the criminal which is going to affect the efficacy of the 
punishment.  In this regard a great deal more psychological insight is going to be required. 
RIDICULE & HUMILIATION 217 
 
    One of the most effective ways of discouraging crime is for the activity to be 
held in low esteem by the general public.  If it is possible to indicate this to the criminal 
without permanently damaging his image, this is prima facie desirable.  It seems highly likely 
to me that in many instances a week in the stocks could prove far more effective than a month 
in prison. 
    As we have seen from the previous section there are various ways of 
inconveniencing, ridiculing and humiliating a criminal.  The manner in which he is treated 
should accord with the view that society takes of the crime.  Today we are faced with a very 
powerful public opinion-former in the guise of Television and the press.  While censorship 
leads to all sorts of difficulties, the creation of crimes such as „The encouragement of 
Criminal Activities’ or „popularization of convicted criminals‟ could be framed, together 
with massive fines. 
    Certainly there is a great deal to be done to re-establish criminal behaviour as 
unacceptable.  It is not only media glorification of the wrongdoer, but the failure of 
influences such as the Church.  The latter was perhaps inevitable once the public woke up to 
the fact that the Christian church historically had displayed an avarice which would have 
made Croesius envious and, with the Inquisition, a disposition to commit crimes which could 
make Hitler look comparatively docile.  Not really the best of role models.  And that is a real 
part of our problem.  We live in an increasingly hedonistic society in which materialism is 
idolized, and education undervalued.  The re-establishment of the idea that criminal 
behaviour is to be despised is a major task in most western civilizations but not one that can 
be developed in this book.  Nevertheless it is vital to a properly organized society, and its 
importance cannot be over emphasized.      Of course there are those who will claim 
that any attempt to alter things will involve a restriction on freedom.  However we have 
already noted that Freedom cannot exist without its concomitant effects.  Perhaps it is time 
we woke up to the fact that the knock on effect of some of our freedoms is too high a price to 
pay.  There are always those who will abuse a freedom and it should be possible to maintain a 
freedom whilst punishing the abuse of the freedom.  This would require dextrous framing of 
laws but it should not be beyond us. 
TREATMENT 
The concept of treatment, except insofar as it can be incorporated as part of any punishment, 
is a subject more fit for medical research.  However there are certain crimes which may be 
the result of a compulsion, e.g.  the child molester, where punishment (currently in the form 
of imprisonment) is proving ineffective.  Although whilst in prison the person is prevented 218 
 
from doing harm, as soon as they are released they will return to their old habits.  Therefore it 
seems that the only hope is to detain them while attempts are made to cure them.  To this end 
they would probably need to be held in a secure medical establishment rather than a prison.  
Fortunately it seems that the uncontrollably criminal are fairly few in number. 
IMMEDIACY:  One of the great features of effective punishment, especially with the young 
or immature is the immediacy of the punishment.  This is where the light chastisement of 
children may occasionally be appropriate.  In the case of adults there is a similar need.  The 
argument that waiting for the thought of impending proceedings is a punishment, is a bad 
one.  In the case of those subsequently found to be innocent it is a gratuitous mental 
punishment.  Where people have been locked up without bail it is expensive and wrong.  No 
case should take more than a month before coming to trial and every effort should be made to 
streamline legal procedures to effect this.  The adoption of an inquisitorial approach to 
determining the truth should certainly form part of this, because, besides its other advantages, 
it has the merit of both parties knowing what is happening. 
    Having reviewed various forms of punishment it does seem obvious that one 
of our problems lies in the complete inflexibility of our system.  Punishments, at present, are 
geared solely to the severity of the offence, and this is quite right when dealing with 
proportionality as to the severity of the punishment.  However when it comes to the type of 
punishment it is arguable that this should depend on the criminal.  To some extent this is 
recognized when dealing with the insane, but it is my argument that it should go very much 
further.  To be effective, the punishment must seriously affect the criminal concerned.  It is 
no good arguing about the dignity of the criminal who has just slashed your face open.  He 
surrendered  his right to dignity with his act. 
SUMMARY 
    If we look back to points I - IV, in the light of the discussion of the various 
Forms of punishment, we see:- 
I.    PUNISHMENTS SHOULD BE PROPORTIONATE.  This proportionality is established 
by the state in establishing both those acts which are to be punishable, and the maximum 
sentences. 
II.   PUNISHMENTS SHOULD BE APPROPRIATE with respect to THE TYPE OF 
CRIMINAL.  Here a great deal of work needs to be done both from a psychological research 
point of view, and a complete revision of available punishments so as to incorporate the 
whole range of those discussed with the exception of mutilation and branding. 
III.  THE ABILITY TO DETER.  Here again the nature and effect of the punishment has to 219 
 
be related to the criminal and his background.  It is no good putting the criminal into a more 
pleasant ambience than his natural one.  To deter it has to be nasty and there is no point in 
being squeamish about admitting this.  The alternative is not to deter! 
 
IV.   THE JUSTNESS OF PUNISHMENT.  This is a vital factor in all punishments.  The 
punishment must not be over harsh or the state merely becomes brutal.  Equally importantly 
the punishment must not be too light, for the sake of the victim and, by inference, the whole 
of the society. 
    The punishment must encompass the additional factors reviewed in the last 
chapter.  These include the retribution factor which may be dealt with by variations within the 
severity of the punishment.  The rectification factor, which is that amount of punishment still 
required even if full compensation has been made..  Finally the much neglected compensation 
of the victims by the criminal must be included.  This part of the punishment should be set 
out separately. 
STATUTORY LIABILITY OFFENSES. 
Punishment as a Regulator.(e.g.  Driving on the left).    There remains that groups offenses 
which result from regulation of the society.  There are all sorts of them and they relate to a 
vast range of subjects from weights and measures, and health and safety regulations, to which 
side of the road one should drive on, the speed at which one should drive, requirements for 
insurance etc., etc. 
    There is no reason why a society should not, and a number of reasons why a 
society should, be regulated.  Usually all the situations regulated are ones where, if they are 
broken, there is a potential danger of harm being done.  The real question is whether the 
breach should be automatically punishable, whether or not harm was done.  The justification 
may well be that the potential harm is so great that it is necessary to train the society not to 
break these particular rules.  In these cases it may be possible to argue for Statutory Liability. 
    In the cases where there is no potential of great harm, or where the harm is 
non existent there is no justification for statutory liability.  The use of this devise when it is 
not necessary brings the law into disrepute and is thus potentially more harmful than might be 
thought. 
    Moreover it could be argued that a great many of these regulations could have 
been encompassed by the case law - For example much of the Trade Descriptions Act could 
have actually been covered by the concept of fraud.  However it can be argued that this would 
have been a cumbersome way of going about things and that it is necessary that people have 220 
 
the  regulations  set  out  so  that  it  is  clear  what  they  are,  and  that  additionally  it  is 
comparatively easy to check them. 
    The  caveats  that  should  be  sounded  are,  first  that  unnecessary  regulation 
encourages breach and this encourages disrespect for the law.  This is made even worse if 
there is an aspect of injustice in the regulations.  Secondly, burgeoning regulation breeds 






























CHAPTER 9.    CONCLUSIONS. 
    I started by showing the necessity of re-establishing the concept of justice as 
standing in its own right, not of trying to isolate applications of justice and then trying to 
work backwards to establish its principles.  The concept of justice, once restored to its pre-
eminent position may then be used to help us solve both moral and legal problems.  Once it is 
appreciated that justice is not merely a virtue but a critical foundation of a civilised society 
we are freed to re-examine problems in a different light. 
    Rather than trying to establish rights to this, and rights to that, such as rights to 
various freedoms, we can regard freedom in its correct light i.e. as a non jural state.  The 
resolution of our problems as to what is and is not permissible then comes from the resolution 
of the question „Is this restriction on my freedom Just?‟  It entirely eliminates the problem 
and emotive inconsistencies of trying to establish a rights based society.  It enables us to 
define rights properly within their jural relations and thus to define our whole legal system 
more accurately along the path first pointed out by both Hohfeld and Kocourek. 
    The correct understanding of Justice and its separation from law permits us to 
examine more clearly our responses to Conscientious Objection and Civil Disobedience. 
    Again  the  understanding  of  justice  is  vital  in  its  applications  to  law, 
particularly  in  the  correct  interpretations  of  foreseeability  and  intentionality  and  the 
establishment of legal rules of intention in criminal cases. 
    In  propounding  a  system  of  inter-relationship  between  Law,  Punishment, 
Freedom and Rights, based on the concept of Justice, one may not solve every conceivable 
problem.  One does however provide a logical foundation for the solution of a great many 
important problems.  Moreover we find that we do not have to introduce artificial factors to 
arrive  at  the  conclusions  we  would  seek  in  accordance  with  today's  political  and  social 
attitudes.  But the principal advantage of this system of approach is that it works, not just for 
our society but for one with a constitution such as the U.S.A.  Also it is irrelevant whether the 
laws are derived under our system or any other such as the code Napoleon. 
    By accepting that Justice itself is involved in the Prime Inherent Law one 
literally remoulds the system so as to allow confluence of certain Natural Law theories with 
Legal Positivism.  In the new system both have to give up something but both gain by the 
result.  In such a system Principles of Justice are potentially more likely (depending on the 
courage of judges) to become converted to rules of Law by adoption by the courts.  But this 
is not a necessary consequence (albeit in my opinion a desirable one), for it will depend on 
the courage and conviction of the judges and the freedom they are permitted under their 222 
 
system of law.  Finally the whole system of law is more easily assessable as to its efficacy 
and also its general acceptability to the public.  Again, while acceptability in the eyes of the 
general public is not a necessary requirement or even a feature of the law, it has been noted 
that  if,  particularly  in  a  free  society,  the  law  comes  to  be  widely  regarded  as  failing  to 
accomplish its ends this will be reflected in a general dissatisfaction with the government, 
with all the consequences that flow from that. 
    We are also able, under this system, to examine issues such as „rights‟ or so 
called „human rights‟ from a different and less emotional viewpoint, and thus the system 
becomes more logical.  We find also that we no longer need complicated constitutions which 
can become out of date within a few years, yet, because of their monolithic structure, proceed 
to stand in the way of progress once their immediate purpose is served.  It is indeed simpler, 
and in my view preferable, to have normal laws which are respected and enforced in order to 
preserve certain rights, rather than to enshrine certain wording with a special status.  That 
merely makes those generalities (and they are almost always in the form of generalities) more 
difficult to change in any way.  This can have a counter productive effect.  It is far better to 
allow a society's most important laws to evolve with changes in circumstances.  Look at the 
problems the U.S.A.  has with its gun laws because of the „right to carry arms‟ contained in 
the constitution.  Imagine if the constitution had been set out a few years earlier and had 
enshrined a slave culture - it could have happened, slavery was only finally abolished in 1888  
- years after the drafting of the U.S.  constitution!  However as I have pointed out, the system 
I have set out does not exclude societies with a constitution (it just won't solve the problems 
they bring on their own heads). 
    At this point it may be as well to take note of the many things that I have not 
sought to do.  I have not set out a general theory of law, yet in some ways I have indicated 
things which would have to be incorporated in any such theory.   In treating the law in a 
positivist manner I have only gone so far.  I do not reject the idea that legislation can, in some 
senses, reflect a general or collective will of the people, but, and let us be very clear about 
this, this is not a necessary objective of the law.  The collective current concept of what is 
just,  will,  in  a  free  society,  feed  back  to  its  legislators.    But this  is  not to  say  that  the 
legislators will or even should automatically enact it.  Thus the law may eventually tend 
towards the will of the people but it is not necessarily the will of the people (not least of all 
because different segments of a multicultural society may have different views).  The law is 
still governed by the will of the State (i.e. those in power) and for a variety of reasons it may 
differ from the apparent collective or majority viewpoint.  In fact as societies grow larger 223 
 
there are always more and more disparate views amongst substantial minorities of the people 
and it will not be possible to satisfy them all. 
    The  duty  of  the  State  or  government  is  towards  providing  for  the  overall 
robustness of the society as a whole and it is not there to try to satisfy the private whims of 
every citizen.  Nor  is  it primarily there to provide  for the citizens'  happiness or even to 
provide facilities for them to attempt to attain happiness themselves.  If it can do so without 
prejudicing other objectives, so much the better, but to have this as a primary object can be 
very counter productive.  A society of content couch potatoes plugged in to the latest placebo 
or soporific is so much easier to control.  Unfortunately when danger strikes they are utterly 
useless. 
    Most societies, particularly highly mobile western societies, comprise many 
disparate parts and views, yet the parts should interact to provide a collective whole.  Law is 
for the governance of, and directed to the benefit of, that whole and not the vacillating whim 
of the individual.  It should however do this with as much justice as it can muster so as to 
provide regulation for the inter action of the citizens with a degree of certainty in the conduct 
of affairs.
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    However before this leads one to conclude that I would maintains that no 
legislation can be objected to except on the grounds that it adversely affects the welfare of the 
group (as opposed to the individual) it follows from  my theory that legislation might be 
objected to on the grounds of its injustice.  The individual as against the state has the right of 
the Prime Inherent Law behind him. 
    On the other hand to claim, as some do, that one has other inherent rights is to 
claim that because I hold a certain moral view I have a right to claim that view as being 
superior to the legislation.  Moreover that I then have a right to try to force that view on the 
State by any means at my disposal.  As I hope I have shown, this private  view may well be 
superior, and it may one day prove to be right, in that it becomes the accepted view, but 
nevertheless the individual view (however superior) does not create a jural relationship giving 
rise to any right properly so called.  What the indi vidual does have is the right of the Prime 
Inherent Law to Justice.  This may spawn individual rights in different circumstances.  For 
                                                 
          113  The fly in the ointment politically is that societies such as ours, who appoint their leaders, almost 
invariably seem (no doubt out of a desire to identify with them) to elect those who are amongst the intellectually 
inferior and who usually otherwise seem to have achieved nothing in life. This is of course compounded by the 
fact that these leaders are chosen from amongst those who want to lead us rather than those who ought to lead us. 
However at this point we are straying into the field of philosophy of governance. 224 
 
example Dworkin refers to individual rights as political trumps held by individuals and that 
individuals have rights when for some reason a collective goal is not a sufficient reason for 
denying them what they wish to have or to do.  But is that not very similar to saying that if 
the collective goal in this case is not sufficient reason for denying the individual, then to deny 
him would amount to an injustice.  That is against the Prime Inherent Law.  Looked at in this 
light  the  original  stand  off  between  Dworkin‟s  viewpoint  and  mine    tends  to  dissolve.  
Although we have come by a different path, I really cannot see that our conclusions with 
respect to any particular case would vary any more than the decisions of two different judges 
might vary in the same case. 
    Moreover, Justice being the criterion of my argument, it will usually turn out 
to be similar, by and large, to the collective viewpoint (with due allowance for the naturally 
conservative nature of most judges).   Obviously there will be minorities whose view of what 
is right or just will not be acceptable because, either it is a view that will never catch on, or it 
is a view which is ahead of its time, but this does not invalidate the theory. 
    My argument with Dworkin appears to boil down to an “s".  He feels that legal 
rights can pre-exist legislation.  But to be a legal right there has to be a law, and if it is not 
brought about by legislation it can only be a “natural Law".  So there would have to be a 
plurality of natural laws each of which would have to have its existence justified.  I have 
propounded what I believe to be the only natural law - The Prime Inherent Law.  From its 
application by virtue of the introduction of the Principles of Justice various decisions will 
arise, but they in fact will all stem from the Prime Inherent Law - the right to Justice.  If there 
were to be other pre-existing natural rights they would of necessity have to spring from other 
natural  laws  and  I  cannot  think  of  any  which  are  readily  sustainable,  or  for  that  matter 
necessary.  If anyone seeks to claim a pre-existing right they will have to show a pre-existing 
natural law, and justify its existence and its right to preference.   
    Furthermore,  as  Power  is  prior  to rights  we  are  entitled  to  ask  from  what 
Power are these claimed rights of Natural Law derived?  There is none that I can see to 
support any individual right over and above that of the law, save Justice whose very existence 
is recognised by the law.  It is the one thing the law cannot credibly deny and the power of 
justice has pervaded the history of man.  Statute Law can of course put a gloss on justice.  It 
can and does, in the name of expediency, deny some applications of justice.  (For example 
there are the cases of Statutory guilt on the grounds of expediency or necessity - Weights and 
measures, Hygiene regulations, Traffic regulations etc.).  It is interesting to note that in most 
cases these relate to comparatively minor offenses. 225 
 
    I have not attempted to deal with Distributive Justice because this is not, in my 
opinion, a strict application of justice.  Views on the distribution of goods vary from the 
concept of each according to their needs, through each according to their ability, merit, effort, 
desert, etc.  At the present time in a free market society wealth is the determining factor in 
most cases.  As to the claim as to which is „just‟ much will depend on one's political views, 
and  these  can  be  quite  subjective.    The  only  non  subjective  solution  would  be  to  effect 
distribution in accordance with whatever manner would be best for the overall „robustness‟ of 
the State. 
    Many people have tried to define society as either rights based or duty based.   
Dworkin points out that there is a difference between:- 
1.     you have a duty not to lie to me because I have a right not to be lied to  -  and 
2.     I have a right not to be lied to because you have a duty not to tell lies. 
    This is because in the first case it is the right which has to be justified and in 
the second it is the duty which has to be justified.  But at this point one must get things clear - 
If we are talking about rights and duties in the Hohfeldian sense the relationship between the 
two is the same.  As Heraclitus would say the way up is the same as the way down.  The path 
is the same, and the top does not cause the bottom any more than the bottom causes the top.  
In the case of the law, Rights and Duties are specified as the lawmakers think fit.  In the case 
of moral claims and moral obligations the argument is irrelevant because they do not create a 
jural relationship and therefore they are totally unenforceable.. 
     To argue about the difference in the relationships between a rights based or a 
duty based society is therefore rather like arguing about whether eggs are chicken based or 
chickens are egg based.  Whichever is established first the relationship thereby caused is the 
same.    However  to  argue  whether  these  relationships  should  be  established  by  virtue  of 
deciding which have priority, i.e a citizen's rights or a citizen's duties, is an absolutely vital 
political question, and the choice will vastly affect the society that results.  Of course it is 
always possible to strike a reasonable mean, and one does not simply have to have one thing 
or the other. 
    The confusion is brought about by the fact that when we talk of human rights, 
as we have the habit of doing, we are in fact talking of moral claims (until established by 
law).  Even so we are talking of moral claims and obligations which are matters founded in 
the concept of justice.    So if we get away once and for all from the jural legal tie up the 
whole thing becomes clearer because in the case of morals and ethics there are no rights 
involving duties and no duties involving rights. - What is left is moral responsibility (the 226 
 
result of a moral claim and a moral obligation - not being governed by a jural relation but by 
the principles of Justice). 
    It is the principles of justice which determine whether a moral claim lies or a 
moral obligation exists in any given circumstances and what is more even if one or the other 
exists THERE IS NO RIGHT TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF EITHER.  The problem is 
how to effect the transposition of the moral decision to the legal where the judges think 
it is appropriate.   Dworkin  is aided  by the  fact that the U.S.  has a constitution.  The 
constitution is not law (some of the signatories who happily owned slaves, like Jefferson who 
had 200, would have been in trouble if it had been law!).  Moreover American judges are 
political animals and that enables Dworkin to use the ingenious method of allowing Hercules 
(his model judge) to interpret the political intentions of the legislature.   
    Sir Herbert Grindit-Fineleigh on the other hand would stoutly deny in any way 
being a political creature, very much the reverse, and would refuse even to try to interpret the 
intentions of „that misbegotten bunch of idiots who spend their time yelling ya-boo at each 
other.‟  (Sir Herbert, when not sitting, having a reputation for expressing himself somewhat 
forcefully).  At that point the door would be slammed firmly against that approach.  What I 
believe I have done though, is to produce a means whereby both can reach the desired result.  
Moreover the principle can be applied to other forms of law as well, and opens a proper 
means for the assimilation of the Natural law position.  It also does not prevent Hercules' 
interpretation from being coloured by the inclusion of a consideration of legal intention.  In 
practice that means simply that Hercules' law may change a little more quickly, which again 
is arguably no bad thing (despite a muffled snort in the background from Sir Herbert). 
    As I have said the confusion has grown up through general misuse of language 
plus the fact that writers of constitutions have always played it loud on the Rights and soft 
pedalled  wildly  when  it  came  to  duties  (the  latter  being  a  far  less  politically  saleable 
commodity than the former).  Empedocles was certainly not confused:- 
“Particular law is the law which each community lays down and applies to its own 
members:  this is partly written and partly unwritten.  Universal law is law by nature.  
For there really is as everyone to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice 
that is common to all, even to those who have no association or covenant with 
each other.  It is this that Sophocles' Antigone evidently means when she says that 
the burial of Polyneices was a just act even though it was forbidden: she means that it 
was just by nature." (emphasis mine) 
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    Empedocles related Universal law, as he described it, to Justice, so, in a sense, 
what I am doing has a very distinguished foundation.  Of course, as I have pointed out, views 
of Justice change and mature, and the moral duties and responsibilities derived from justice 
become rights and duties as they become incorporated into the law. 
     So far we have seen that where in our society there is a jural relation we may 
use the rights and duties thereby imposed to resolve the matter.  In anomic situations we look 
to the Power / responsibility relation to determine the moral obligations in accordance with 
our concept of justice.  This moral obligation establishes the duty of care the powerful owe to 
the weak in the just conduct of their affairs. 
    Apart from the Individual responsibility which may best be expressed as a 
duty of care brought about by exercises of paucital power (Individual action between people) 
there  is  a  duty  of  care  which  lies  as  a  result  of  multital  acts  of  power  (State  Action  or 
legislation).  This comes about by virtue of the necessity for the State to act justly in order to 
merit  being  civilized.    Thus  the  citizen  member  of  that  State  is  entitled  to  invoke  the 
principles of justice in relation to the State. 
    This still leaves us to consider whether there is such a thing as a duty of care 
by the community towards its individual members.  This is quite different from the question 
of the requirements of justice so far considered.  It is a further anomic situation and relates to 
the question as to how far I should be my brother's keeper.  We have seen that where there is 
a power relationship responsibility flows, e.g.  parent / child; animal / keeper etc.  However if 
my neighbour falls and breaks his leg, to what extent am I obligated to help? And this is 
where the difference between a rights based society and a duty based and a justice based 
society will show up. 
    Those basing their concepts on rights may say „Those who are ill have a right 
to help‟.  At this stage they promptly avoid the duty themselves by virtually saying as it is a 
general right, it is up to the State to assume the duty.  In a duty based society it would be our 
duty to help those who are ill.  We may discharge the duty by paying for a national health 
care service, but there is a very distinct change of emphasis.  The first is regarded as a natural 
right and because of its universality it ceases to be an individual responsibility.  In the second 
case it is very much because of an individually felt duty of care that we may construct a 
generalized solution.  However, What establishes that duty of care in the first place?   In 
France, if there is a situation in which one can render aid (one is a passing doctor) one is 
legally required to do so.  In England one may cheerfully walk by on the other side. 
    The answers to these questions should be found by resolving what is thought 228 
 
to be morally right (just) in each case.  So the question becomes is it right (just) that someone 
who could help should pass by? Looked at in this way the French seem to be more civilized 
than we.  We may be stopped because of our fear that the other person will claim, in the event 
that we are not successful in our help, that we have impaired their right to be properly treated 
and sue us for negligence.  Our rights approach has reached the point, particularly in the 
U.S.A., that there  is  now  such  a  litigious  society  that  there  is,  for  example,  a  dearth  of 
gynaecologists because if the slightest thing goes wrong they get sued.  Medical and legal 
Insurance premiums have reached the point where they actually force people out of practice.   
    The difference comes about because rights claimed are regarded as absolute 
and involve legal enforceability.  Duties on the other hand, unless they are a specific duty 
(flowing from the correlative of a right) are generally regarded as anomic or moral.  Now, 
however strong a moral duty may be it can never be performed other than to the best of our 
ability.  It is this difference that makes the concept of starting with rights pernicious.  It is 
also the excuse for lumping the duties resulting from rights off onto the State.  It is thus far 
better, and ultimately less contentious, to determine to what extent it is just to impose a duty, 
and, having done this, to derive any necessary right from this.  In short I am saying that a 
duty based society will inevitably be superior to a rights based society. 
  In the old days of small units, the community was virtually the State, and the two 
were thus synonymous.  As the size of populations and the State grew larger and larger into 
millions it began to have discernable differences caused purely by its size.  Moreover it had 
additional differences between communities within the same state.  This leads us to a number 
of problems.  For example the large state may not be able to care for every stray dog or even 
know about them, whereas the small community did, and would decide either to drive them 
off or care for them. 
    Similarly  where  the  state  becomes  so  large  that  it  includes  a  plurality  of 
communities some of which may have opposing views on a variety of matters, it may be 
impossible to cater equitably for all of them.  In a rights based society the citizens tend to 
foist their responsibility onto the state.  I believe that a state can only be expected to have a 
duty of care in those areas for which it has assumed power.  Therefore there will be areas for 
which a community conscience will have to provide the answers, as indeed it does by the 
provision of so many charities.   These charities are motivated by a moral duty of care not a 
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